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Of Clouds and Bodies: Film and the Dislocation of Vision in Brazilian and Japanese 
Interwar Avant-gardes examines the political impact of film in conceptualizations of 
the body, vision, and movement in the 1920s and 1930s avant-gardes of Brazil and 
Japan. Through photographs, films, and different textual genres—travel diary, 
screenplay, theoretical essay, movie criticism, novel—I investigate the similar political 
role played by film in these “non-Western” avant-gardes in their relation to the idea of 
modernity, usually equivalent to that of the “West.” I explore racial, political, and 
historical entanglements that emerge when debates on aesthetic form encounters the 
filmic medium, theorized and experienced by the so-called “non-Western” spectator. 
Through avant-garde films such as Mário Peixoto’s Limite (1930), and Kinugasa 
Teinosuke’s A Page of Madness (1926); the theorizations of Octávio de Faria and 
Tanizaki Jun’ichirō; and the photographs and writings by Mário de Andrade and 
Murayama Tomoyoshi, this dissertation follows the clash between the desire for a 
universal and disembodied vision, and the encounter with filmic perception. I argue that 
the filmic apparatus, as a technology and a commodity, emphasizes an embodied and 
localized experience of vision and time that revealed the discourse on cultural-historical 
  iv 
difference—the distinction between West and Rest, or modern and non-modern—as a 
suppressive modulator of material power dynamics embedded in racial, class, and 
gender hierarchies enjoyed by the cosmopolitan elite in the “peripheral” spaces. The 
temporality of filmic perception becomes a problem for the avant-garde program of 
“moving forward.” The dissertation is punctuated with images that traveled across 
national territories, building a political theory of the technical image that takes into 
consideration the experience of a displaced spectatorship: transnational, in racially 
marked bodies, and within discourses of historical belatedness. Comparing two 
disparate spaces through a mobile medium that represents movement, I explore the 
possibilities and limits of nation-bound comparison and area studies, while contributing 
to debates in film and media theory.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Comparison and World-Mapping: the modern problem of film 
It has become a common discourse in the twenty-first century that new media 
have shortened distances and consolidated what Marshall McLuhan famously called 
the “global village.” This dissertation looks back at almost a century ago, to the 1920s 
and 1930s, when a similar discourse circulated across different continents with the 
establishment of new medium of film and its moving images. One very basic premise 
of this dissertation is that new media always carry with them promises and fears of 
radical change of space-time relations that disorganize our understanding of the world 
and its social relations.  
The perceptual shift caused by the technical image of film and photography 
has been widely theorized in what are now canonical works of critical theory from the 
twentieth century. In Europe, during the 1920s and 1930s, Walter Benjamin’s work, 
alongside his fellow Frankfurter Siegfried Kracauer, have been crucial to argue for the 
political implications that media technologies introduce to the human sensorial 
apparatus.1 Emerging media make clear that the body is implicated in many ways in 
the political shaping of the world. Different forms of experiencing and theorizing time, 
the public sphere, perception, and the process of capitalist commodification were 
brought about by the technical image and the culture industry that flourished through 
                                                 
1 See, for example Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction”, Illuminations, 2007; and Siegfried Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: 
Weimar Essays, 1995. 
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it. I take these as a starting point, in order to inquire how these perceptual changes 
worked in the geopolitical imagination of the modern world mapping, its epistemic 
and material separations, and what sort of political-theoretical proposition they allow 
for.  
In the early twentieth century, with the development of the filmic apparatus 
and its industry, film raised a number of hopes, desires, and frustrations in relation to 
the way non-“Western” nations were placed—temporally, politically, culturally—in 
the world-mapping. On the one hand, for the white metropolitan spectators, film’s 
evidentiary power worked to confirm their modernity, feeding into the curiosity for 
“primitive” and distant subjects to be captured and abstracted into the Eurocentric 
modern mapping; on the other hand, those same “primitive” subjects that were filmed 
and brought as image to the metropole were themselves spectators who saw the 
images of Hollywood and European cinema as an evidence of their belatedness, 
creating a sense of longing for a modern future that, albeit coeval, was felt as 
geographically distant. Filmic eloquent indexicality legitimized difference by giving it 
visibility—it reaffirmed a certain world-mapping by being a machine that provoked 
comparison.   
But the division between modern and Other, “Western” and “non-Western” is 
not self-evident and devoid of its own political nuances. It is important to remember 
that the handling of anthropological difference and the teleological discourse on 
modernity is usually carried out not only by the metropolitan powers, but also by local 
cosmopolitan elites, who saw themselves as local representatives of the modern ethos 
and its new mode of life. In this sense, this dissertation understands that the discourse 
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on cultural-historical difference—the distinction between West and Rest, or modern 
and non-modern—functions to suppress material dynamics of power embedded in 
racial, class, and gender hierarchies that surpass national boundaries. Epistemic and 
anthropological difference usually have their material implications in forms of capital 
accumulation, labor abstraction, and political subjugation. A claim that is latent 
throughout the chapters is that such a power dynamics also inform the avant-garde as a 
practice and as an idea, especially when it is displaced and travels to the peripheral 
spaces as a mode of discourse and an object of desire, serving as a tool for the 
modernizing paradigm to be implemented within the avant-garde discourse. 
Looking into various objects, genres, and media—photography, film, literature, 
theoretical essay, travel diary, screenplay, manifestoes—I argue that the new 
perceptual experience brought about by cinema operated a potential disruption of the 
anthropological difference that film’s very circulation promoted. It, at once, confirms 
and questions the metaphysics of identity. Bringing to a critical dialogue film-
phenomenology, theories of the image, Marxist critique, and critical race theory, I 
pursue the instances in which these two poles—the aesthetic experience and 
commodification of the visible—are in tension. This tension is precisely what opens 
up the space for political dislocations and frictions. 
Such a space is related to what I call, in chapter one, the “anthropological 
ambivalence” that film did not create, but emphasized as a particularity of the position 
occupied by the peripheral avant-garde: the cosmopolitan elite that, through the 
encounter with film, encounter themselves as the Other to the modern they desire to 
be. In Brazil and in Japan, this means being and not being “the tropical” and “the 
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Oriental,” the colonizer and the colonized, categories of difference that carry also 
geographic, historical, and racial connotations.  
This “anthropological ambivalence” feeds into the desire for universality that 
emerges in several objects analyzed here as a promise enabled by film. Be it in the 
speculations on the future of the medium by Octávio de Faria and Tanizaki Jun’ichirō 
discussed in chapter one, the avant-garde filmic experiments Limite (directed by Mário 
Peixoto, 1931) and A Page of Madness (Kurutta Ichipēji, directed by Kinugasa 
Teinosuke, 1926) in chapter two, or the theories and images of Murayama Tomoyoshi 
and Mário de Andrade in chapters three and four, the desire and impossibility of a 
universal humanity defines a field of tensions and anxieties established by the relation 
between perception, image, and the apparatus of film. The fact that the novelty of film 
was related to its promise of a universal type of perception appear, in different 
modulations, in all chapters. And that is precisely where and when vision and 
perception become political issues attached to the relation between technology, image, 
and body. 
 
Vision, Movement, Body 
What does it mean to see?  This question is another important thread to 
navigate the debates in this dissertation. The objects here analyzed usually mobilize, 
oscillating or modulating, two discourses on vision that make up their “geopolitics of 
perception.” The first one is the body/eye split, part of a modern hierarchy of the 
senses that privileges sight over the other senses. Because seeing is an activity that can 
be done from afar, the paradigm goes, it would be more suitable for reason and its 
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analytic faculties. The myth of objectivity, which informed the scientific endeavor that 
paved the way to photography and cinema, is also the myth of the superiority of 
visibility. This paradigm is also a discourse on the body, whose flows of desires and 
sensations would be seen as an impure obstacle to knowledge.  
Silent cinema provided an experience that seemed to accommodate such desire 
for a pure visuality. In chapter one and chapter two, the theories and films discussed 
are in direct relation to such a project of purification of vision. Octávio de Faria, Mário 
Peixoto, and Kinugasa Teinosuke were defenders of a modern visuality that excluded 
the “intrusion” of the verbal—written or in sound—into the realm of the visual. 
Subscribing to the hierarchy of the senses, they saw film as an opportunity to reaffirm 
and refine the separation of the eye from the body, producing an experience of 
transcendentality and atemporality that was seen, at the same time, as the epitome of 
modernity.  
Such an aesthetic-sensorial split had a geopolitical task for them. If the 
cosmopolitan elite felt the burden of locality—being “tropical,” “Oriental,” non-
modern—filmic visuality was seen as an opportunity to achieve a universality in the 
sensorial dimension, as a liberation from the restrictive and localized body, stuck in 
the periphery in space and time. As I discuss in chapter one, Octávio de Faria provides 
a sophisticated theorization of film as a producer of a disembodied eye and a universal 
life, drawing from a particular reading of Henri Bergson’s philosophy of movement 
and duration, to which Tanizaki Jun’ichirō presents an alternative through his material 
understanding of the filmic image and its sensorial impact on the body. 
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The dissertation follows the encounter with the body, even in the occasions 
where the body was unwelcome, through the temporality of perception. It thus argues 
that filmic perception provides a privileged site to examine the temporal delay 
intrinsic to perception, which is produced by the mediation of the body, since the 
assemblage of movement happens precisely because one frame merges with another: 
they overlap because perception takes time. The defining aspect of the medium—its 
capture of movement—is also what makes it important to think the temporalities of the 
body, rather than being an evidence for the immediacy of the technology. In chapter 
two, where I read closely the two most notorious (sometimes seen as the only ones) 
avant-garde films from the silent era in Brazil and Japan, Mário Peixoto’s Limite and 
Kinugasa Teinosuke’s A Page of Madness, this disjunctive temporality of embodied 
perception emerges through the desired atemporal purified visuality. 
 Following the eye/body split, since vision is bourgeois, detached, and 
disembodied, the second paradigm claims that it would be necessary to reject visuality 
altogether in order to build a political art. The seeing/acting split represents a 
fundamental question for the development of political avant-gardes in the twentieth-
century—film and other arts, in Europe and United States, but also in Brazil and 
Japan.2 To see, in this sense, would be the opposite of to do. This paradigm could be 
traced back to Plato’s critique in the myth of the cave, and has found important echoes 
                                                 
2 See Pedro Erber, Breaching the Frame: the Rise of Contemporary Art in Brazil and 
Japan, 2015, for an account on the problem of participation in Brazil and Japan 1960s 
avant-gardes. About film, see Yuriko Furuhata’s Cinema of Actuality: Japanese 
Avant-Garde Filmmaking in the Season of Image Politics, 2013, on the problem of 
participation in the 1960s and 1970s Japanese filmic avant-garde. 
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in twentieth-century thought and art, to name a few, in Hannah Arendt’s political 
theory, Soviet formalism, post-1968 international avant-gardes, guerilla cinema, and 
still constitutes part of the guilty consciousness displayed by politically engaged film 
theory. In this dissertation, such a paradigm is most emphatically represented by 
Murayama Tomoyoshi, discussed in chapter three, but its implication finds echoes in 
all chapters.  
According to this paradigm, seeing would be a passive activity of “only 
looking,” something that political art needs to fight against. This has created the 
occasional demand that one does not merely see but touches and feels, as in theories of 
haptic visuality, which, on their flip-side, bring back in different clothes the 1970s 
paradigm that affirms that only looking is not enough (when they do not overtly 
deploy the Orientalist division of tactile primitive / optical modern that finds its most 
notorious iteration in Aloïs Riegl’s theory of haptic visuality, with echoes in Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s model of the nomadic hapticity).3 What could be seen as 
opposite to the eye/body split is actually its development. Here in this dissertation, I 
take the opposite route and affirm, by a counter-reading, that filmic perception shows 
that by only looking important political dislocations take place.  
Through the shift that filmic perception brings to the experience of 
movement—a movement that is constituted within an immobile body—the injunction 
                                                 
3 Aloïs Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry, 1985; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, 2009. See, on haptic visuality and the paradigm of the  Laura Marks, Touch: 
Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media, 2002; Laura Marks, The Skin of the Film, 
2000; Jennifer Barker, The tactile eye: touch and the cinematic experience, 2009; 
Giuliana Bruno, Surface: Matters of Aesthetics, Materiality, and Media, 2014.  
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to motor action is also displaced. In Murayama Tomoyoshi, as we see in chapter three, 
the demand of action is modulated by the understanding of one’s racialized body and 
the filmic movement on screen; whereas in Mário de Andrade, the filmic situation 
finds an analogy in the malarial gaze of the Amazonian body, opening a different 
politics of seeing that requires a type movement that is not contingent upon the acting, 
but rather the not-acting and “just looking.” Filmic perception functions to highlight 
that the freedom of movement is, itself, a privilege granted to the bourgeois avant-
garde subject, subsumed in the structures of capital circulation and the modern world-
historical mapping. 
 
Structure by chapter 
In Chapter One, I look into two theorizations of the future of film. Octávio de 
Faria, in Brazil, and Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, in Japan, wrote imaginative theories for the 
future of a medium that seemed to be coming from a foreign, “Western” modernity. 
They produce two radically different propositions for a theory of the moving image, 
each having the place of the body as a central problem. Faria, a conservative 
intellectual, turns to Soviet theory as a non-Western model for the development of 
film in Brazil, but erases all revolutionary politics from it. A devotee of the image in 
opposition to the verbal, he theorizes an “absolute visuality,” purified from both 
politics and the body, in a transcendental and universal mode of image that only film 
would enable. Modernist writer and film enthusiast Tanizaki, on the other hand, 
proposes an understanding of the filmic image centered on the close-up, highlighting 
film’s sensorial disorientation that stems from its interruptive material qualities: the 
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fact that it is made of photograms, which enables film to be captured by commodity 
fetishism. Tanizaki understands the filmic image as a diffuse object, whose movement 
comes into being by the interruption of light by the screen, thus residing in the 
spectator’s body and desires. Faced with the racialization of the Asian body and the 
“complex of whiteness” that the commerce of film had brought to the Japanese 
screens, Tanizaki’s material theory of the image is fully contingent upon the 
acknowledgment of the body and of capitalist material relations. The chapter thus 
provides two theoretical strategies that have the body—its absence or presence—as a 
central piece to different politics of time and image. These two poles set the main 
framework for the following chapters. 
 Chapter Two turns its attention to two films—Limite, by Mário Peixoto (1931), 
and A Page of Madness, by Kinugasa Teinosuke (1926)—balancing film analysis with 
readings of other materials related to the films, in dialogue with film-phenomenology. 
The two films occupy a very particular place both in national and world film history: 
they are considered the first and only experimental avant-garde films of their 
countries, they were both lost for decades, and they have always been received with 
astonishment and perplexity. These “fossils of the avant-garde” have been exposed to 
several layers of discourses that placed them as avant-garde objects precisely for the 
fact that they seemed very similar to avant-garde European cinema. Both films follow 
vague plots that deal with situations of physical restriction: a boat adrift in the sea, and 
a mental hospital. Interestingly, both have the very act of filmic vision as an object of 
fascination, which is conveyed by the way they experiment and manipulate their own 
material constitution—or their own “film-bodies,” a term borrowed from Vivian 
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Sobchack—to highlight the autonomy that the camera and the montage provide to the 
phenomenon of sight as independent from the human body. They were also both 
products of modernist aesthetic agendas—the Chaplin Club in Brazil, and the New 
Perception School (Shinkankakuha) in Japan—that advocated for a modern aesthetic 
form that would produce direct, immediate, and pure forms of address. I read them as 
experiments on vision that push to the limit the capacity of film to capture movement, 
producing a “masochistic spectator” that waits for a full visibility only to be frustrated. 
Once again, their political proposition comes precisely from their failure to fulfil 
immediacy, revealing that the temporality of perception entails a delay that is the 
temporality of the spectator’s body. 
 Chapters Three and Four establish a dialogue around the question of movement 
and political action. In Chapter Three, I read the political aesthetic theory of Japanese 
avant-garde multimedia artist and theorist Murayama Tomoyoshi, who was at once 
against and fascinated by film. Murayama’s theory of art placed the physical presence 
of objects and bodies as central for art to be political, a feature that cinema lacked. 
Paradoxically, however, it is through film that Murayama states the belatedness and 
un-modern aspect of Japan and the Japanese bodies, which, simultaneously, places 
him as the racial Other but also as the cosmopolitan intellectual entitled to teach his 
nationals how to improve towards modernity. By reading him against Vilém Flusser’s 
theory of the technical image, which proposes indeterminacy as its central 
characteristic, I see how, in Murayama’s late texts on filmic sensorial realism and its 
unsettling relation to history, his encounter with filmic movement goes counter to his 
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demand of a will to act and move history forward, dislocating the place of agency 
through the immobile experience of duration.  
  Finally, in Chapter Four, I read film essays, aesthetic theory, and the last novel 
written by avant-garde intellectual Mário de Andrade, along with the travel diary and 
photographs he produced in his ethnographic trip to the Brazilian and Peruvian 
Amazon. One of the few of his generation to pay attention to film, Andrade was also 
caught in the place of the peripheral intellectual with the mission to modernize his 
nation. An active member of the Brazilian avant-garde and a public intellectual, he 
was engaged in ethnographic explorations of Brazilian folkore that would inform the 
project of bringing modernity to Brazil. Closely looking at his photographs, his travel 
notes, and his theoretical writings, I follow how he finds in photography a mode of 
filmic vision that he theorizes as the “malarial gaze”: a “cloud-like” dialectical 
immobile-mobile gaze that is an embodied uptake of the world. I argue that impact of 
the photographic and filmic mediation in Andrade disrupts his initial endeavor to map 
the primitive in the backlands of Brazil and produce modernity, finally leading him to 
the realization of his double position of an “internal colonizer” just as much as a 
“peripheral” colonized subject. It provides a productive framework through which to 
read the aporias of the avant-garde in relation to questions of the aesthetic dimension 
of biopolitics, nation-building, and the teleological modern historicism.  
 In each of the four chapters, the idea of movement is transformed by the 
experience of film, dislocating what it means to see. Such dislocation brings to the 
surface political questions related to the temporality of perception, the role of the body 
and of affect, and the place of the “peripheral” cosmopolitan avant-garde. The 
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chapters can be read as a sort of montage of theoretical speculations that work as an 
intervention in both the historical image of the peripheral avant-gardes, usually seen in 
positive and unproblematic lights, and also in film theory debates. What it does not 
want to claim is that an “indigenous” theory from the periphery is ontologically 
different from the theory of the metropole, or, to that matter, the “same.” Instead, the 
point is quite the opposite: it understands theory as a relation. All theory illuminates 
political relations of power, even when it wants to repress them. By taking up the 
comparative apparatus of film, the dissertation hopes to show the limits of the 
comparative regime of modernity, in order to contribute to the critique of the 
metaphysics of cultural difference that animates the geopolitics of film history—and 
of cultural history as a whole—and propose a different political understanding of 
embodied modes of engagement. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE FUTURE OF A MEDIUM: TWO PROPOSITIONS 
 
“Thus each day film further defines its means of expression. An eye that lowers before 
another, a hand that twitches, a smile beneath a mourning veil that one experiences, a 
pair of shoes that instead of merely removed from one’s way are thrown far with a 
thrust of the foot, a criminal that soaks the finger in milk to feed a kitty, the spark of a 
light bulb in a lamp that brings one’s thought to the desired jewel… and film each day 
acquires means to speak to the spirit through the eyes.” (Faria, “Eu acredito na 
imagem” 2) 
 
“The human face, no matter how unsightly the face may be, is such that, when one 
stares intently at it, one feels that somehow, somewhere, it conceals a kind of sacred, 
exalted, eternal beauty. When I gaze on faces in “enlargement” within moving 
pictures, I feel this quite profoundly. Every aspect of the person’s face and body, 
aspects that would ordinarily be overlooked, is perceived so keenly and urgently that it 
exerts a fascination difficult to put into words.” (Tanizaki, “Mr. Aozuka’s Story” 236) 
 
 
 
Universals; apparatuses 
The dream of a universal spectator, a predominant discourse used to validate 
cinema in its early narrative years, gave fuel to an image of the medium as the first 
platform in which language would not be a barrier for universal understanding. The 
(filmic) visual would be understood as the opposite of the verbal, just as the drive to 
realism, which justified synchronized sound, would be opposite to the drive for 
communication, which required the absence of dialogue. Of course, needless to say, 
the Griffithian dream of the universal medium—the overcoming of the Babel tower 
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through film—was embedded in the structures of imperialism and capitalism, 
privileging the paradigm of the so-called “Western” as the universalizable spectator.4  
However, in the sites of encounter—the movie theaters—these images gave 
new visibility to a politics of perception, which revealed the vicissitudes of difference 
in the dream of the universal. Geopolitical mapping, capitalist infrastructures, and 
embodied experience met in the differences inhabited by the filmic spectator in and 
within the global epistemic “periphery,” be it the “tropics” or the “Orient.” The filmic 
experience entailed transformations in the perceptual engagement of the body with the 
world, carrying multiple political implications on conceptualizations of vision and 
body, the relation between image and time, and the location of different bodies—on 
and off-screen—in the geopolitical historical structure of modernity.  
In this chapter, I will explore how different theorizations of filmic vision 
negotiated the complex of not-being “Western” in the speculations and desires for the 
future of film, which catalyzed important question of the politics of time and of 
perception around the moving image. I will focus on moments in which film was 
theorized as an unfinished medium in Brazil and Japan, both places where, in the early 
twentieth century, an international division of (visual) labor was very marked: those 
who were spectators to a foreign modernity on the screen (local consumers of 
images), and those who were seen by those who needed to learn how to be modern 
(global producers of images). The awareness of being “outside”, in the words of 
Brazilian film theorist and writer Octávio de Faria, “with the impassivity of the always 
belated spectators,” brings “non-Western-ness” into the frame as a particular relation 
                                                 
4 See Miriam Hansen, Babel and Babylon, 1991. 
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with history that is reiterated in the way that the medium is theorized as something yet 
to happen. (Faria, “I believe in the image” 3)5 The desire for a universal mode of 
being, of showing, and of seeing gained strength with the apparatus of film.  
The notion of apparatus is useful to think the implications of the different 
understandings of filmic perception proposed by the texts addressed here. Philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben suggests that, in Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist rejection of 
“universals”—State, Law, Sovereignty, and so on—what takes the place of the 
universal is the concept of “apparatus” (dispositif), understood as 
 
not simply this or that police measure, this or that technology of power, and 
not even the generality obtained by their abstraction. Instead, as he claims in 
the interview from 1977, an apparatus is "the network [le reseau] that can be 
established between these elements. (Agamben 7)  
 
An apparatus, being a network, is difficult to grasp in one single theoretical 
proposition. In the Foucauldian hypothesis, argues Agamben, it is from the relation 
and “relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses” that subjects are 
produced. (14) If we take the network analogy to its limit, each point in time and space 
of an apparatus—dispositif—will reveal a different constitution of relations—a 
“constellation,” to use a Benjaminian terminology—that will produce its subjects from 
particularly localized relations. As a dispositif, the apparatus is a technology of 
production, a set of subjectifying power technologies that build relations that are only 
                                                 
5 All of Faria’s quotes are my translations from Portuguese. 
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universalizable in the fact that they are all contingent upon the place and time one 
occupies. 
In film theory, the concept of apparatus comes from the Althusserian lineage—
instead of dispositif, appareil in French—through Jean-Louis Baudry’s definition of 
film as an apparatus for the reproduction of ideology.6 Baudry’s “apparatus theory” 
pays attention to the optical constitution of classical narrative cinema—centralized 
artificial perspective, framing, camera movement, continuity montage—and material 
situation of its spectatorship—dark room, screen projection—to address classical 
cinema as a machine of abstraction of ideological surplus through the production of 
transcendental subjects around whom the filmic world is centered, whose “eye which 
moves is no longer fettered by a body, by the laws of matter and time, if there are no 
more assignable limits to its displacement” (Baudry 43). The desire for the universal, 
within the ideological-phenomenological apparatus, is fulfilled by the production of a 
disembodied transcendental spectator reduced to an eye: “the world will not only be 
constituted by this eye but for it” (Baudry 43). As an appareil, the apparatus is a 
machine of abstraction, understood as universalizing technology that responds to the 
ideological constitution of a mass individuality, carried out by film and its effects. 
Cinema is an apparatus, both as a dispositif and as an appareil: it is a network 
of localized practices and discourses, and a technology of power; it is a material 
situation, and a cluster of desires; it is particularizing and universalizing. Any theory 
of the image—here, the filmic image—will necessarily imply its insertion in the two 
                                                 
6 See Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus,” 1974-
1975. 
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circuits—of production and of abstraction—built upon a definition or tacit assumption 
of what perception is; that is, the relation between apparatus, image, and body. It is 
with this intercrossing that this chapter is concerned. In these “peripheral” 
theorizations on film, the geopolitics of modern historicism—the teleological 
discourse of belatedness—becomes intertwined with a politics of perception through 
its “anthropological dimension”: the relation between the spectator’s body and the 
bodies on screen. This is what I call a “geopolitics of perception.” 
Reading Octávio de Faria’s film theory from the pages of the short-lived 
Brazilian journal O Fan in the late 1920’s, and the theoretical imaginations on the 
medium by Japanese novelist and screenwriter Tanizaki Jun’ichiro from the late 1910s 
to the 1920s, I will examine this “geopolitics of perception,” which brings together 
aesthetics, politics, and historicity in a discourse on visual mediation, alongside the 
“anthropological” questions it raised. What does seeing entail? What is its 
temporality? What sort of futurity does the image carry? What does it bring to the 
peripheral modernist elite, white and non-white? In both cases, image, mediation, and 
apparatus are theorized and negotiated always in relation to the question of the 
(im)possibility of a universal perceptual experience. Their thought about filmic 
perception reveals the anxieties with the discourse of being “outside” Western 
modernity, while the theoretical strategies deployed to circumvent such anxieties 
reveal the aporias and pitfalls of such modern Eurocentric discourse. In both cases, 
what emerges are cleavages of race, gender, and class, that get hidden under the 
dichotomy of West-Rest. Understanding the imbrication of aesthetic and political 
discourses revolving around film, this chapter addresses these questions as they 
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become intertwined with one another, dislocating the metaphysics of cultural-national 
difference. 
 
The Eye and the No-body: displacing Soviet theory 
In 1920’s Brazil, movie-going was already an important element of the modern 
ethos that the big cities liked to showcase. Alongside urban reforms, mass media, and 
increasing industrialization, film was a technology that could carry several layers of 
meaning and value at once—entertainment, cultural capital, commodity, technological 
advancement—which fit well the paradoxical position that modernity itself occupied 
in common Brazilian imaginary, not unlike other non-Western spaces. As Rielle 
Navitski points out, since the early years of the twentieth century, “in Brazil’s 
expanding cities, the overwhelming and enervating qualities of a highly industrialized 
metropolis were as much an object of longing as an element of daily experience” 
(128). The apparatus of film was a repository of these contradictory and super-
imposed temporalities: through its eloquent verisimilitude and technological realism, it 
projected the desired future as an already-present on the screen images. With moving 
images coming from mostly France and the United States, alongside the always 
contentious issue of the shaping and viability of “national cinema,” film was new 
enough to be an open-ended technology that summed to the senses not only what 
modernity was but, most importantly, what it could be. 
Although a few modernist intellectuals, such as Mário de Andrade,7 were 
familiar with some writings of European film theory and had cinema as a model for a 
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion of Mário de Andrade, see chapter four. 
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modern type of perception, one of the first focused endeavors to theorize film in Brazil 
was carried out in the pages of the journal O Fan, which was written and published by 
the Rio de Janeiro film club called Chaplin Club, initially comprised by four members 
(Octávio de Faria, Plinio Sussekind Rocha, Claudio Mello, Almir Castro). The group’s 
activities included the screening of films from the European avant-gardes; reading, 
debating, and producing film theory from a Brazilian perspective; and to think the role 
of criticism in the shaping of the future of film. As a politically conservative group of 
young elite intellectuals, they were nonetheless responsible for the first translations 
into Portuguese of Soviet montage theory, creating a discourse that set out to theorize 
the specificity of film—both as a narrative form and a technology—in the particular 
context of early twentieth-century modernizing Brazil.  
Long forgotten in the history of film and aesthetic theory, Octávio de Faria’s 
theoretical writings on the pages of O Fan are major endeavors of a film theory 
produced in Brazil, set up in dialogue with—and in difference from—theories coming 
from France, mainly, and Russia. A prolific intellectual, who wrote sociological 
treatises and novels, Faria figures among the first to see in film a serious object of 
theoretical, aesthetic, and political inquiry. His intensely argued theoretical thought 
modulates the relation between image and time through a territorialized 
spectatorship—seeing from the distance of Brazil—, negotiating tensions and 
paradoxes in the way that the filmic technology is conceptualized and theorized by 
him as a desired medium to come.  
Cinema represents a fascination and a problem repeatedly revisited by Octávio 
de Faria. In his texts, what is pressingly at stake is the shaping of the future of the 
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medium, which was not only contingent upon the shaping of the future of the world, 
but determinant to it.8 Through a medium that seemed to still be “unfinished,” Faria—
with his peers in O Fan—is concerned with the ongoing process of North-
Americanization of film, and, more importantly, with the advent of the talkies and 
what seemed to be a path away from pure filmic visuality. In the cusp of one of the 
biggest technological shifts in film history—the possibility of synchronized sound and 
dialogue, first with the sound-on-disc Vitaphone system, and later with sound-on-
film—the future of film, and of the world itself, was at stake, just as much as out of 
reach for someone writing from Brazil.  
Faria’s writings on film unfold in different layers as his thought advances from 
the first edition of O Fan, in August 1928, until the publication reaches its end, in 
December 1930. What is kept throughout is the centrality of the filmic image—to 
which Faria refers as only “the image”—to the fate of modernity, defined by him as 
the “period in which a whole conception of life has changed, allowing for a mere 
scientific discovery to rise to the category of art” (“I Believe in the Image” 3). As still 
a relatively new medium under construction, Faria sees film pertaining to both the 
spheres of art and of science—characterized by him through the difference between 
                                                 
8 The historical importance given to cinema was a common feature in many 
intellectuals of this period. For example, famously thinkers of the Frankfurt School, 
mainly Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor Adorno, would understand 
film as a major turning point in modernity, as was the case with intellectuals of the 
New Perception School (Shinkankaku-ha) in Japan, which will be discussed in chapter 
two. Here, my interest is to see how, or if, the same issues are read differently by those 
who were seen as not-fully modern, and what critique of modernity that allows for. 
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expression and realism—carrying the possibility of changing the concepts of life, 
perception, and time. He argues that 
 
the basic fact to be considered is the cinema understood as a new medium, 
which was given to man by a scientific discovery. Just as the word. But much 
superior to it. A medium of expression more perfect, capable of better 
translating the complexities of thought and senses. A new language, richer, 
stronger, and universal. (“Rhythm” 3) 
 
Faria’s theoretical debate on the present and future of film focuses on two main set of 
issues: the possibility of a universal experience; and the need to find alternatives to the 
codification that came from the central powers of the United States and Europe. The 
negotiation between two somewhat contradictory issues could only be solved by a 
non-dialectical ontology of the image, whose immateriality would dissolve the 
disputes that its mobility, globality, and indexicality might spur, circumventing the 
paradoxes that the universal entails. A theory of film seen from the periphery would 
have to think the universal through different lenses from the ones used by the center. 
If, for Faria, Charles Chaplin represented the “present” of the medium in its 
fulfillment—although one still to be universalized since, as Faria writes, “cinema, 
except for the work of Chaplin, has produced nothing or close to nothing” (“I Believe 
in the Image” 3)—Soviet cinema offered a possible future of Brazilian cinema.  
Film as a “horizon of expectation,” as Sarah Ann Wells describes it (153), 
could not escape its material location within the circuits of political and 
epistemological power, capital accumulation, and access to technology. All of which a 
peripheral space such as Brazil did not fully enjoy—perhaps, indeed, only as a 
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“horizon of expectation.” Soviet cinema and montage theory, thus, are received by 
Faria and the cosmopolitan critics of O Fan as the best model to follow. The need to 
find new models of expression that escaped those developed in Hollywood and 
Western Europe led to the encounter with Soviet theory as a promising revelation of 
what Wells calls a “parallel modernity”—since the access to foreign film culture relied 
on a distribution mediated by the hegemonic markets, the production of other places 
such as Japan was still very limited for Brazilian audiences. In Wells’ words: 
 
In this [Latin American] context, Soviet cinema offered a unique point of 
inflection. As the only foreign film industry not part of Western Europe or the 
US that circulated in Latin America during the modernist period, it represented 
an important possibility for an alternative cinematic modernity.  (154) 
 
Unlike the 1970s Third Cinema and Cinema Novo’s reception of Soviet theory and 
film’s revolutionary ideals, in the 1920s and early 1930s the absence of the films 
themselves invested Soviet film with an aura of promise and speculation, through the 
mediation of the pages of European publications. It was seen, foremost, as Wells 
argues, as “a tactic to construct a virtual cosmopolitan film spectatorship that did not 
preclude a preoccupation with the national, even when—or perhaps precisely when—
Soviet films themselves were not available” (154). 
It is interesting to realize that the Soviet thought on film and montage enters 
Brazil through the high-theoretical endeavor of the conservative Octávio de Faria. 
Besides introducing the cinema from Russia, then absent in Brazil, as a novelty that 
opened an alternative path for film, the journal O Fan also published the first 
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translations of texts by Vsevolod Pudovkin and Sergei Eisenstein, commented on 
montage theory, and organized screenings of a few Soviet films in their monthly 
events. Faria, as their leading enthusiast, was adamant in pointing at the importance of 
the Soviet thought and practice for the future of the medium particularly in Brazil, 
almost as an evidence of not only the importance of film for the future, but also as a 
sign of hope for a peripheral nation to participate in the shaping of the medium.  
Faria opens his essay “Russian Cinema and Brazilian Cinema” (“Cinema 
Russo e Cinema Brasileiro,” hereafter “RCBC”) with a reference to Lenin, in a quote 
he got from French film historian Léon Moussinac’s Le cinéma soviétique (1928). The 
famous quote, in which Lenin states that “filmic art is the most important art for 
Russia,” functions in Faria’s text as an evidence of the importance of film, although 
turned upside down. If Lenin saw film’s importance for its capacity of massification of 
revolutionary ideals, Faria makes it clear that, for him, what is at stake is not politics, 
but rather the medium and the art of film: “I do not even want to say that I am not a 
communist. That would exceed the limits of these columns, which are not concerned 
neither with politics, nor with sociology” (“RCBC” 1). Faria wants to purify Soviet 
film from its communism, stating that “we shall refrain from a deeper judgment, 
which necessarily means to discuss communism itself,” in order to retain only what he 
sees as the aesthetic potency of the medium. (“RCBC” 3)  
 The first appearance of Soviet film theory in Brazil comes “purified” from its 
revolutionary politics. Such a purification depends precisely on the place of the 
spectator—the Brazilian spectator looking at the development of the medium from 
outside. Instead of following conservative critics of Soviet film for its propaganda 
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uses, Faria suggests that the condition of being a peripheral and distant nation would 
give Brazil an epistemological authority:  
 
No other thing does the American cinema than propagate its ideas. A whole 
sociology, and opposite to the communist. To the eyes of Moscow, then, it is 
New York who is the rampant propagandist. And since I am neither Moscow, 
nor New York… (“CRCB,” 3)  
 
Being distant, the periphery would occupy the position of the spectator, “outside” of 
the main stage of history. From such an epistemic vantage point, Faria is able to make 
a statement that all is political in film—Hollywood and Soviets—except for himself, 
as the Brazilian subject who sees from outside. 
Through such a detached look, the medium of film could be also detached 
from its environment, purified from its political use. Soviet montage thus, in Faria’s 
reading, is not a tool for aesthetic-political sensorial stirring of the masses, but rather it 
is an artistic instrument to the animation of the inanimate. The political is obliterated 
in favor of an idea of the “vital.” Explaining Pudovkin’s montage theory—through his 
reading of the French translation of “Montage, vital element in cinematography” (“Le 
montage, élement vital en cinégraphie”), in the pages of the January 1929 issue of the 
journal Cinéa-Ciné Pour Tous9—he distinguishes it from both US-American 
continuity and French rhythmic editing:  
 
The construction of the film, in his [Pudovkin’s] opinion, is exhausted neither 
by “the chronological succession inherent to the scenes” (which is the 
                                                 
9 French film journal, published from 1923 to 1932. 
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American continuity), neither by the creation of a rhythm. He says that 
“montage” is the basic driving force through which soulless photographs (the 
separate “bouts” or “plans”) turn into a living cinegraphic life. (“RCBC” 4)   
 
The temporality of the medium becomes intertwined with its visual “vitality”: the 
political is suppressed under a general idea of life. Faria claims that montage instills 
life onto the dead photographic instants, operating the “transposition of one reality into 
another reality” (“RCBC” 4). Emphasizing that “the Russian realized all this… 
Pudovkin. Eisenstein,” (“RCBC” 4), Faria and his peers in O Fan would see Soviet 
theory as path to the human universality of life, of a localized access to a universal 
humanity.  
Faria’s major work on political thought, the book The Fate of Socialism (O 
Destino do Socialismo), published in 1933, just a few years after the last issue of O 
Fan, provides a frame through which to read his vitalist take on Soviet theory. The 
book, described by Faria himself as an “act of anti-socialist faith” (XVII), exposes his 
adamant rejection of socialism in favor of an emphatic defense of a transcendental 
human universality, premised upon a temporality that does not admit change, that is, 
which denies any possible difference between present and future.  
Affirming that “man is one and only in all times”, he criticizes Marxist thought 
for its dislocation from “man” to “material relations,” which are historically, spatially, 
and physically determined (The Fate of Socialism 12). Since he argues that “to start 
from man means to truly know man and not to isolate him in a specific historical 
moment, in a given society” (12–13), socialism for Faria would mean “the revolt 
against human nature, against man as he is in the name of a man as he could be” (18). 
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Faria’s concern with a transcendental notion of life that would replace politics is 
premised on a “humanity” devoid of history and place—and, as we shall see, of 
body— revealing the desire for a universal that would privilege the vantage point of 
an elite comprised of “spectators” from the margins of capitalist modernity. 10 
 
Visual Labor and Absolute Value 
Faria replaces politics with life in order to gain access to a universal 
sameness—but what how does he link it with the filmic experience? The essay titled 
“I believe in the image” (“Eu creio na imagem”), published in September 1929, 
proposes a media-historical narrative that tells the rise of the image and the crisis of 
the word as part of the “spirit of general collapse of the whole Europe in this end of 
century” (3). In a text that lies somewhere between a film-phenomenological essay 
and a manifesto against the talkies, Faria argues that the inclusion of the spoken word 
into film would pull the medium towards the wrong direction, one that would go 
against the historical possibilities introduced by it in the field of perception. He places 
himself, and the Brazilian readers, as external spectators of a geopolitical and 
historical shift taking place in the modern world, i.e. Europe, in which media and 
ethics would be inextricably intertwined: “The apotheosis of the image which we are 
                                                 
10 It is possible to think Faria’s “life” here through the similarity it shows to Husserlian 
transcendental phenomenology and the idea of Lebenswelt. Such a close comparative 
task exceeds the scope of the present dissertation, but the critical argument developed 
here can/should be read as a critical modulation to the Eurocentric project of 
transcendental phenomenology and to the politics of “peripheral” modernism. See 
Edmund Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970 [1936]. 
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watching here, from Brazil, in our impassivity of always late spectators, is the result of 
the failure of the word, which seems evident to me” (“I Believe in the Image” 3).  
Faria seems to suggest that the “always late” Brazilian spectators, although not 
qualified to intervene in the course of history, would be ideal judges of such an 
“apotheosis of the image.” In an idiosyncratic argumentative move, and somehow 
anticipating thinkers such as Vilém Flusser and Bernard Stiegler’s media-based 
histories, Faria evokes Henri Bergson in dialogue with Nietzsche to propose a 
diagnosis of a general crisis of Western Europe. In the rise of the visual media of film, 
he reads a general crisis of human reason represented by the decline of the “word”:  
 
Bergson goes deeper, from man to the words themselves and finds out the 
reason for such an insufficiency [of the word]. He thus moves from subjective 
to objective misrepresentation, if we can so say. […] It was thus the two 
greatest philosophers of recent times who destroyed the preconceptions related 
to the excellence of the word, preparing the ground for the affirmation of the 
image. (Faria, “I Believe in the Image” 3)   
 
The collapse of the medium of the word, he argues, would imply the prominence of 
not any type of image, but the filmic one. He sees an evidence of such a crisis in the 
uptake of filmic techniques in modernist literature 
 
in the style of Proust, Bernanos, and Julian Green—who seek to convey the 
highest number of directions on each momentary state of spirit of their heroes, 
thus enriching all reconstructions of the mental processes that they study, true 
uninterrupted series of close-ups of thoughts… (Faria, “I Believe in the Image” 
3)  
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Through his reading of Bergson’s idea of movement and duration (durée), Faria places 
the word in the realm of rationality and intelligence, translated in temporal terms as 
the interruption embodied by the instant. In this sense, the word’s “domain is the 
inanimate, the discontinuous—in opposition to the instinct, this faculty of reaching life 
in its continuity, its non-decomposability by the process of reasoning” (“I believe in 
the Image” 3). Faria’s version of vitalism —which substitutes “politics” with “life” in 
his reading of Soviet montage theory—draws from Bergson to conceptualize the word 
as a rational interruption of the phenomenological wholeness of life, “cutting its 
continuity and rounding up certain edges” (3).  
What is equally important for the theorist is that the difference between the 
universality of the image and the insufficiency of the verbal is not merely a semiotic or 
cultural one—to which the Griffithian utopia of a post-babel filmic world would 
attend. It is understood, instead, as a temporal one: the universality of the image would 
reside in its relation to a temporal totality of the “whole life,” which would be re-
presented by the filmic ability to display time beyond the instant, movement without 
change.11  
                                                 
11 For a discussion of the instant as the opposite of such an empty and dead concept, 
the most important reference would be Walter Benjamin, who would take a 
monadological approach to the historical conundrum that the photographic instant—
Augenblick—could bring. This represents yet a different understanding of vitalism, 
which politicizes life through the interplay of materialism and aesthetics, different 
from Faria’s universalist humanist theorization. See Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” 1942; and Ariella Azoulay’s “The Tradition of the 
Oppressed,” 2007.   
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To build a total image of the universal, Faria rereads Bergson’s idea of life as 
opposed to the idea of form. He argues that “The word is only good to designate 
‘forms.’ And, according to Bergson: “the form is but an instant that is extracted from a 
transition.” Therefore, as we have seen, it is necessarily incomplete, false” (“I Believe 
in the Image” 3). The word, for Faria, would function in a photographic process of 
analysis that interrupts the flux of time. Film would provide back the synthesis, a 
process he believes to be shared by human perception: “Well, since what we always 
do is “to catch vistas almost instantaneous of the reality that passes” and, later, to 
reconstruct them in our brain, Bergson arrived at the following proposition: “The 
mechanism of our usual knowledge is of a cinematographic nature.”” (“I Believe in 
the Image” 3)  
For Faria, the ideal of a pure formless medium would only possibly be 
translated to the screen as the single-shot film. This idea is introduced in one of Faria’s 
first film-theory texts, “The Scenario and The Future of Film” (“O Scenario e o Futuro 
do Cinema,” 1928), and tested in his screenplay “Reincidência,” published on the 
pages of O Fan. Faria goes against both rhythmic montage and classical narrative 
editing, defending that the true filmic requires an absolute “value of visualization:” a 
total continuity that would eliminate all cuts. The future that Faria desires for film 
tends to a minimum of interruptions in its flow, reaching an absolute visuality that he 
believes to be only available to film: “there will be no more literary or psychological 
value. Only a new value, of visualization.” (“The Scenario and the Future of Cinema” 
n.2, 3) He thus exemplifies:  
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When I watch a movie of nine acts, deemed exceptional, such as The Crowd12 
and, for it, I need to accommodate my sight as much as over 1,100 times—
twelve times per second, more or less—having in mind that, beyond the film’s 
two hundred something title cards, over nine hundred images [shots] passed on 
the screen, it is then that the theory of absolute continuity imposes itself. And it 
covers the form—ideal, for sure—of a movie, one-piece, that is, with absolute 
visual continuity (“The Scenario and the Future of Cinema” n.1, 2).  
 
Such an “absolute visual continuity” implies a relation between seeing and labor 
[trabalho] that would shape such “absolute value of visualization,” which requires the 
maximum reduction of “the constant labor of accommodating the sight to each new 
scene, the adjustment of the mind to the prism through which one needs to see” (“The 
Scenario” n.1, 2). The cut, he argues, would not only interrupt the vital flow of life, 
but it would also physically and mentally tire. Faria affirms that to see across cuts 
makes filmic spectatorship become visual labor, a labor that is both physical—of the 
eye—and mental—of the memory: the spectator’s eye needs to readjust to every new 
shot, in a regime of attention that requires concentration but that also constantly 
reminds the viewer “that that is a celluloid film, cut, glued, split, etc.” (“The Scenario” 
n.1, 2).  
The absolute continuity fantasized by Faria—expressive of the universality of 
the vital flow that cannot be split into words, or photograms—would require that one 
does not engage in any physical relation with the apparatus. Or, in other words, would 
require the apparatus to vanish. If, as Hans Belting reminds us, “the distinction 
                                                 
12 The Crowd, (1928) a US film directed by King Vidor, was widely watched in Brazil 
and highly praised in the pages of O Fan as an example against the talkies. 
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between image and medium is rooted in the self-experience of our body,” where 
memory-images are also produced, (11) in order to achieve Faria’s absolute “value of 
visualization” in which visual labor must be avoided, it would be necessary to 
eliminate the difference between image and medium and, hence, suppress the body. In 
this way, time could be experienced as an unchanging present by a universal no-body.  
The critique of the word, which made his theory one of the most ardent anti-
talkie discourses among his peers, stemmed from two factors: the inclusion of 
dialogues would mean the interruption of the moving flow of the image by words, and 
also it would cause the intrusion of the aural into the visual absorption of the spectator. 
He explains: “The image is a gesture that gets animated, that starts, that acquires life. 
The word (word, sound, etc) is a gesture (if one can say so) that has ended, been 
sterilized, that has died” (“I Believe in the Image” 3). The future of the apparatus 
would lie, therefore, in film’s ontological destiny of producing spectators bound by the 
universal temporality of life, who are addressed not in their bodies. The future of 
film’s universality would thus depend on the production of a disembodied purely 
visual spectator, in an immaterial medium. Any interruption, any address to other 
senses, in his theory, becomes “a parasite to life” (“I Believe in the Image” 3). 
Although it might look as if Faria tries to overcome the mind-body dualism through 
vitalism, his fantasy of filmic visuality serves to further intensify the split, which is 
doubled in a body-eye dualism.  
 It is worth here taking a detour to look into Henri Bergson’s own philosophy of 
life, to help understand Faria’s stakes in his film-vitalism. Contrary to Faria’s 
understanding, Bergson adamantly rejected filmic technology as capable of capturing 
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movement and duration (durée). As is known, Bergson’s philosophical project was to 
build a non-metaphysical ontology of time against the scientific claim of objectivity, 
described by a dialectical relation between body and mind (spirit) in the temporal 
category of duration (durée). To build a philosophy of life based on the ontology of 
becoming—that is, of change, instead of being—Bergson draws a distinction between 
what human intelligence represents in order to enable action in the world—measurable 
time— and the domain of the actual phenomena of life, which unfolds as a becoming 
in a temporal duration (durée) that is not representable since it is not divisible.  
For the French philosopher, any ontological project requires the understanding 
the experiential nature of the durée, which human intelligence can access only 
retrospectively, already at a loss, through the act of seeing the phenomena of 
movement and of change once the experience has already ceased to exist.13 The 
“intellectual representation of movement,” Bergson describes, is “an excerpt fixed, 
dissected, emptied, a general system of abstract ideas” (La Pensée et le Mouvant, 
15).14 Human intelligence, he claims, only deals with immobilities, never achieving 
movement as it is experienced, which is what Faria transposes to his own theory. Such 
ungraspability, however, for Bergson, would be related to time’s non-repeatability, 
which would prove life to be open-ended, non-causal, and always based on the 
emerging of the new.15 It is, ultimately, an ontology of history that is built upon the 
                                                 
13 See Bergson’s Matter and Memory, 1962, chapter 1; and La Pensée et le Mouvant, 
1934, p.12. 
14 All translations of Bergson’s “La Pensée et le Mouvant” from French are my own. 
15 On the role of contingency and the ontology of the new in Bergson, see Elizabeth 
Grosz, Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art, 2011. 
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experience of change in matter, in which the future is not foreseeable from the present, 
and the past is open to whatever present it is narrated from. Bergson inescapable 
difference arrives at an opposite proposition than that of Faria’s inescapable sameness, 
since for the French philosopher the nature of duration would produce a history in 
which “neither its course, nor its direction, and consequently none of its terms are 
given” (Bergson, La Pensée et le Mouvant, 24).  
Faria states that “from that [Bergson’s thought] one can easily reach the 
conclusion that interests me (I do not know if Bergson wrote it) but which is evident: 
that, if “our usual knowledge is of a cinematographic nature,” film is the best means to 
reproduce such a knowledge” (“I Believe in the Image” 3). But Bergson did not write 
it. The filmic apparatus, for the French philosopher, worked as an analogy of the 
artificial process of intelligence, which necessarily stays outside the “inner becoming 
of things” (Bergson, Creative Evolution 332). Film, for Bergson, would be a deceiving 
apparatus that masked its materiality, its fundamental temporal interruption. Film’s 
process of mechanical synthesis of movement from single still photographic units 
would thus show reason’s limited grasp of time, as he explains:   
 
If movement is made of a series of positions, and change [is made of] a series 
of states, time is made of distinct and juxtaposed parts. No doubt we still say 
that they succeed each other, but such a succession is then similar to the 
images of a cinematographic film: the film can unwind ten times, a hundred 
times, a thousand times faster, without anything being modified in that which 
unwinds; if it goes infinitely fast (now outside of the apparatus), if the 
unwinding becomes instantaneous, those will still be the same images. […] In 
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sum, time thus envisioned is but an ideal space, where we suppose that all past, 
present and events are aligned… ”  (Bergson, La Pensée et le Mouvant 16) 
 
Instead of the “continuous creation, uninterrupted gushing of novelty” (Bergson La 
Pensée 16) that the experience of durée provides through movement in the body, 
filmic capacity of repetition without change was for Bergson an evidence of its 
incapacity to harbor movement. That is why, not without a hint of provocation, he 
states that, if there is movement in film, it would not be on the images projected on the 
screen. Instead, it would be hidden somewhere “inside the apparatus (appareil)” (La 
Pensée 14) As science and technology historian Jimena Canales reads it, Bergson’s 
notion of movement—as an actualization of duration—is of an experience 
“inescapably entangled with the rest of reality” (“Movement Before Cinematography,” 
290). His version of vitalism would differ from Faria’s because it entails an 
entanglement between life and body through the inescapable duration—durée—of 
time. Movement is experienced by the duration of/in the body. Therefore, instead of 
looking at the images on the screen, Bergson turns to the body of the machine, as the 
only alternative to the experience of change lived by the body of living beings.16 
                                                 
16 As Canales describes, the whole debate on the transition from photography to film 
revolved around the place of the observer. (Canales 2009, 124-125) The question was 
whether a photographic machine could be more reliable for the portrayal and the study 
of natural phenomena than the human observer. And—just like Bergson, Faria, and 
many others would affirm—since living phenomena necessarily entail change, the 
capture of movement over duration was seen as the next step to the observation of the 
real. The freezing effect of photography, it was soon noticed, would fall short of any 
accurate observation of the world.16  
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The mere shift from apparatus (both as dispositif and as appareil) to image, in 
Faria’s theory of film, entails the obliteration of the observer’s body in the process of 
perception. Faria’s theory suppresses mediation in perception, and change in duration, 
focusing on the eye and the purely visual aimed at purifying and repressing the locality 
of perception within the limits of the body. If, as Jonathan Crary argues, modern 
technologically mediated visual perception was marked by the emergence of “the body 
as a productive physiological apparatus,” when Faria eliminates the body in favor of a 
concept of transcendental life, he imagines an image without perception (“Vision and 
Visuality” 46). The erasure of politics from Soviet revolutionary montage theory, 
justified by him through the place of the Brazilian subject as a “spectator” (instead of a 
participant) of history, can be understood through the erasure of the body from filmic 
vision in his conflation of image and medium, which allows for a conservative 
temporality that excludes change. Instead of the interruptive revolutionary politics of 
montage, the “absolute visual continuity” would thus be an absolute present in which 
no other world could be imagined. 
When Faria imagines the future of film based on Bergson but shifts the 
philosophers’ focus from the materiality of the apparatus to the image on screen, he 
tears apart the body from the eye, inadvertently revealing its opposite: the 
impossibility of an embodied universality that escapes political change. It desires life 
without relationality, through the localized universality of a Soviet theory striped from 
its politicality. For the peripheral modernist elite intellectual, the filmic promise of 
universality is that which detaches one from one’s own bodily and political conditions, 
“something that makes the spectator forget her own personality and the place where he 
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is.” (“I Believe in the Image” 6) The “intellectual cinema,” proposed by Faria and 
defended by Aluízio Bezerra Coutinho in O Fan, n.7, with “each sequence, each 
image, perfectly autonomous,” was not a matter of word against image, but rather a 
matter of image versus apparatus, of permanence against interruption. (“Em Demanda 
do Cinema Intellectual” jan 1930, p.2) 
 
Filmic Crystallization  
Some ten years prior to Faria’s text on the image, another speculative essay 
about the future of film was written in another so-called “peripheral” space engaged in 
the project of modernization. In September 1917, the modernist writer, essayist, and 
(for a short period) screenwriter Tanizaki Jun’ichirō penned the manifesto essay “The 
Present and Future of Moving Pictures” (Katsudō shashin no genzai to shōrai), which 
was first published in the journal Shinshōsetsu (The New Novel). Tanizaki was among 
the strongest enthusiasts of film in Japan in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
being one of the first to address the relation between cinema, modernity, and 
perception—the core problem that occupied Faria, which Thomas Lamarre calls the 
problem of the “cinematization of the world”—starting in the late 1910’s, before he 
was hired to work for two years in the short-lived Taikatsu Studios, until eventually 
leaving film criticism and production. His thought on film continues, from the mid-
1920’s on, incorporated in his literary fiction writing. 
With a growing film production and enjoying rapid capital accumulation, 
especially during the period of the first world war in Europe, Japan also had a growing 
intellectual community theorizing film—something that would grow enormously 
  
 37 
towards the end of the Taishō (1912–1926) and early Showa (1926–1989) eras. In this 
sense, Tanizaki was writing in an environment where film was a growing object of 
thought, which was a different context from Brazil—related to the different ways 
industrial capitalism got established in these two places.17 Nonetheless, as a cultural 
and epistemic object, also in Japan film embodied the desired ideal of “Western” 
modernity. 
As a modernist, Tanizaki was critical of the transposition of Japanese theatrical 
codes to film, such as the use female impersonators (onnagata), static camera, and the 
deployment of the live narration of benshi or katsuben, in favor of a naturalist mode of 
representation that he considered more suitable for the filmic medium. In his 1917 
essay on the future of film, such claims, addressed to Japanese filmmakers, place 
Tanizaki within the modernizing discourse that was called the Pure Film Movement 
(Jun’eigageki Undō), which Isolde Standish describes as an “‘intellectual approach to 
filmmaking” (34). Pure Film was a rather loose “movement,” characterized by a 
general discourse in journals and magazines calling for the “modernization” of 
Japanese film in the paradigms of classical narrative cinema.  
As Aaron Gerow argues, in the late 1910’s and early 1920’s Japan, the Pure 
Film Movement aimed at constructing the modern object called “cinema” (eiga), as 
opposed to the un-filmic idea of “moving pictures” (katsudō shashin). In Gerow’s 
words, such aesthetic modernization of film meant that:   
 
                                                 
17 Among other important thinkers that turned their attention to film were Marxist 
Tosaka Jun, Nakai Masakasu, Terada Torahiko, besides intellectuals that would 
become prominent Marxist film theorists such as Iwasaki Akira and Tanaka Jun’ichirō.  
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modes of cinematic narration were altered, onnagata (female impersonators) 
disappeared in favor of actresses, the star system was solidified, the institution 
of the author-director formed, the screenplay was established and codified, the 
genres of shinpa and kyūgeki were replaced by gendaigeki and jidaigeki.” 
(Gerow 18)  
 
Scholars such as Irena Hayter and Aaron Gerow read the Pure Film agenda as a choice 
for a clean and bourgeois version of modernity over a popular one—of the new high-
end district of Ginza in opposition to the popular Asakusa, where noisy movie theaters 
thrived in film’s early years. The codification of the classical narrative film, as seen in 
the movies coming from the growing presence of US-American films, produced a 
unified object that could be consumed anywhere by any spectator, without the costly 
and disturbingly embodied presence of the benshi.  
Tanizaki’s interest in film is directly related to the medium he has seen coming 
from the “West”: “I would go as far as to say that Western films, no matter how short 
or trivial, are utterly fascinating in comparison with theater in Japan” (“The Present 
and Future of Moving Pictures” 65. Hereafter “The Present and Future”).18 Just as 
much as Faria, the consciousness of being “outside” is central to Tanizaki’s 
fascination with film—but unlike his Brazilian peer, Tanizaki believes the potential of 
film has already been achieved in the historical present of Western modernity. The 
ideal of a “pure” medium localized the modern, at once, within the “Western” and the 
bourgeois spheres—which were seen as somewhat equivalent. In this sense, when the 
                                                 
18 Tanizaki’s quotations are the ones available in English language editions, unless 
otherwise noted, in the cases where I will offer my own translations.  
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Pure Film Movement called for the “purification” of film into an art form, it 
hygienized it from from both its lower-class dimension of street attraction [misemono] 
and from its local Japanese traces, in favor of a sophisticated and universal aesthetic 
form.  
Irena Hayter reads the Pure Film Movement, along with other modernist 
movements happening around the same time such as New Perception School 
(Shinkankaku-ha, which will be addressed in Chapter 2), as sorts of sensorial 
management programs that split the senses apart in order to subsume them into 
capitalist exchange. That is, film’s inherent realism also shaped politically what reality 
should look like, and which corporeal sense would be best equipped to assess it. As 
she argues:   
 
As a discourse […] it was a potent manifestation of the larger historical forces 
that further separated the senses and amplified certain single historical 
pathways. The senses were to be managed by different media and included in 
capitalist circulation and exchange. If cinema was becoming an intensely 
visual experience, then the telephone, the phonograph, and the radio, on the 
other hand, were working to detach hearing from seeing. (Hayter 296) 
 
For Hayter, the push towards film modernization meant the defense of its path towards 
a detached visuality, making up a “disembodied, intensely absorbed spectatorship that 
focused on the visual,” similar to the ideal latent in Faria’s approach to a universal 
form of cinema. (Hayter 296) The question of distance and locality in the “periphery” 
of the “Western” centers was, naturally, always tinged with the desire for distinction 
of local elites. 
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Tanizaki’s claim for the “future of moving pictures” is commonly read as an 
embrace of the modernization paradigm of the Pure Film Movement, based on the 
desire for the construction of a transparent medium modeled after “Western” film. If, 
as Tanizaki writes addressing filmmakers in Japan, “for the role of a beautiful woman, 
a beautiful actress must by all means play the part, and an old man must without fail 
fill the role of an old man (as it is for the most part in Western pictures),” it would be 
because phenomenal immediacy—the actual body playing the fictional character—
was seen as a condition to achieve “Western” modernity (68). The fact of cultural 
difference and modernization are usually placed by critics and historians as central 
propellers to Tanizaki’s approach to the filmic apparatus—first as a theorist, then as a 
screenwriter in the Taikatsu studios. Joanne Bernardi’s study of his film writings, for 
example, thus describes it:  
 
He had always exhibited a strong interest in foreign cultures, and around the 
time he entered the film industry his fascination with the West had become 
extreme. This obsession with Western culture played an important role in his 
becoming involved in motion pictures. (Bernardi 145)  
 
In a similar fashion to Faria, the modernity and foreignness of film fascinated 
Tanizaki—a fascination that, nonetheless, moves his thought beyond the mere claim to 
naturalism. Tanizaki’s interest in foreign films—much like modernists and avant-
gardists elsewhere outside the US-Europe sphere—is usually placed by commentators 
and historians as the most fundamental background to his interest in film, in spite of 
what he theorized film to be. There seems to be a desire for Tanizaki’s desire for the 
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West latent in scholarly works on his film writings. Less careless, Thomas Lamarre 
links the presence of film in Tanizaki to “the West as metaphysical effect”:  
 
Tanizaki's interest in the West as metaphysical effect is one of the most 
interesting aspects of his work. And it leads him to two insights. First, the 
West is not an empirical object or site but a form of desire, a metaphysical 
effect that is only temporarily actualized in specific artefacts and commodities. 
Second, as a result, the West is mobile and indifferent to scale: its effects can 
be compressed or extended anywhere and everywhere. (Lamarre, “The 
deformation of the modern spectator” 35)  
 
Indeed, Tanizaki’s call for a transparent and naturalist medium is explicitly inspired by 
his spectatorial experience with foreign film. Most Japanese intellectuals of the period 
patronized more foreign films than Japanese ones, usually either seen as “non-artistic” 
or too theatrical—backwards. But if the “West” appears as a “metaphysical effect,” in 
Lamarre’s words, it is nonetheless carried through specific objects—such as the 
female body, capitalist commodities, the coffee shops—of which film seems to be the 
ultimate representative, since the spatial distance separating the non-Western subject 
to its object of desire could be shortened by film’s perceptive transparency. At first, it 
would seem, in this shortening would lie the desired purity of the “Pure Film 
Movement.”  
Although this explanation seems to fit perfectly to both the reading of Pure 
Film as a claim to transparency, and the reading of Tanizaki as a subscriber to the 
teleological modernization agenda, it is precisely what separates Tanizaki and Faria—
the understanding of the rapport between apparatus, image, and body—that will reveal 
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not only the impossibility of purity but his theory of filmic mediation as a theory of 
impossibility, in which there is no metaphysics of East/West, primitive/modern 
difference, nor there is the Western form/Oriental content dichotomy. Instead, there 
are rather the different forms of virtualization of those into different objects-
commodities, which do not get actualized. They ultimately vanish into light. It is all a 
matter of the centrality of perception.  
Tanizaki, in his 1917 essay, writes that “Just as painting lacks sound and 
poetry lacks shape, so too because of their flaws, moving pictures are forms that effect 
“crystallization,” the purification of nature requisite to art” (“The Present and Future” 
68). As an effect of the techniques of enlargement and the close-up, the fascination 
brought about by filmic purification depended on the fact that movie pictures “lack the 
sound and color of actual objects,” (68) which would elevate human perception 
beyond its naturalized conditions: “The human face, no matter how unsightly the face 
may be, is such that, when one stared intently at it, one feels that somehow, 
somewhere, it conceals a kind sacred, exalted, eternal beauty. When I gaze on faces in 
“enlargement” within moving pictures, I feel this quite profoundly.” (68) 
In Tanizaki, filmic ontology resides in film’s capacity to extract the “actual 
objects” from the physical world in the process that Tanizaki calls “crystallization”: a 
purification of nature into timelessness, somewhat similar to Jean Epstein’s concept of 
photogenie, the achievement of an extra-historical aesthetic quality. Such a 
purification, a call for a “return to nature” (shizen ni kaeru), paradoxically, however, 
entails a constant interruption of the flow of the film by scale-deforming close-ups. 
Opposite to Faria, Tanizaki rejected the seamless continuity of the long take—a stance 
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that could be read as Tanizaki’s privileging of space, through the magnified scale of 
the screen, over the temporal fluidity of the long take. In Tanizaki’s future of film 
there is no possible “absolute continuity,” to use Faria’s term. In fact, the emphasis on 
the close-up and the visual distortions made possible by film places Tanizaki’s 
ontology not only on the side of the fetish—the focus on the “larger than life” actors 
on screen—but, most importantly, on the screen itself. The medium’s future, for him, 
was not on the value of duration or its access to the truth of life through movement, 
but rather on the transformation of life into images on the screen.  
A filmic ontology that focuses on the extracted and augmented image is an 
ontology built on the filmic screen’s scale and luminosity, instead of an ontology of 
the world. In this sense, it is an anti-ontology. The close-up as an object of thought, as 
Mary Ann Doane (2003) reminds us, usually entails thinking film as image and not as 
representation. As a “potential semiotic threat” that isolates an object from the 
dramatic logic of the mise-en-scène, the close-up points to “the screen as surface, with 
the annihilation of a sense of depth and its corresponding rules of perspectival realism. 
The image becomes, once more, an image rather than a threshold onto a world” (“The 
Close-up” 91). The close-up is the affirmation of the image on the screen and its 
mediating presence, rather than that of narrative knowledge and immersion. Through 
the combination of physical proximity— as in English, close-up—and the disturbance 
of scale—as in French gros-plan—Doane reads the close-up as a sign of the loss of 
control over space that is characteristic of modernity, a disturbance of the space-time 
continuum. 
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The manipulation of distance and scale was described by Tanizaki as film’s 
most marked difference to theatre: “While the stage always entails a fixed distance 
between actors and spectators, film differs in that its actors at times loom within 
inches and at other times appear at a distance of several blocks” (“The Present and 
Future” 67). Unlike Faria’s fascination with the temporality of the film, which would 
dissolve the body in a conflation of apparatus and image generating an “absolute 
value,” Tanizaki’s fascination relied precisely on the unsurmountable difference 
between image, spectator’s body, and physical world. Filmic purifying power of 
“crystallization” consisted on the gap it could open between perception and physical 
world not as an evidence of the “falsification” of the image or of an escape from the 
body. It meant rather a direct address to the body that could provide a common ground 
to all embodied spectators through the screen’s ability to work the “imagification” of 
the physical—a democratization of the process of abstraction—which is the opposite 
of Faria’s Bergsonian dissolution of the body into a non-physical vitality. It suggests a 
common difference that creates a zone of tension between perception in the body, the 
image, and the screen. 
 
The Anthropological Screen and Image as Interruption  
In an article titled “Film and Lifestyle” (“Eiga to Seikatsuyōshiki”), published 
in the journal Film Era (Eiga Jidai), in July 1926, the film critic Iwasaki Akira wrote, 
in regard to film in Japan: 
 
the biggest problem with nowadays (genzai) Japanese cinema is the fact that it 
is cinema of Japanese people. Japanese people! With chubby trunks, short 
  
 45 
necks, bowlegs, flat facial expressions; even if we ignore those, it is the 
Japanese, who lack fresh wit and the force of initiative! That is, [films] made 
by the Japanese, who, in any thinkable aspect, stand opposite to the concept of 
‘filmic’ (eigateki)” (51).19  
 
Claiming that the problem of Japanese film is that it reproduces (mosha suru) Japanese 
life, which is “totally devoid of a ‘filmic atmosphere’” (eigateki fun’iki), Iwasaki is 
saying that the problem is that the film reveals the very physicality of Japan itself, its 
bodies, spaces, and objects (Iwasaki 51). Part of a common discourse of the time,20 he 
connects the Japanese body to the “un-modern” Japanese “material life” (seikatsu), 
from the clothes to the narrow streets, in what he saw as their incapacity to live up to 
the modern atmosphere required by the medium of film. His complaint represents well 
the racial complex that results from filmic modernity, which I call the 
“anthropological ambivalence” spurred by film.  
 The anthropological is, as Naoki Sakai (2010) argues, a particular and 
powerful feature of the modern intellectual discourse that places transcendental 
universal knowledge (theory) on one side of the modern “Western” subject—
humanitas—opposite to the other sphere whose knowledge is “only” empirical, or in 
other words, localized, physical, restricted—anthropos. Sakai explains:  
 
As the historical evolution of anthropology suggests, humanitas has signified 
those people who could engage in knowledge production in both the first and 
the second relationships namely, in the empirical as well as transcendental 
                                                 
19 Iwasaki Akira’s quote are my translations from Japanese. 
20 For another iteration of the self-deprecating racialized discourse, see chapter three, 
on Murayama Tomoyoshi. 
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relationships, hence, empirico-transcendental doublet while anthropos has 
gradually been reserved for people who participate in knowledge-production 
only in the first. Thus, humanity in the sense of humanitas has come to 
designate Western or European humanity, to be distinguished from the rest of 
humanity so long as we trust in and insist upon the putative unity of the West. 
This means that humanity in the sense of humanitas authorizes the very 
distinction of the West from what Stuart Hall incisively called ‘the Rest’. 
(Sakai 455) 
 
The “ambivalence” to which I refer is precisely the blurring of these distinctions that 
happen in the process of subjectification of the peripheral elite as a constant tension: to 
occupy, at once, the place of the humanitas and of the anthropos, a position that 
Fatimah Tobing Rony (1996) calls the “third eye,” made possible first by the spectacle 
of film, and later by the post-colonial condition. Film functioned, in the early 
twentieth century, as the visual inscription of race, “bringing close” the 
anthropological divide. Deguchi Takehito reads a “complex of whiteness” constantly 
present in Tanizaki’s work and in film spectatorship in Japan during the Taishō and 
early Showa periods, strongly informed by the recent developments in racial relations 
between Japan and the United States, with the discourse of the yellow peril rising with 
the 1924 Immigration Act that prohibited Asian immigration to the North-American 
country. 
To imagine the universal from the anthropologically ambivalent place of the 
elite in the margins of Western modernity, Faria has to imagine a no-body in front of a 
total image, a pure visuality that denies the body. A privilege granted to him by the 
particular colonized ethos that, in Brazil, works through the belief of the white subject 
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to be part of the metropole center, devoid of race.21 But for the racialized Other, as 
many have shown, the effect of film was that of a constant machine of comparison that 
would produce Otherness in oneself through the visibility granted to racial 
difference.22  
Film is particularly important in this process because, by its very structure of 
embodied vision whose movement is visible through its restrictive framing, it 
constantly reminds one of one’s own limited physical position.23 Its most basic feature 
is its physicality. The enlightened transcendentality of the humanitas, critically 
described by Sakai as the foundation of a discursive geopolitical map of the modern 
ethos, finds in the very act of seeing through film a constant obstacle. Not only is one 
reminded of one’s own body—that which the white male-bodied Faria tries to dissolve 
into an immaterial and a-historical “image”—but also the racialized modernist elite is 
constantly reminded, by the images of white bodies in circulation on the screen, that 
one carries a race to the very eyes they desire to occupy.  
                                                 
21 The discourse on whiteness in the early twentieth century Brazil was itself 
embedded in a temporal debate over the whitening of the population, whose bodies 
would be the universal default—the only ones who would be granted the possibility of 
not carrying a body and a race. About this, see Lilia Schwarcz, O Espetáculo das 
Raças,1993. On the filmic screen, “good cinema” in early twentieth century Brazil 
was the one who appeased the white elite by only showing “beautiful white bodies.” 
About this, see Roberto   and Fernão Ramos (org), História do Cinema Brasileiro. 
22 See, for example, Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano’s analysis of the “whitening” of 
Japanese silent film starts in her Nippon Modern. Also, see my discussion of 
Murayama Tomoyoshi in Chapter 3. A famous quote by Tokugawa Musei, the most 
celebrated benshi, describes the experience of the encounter with the image of a white 
actress on the screen as a simultaneous ecstatic daze and a deep “grief for being 
Japanese” (quoted in Deguchi, 106). 
23 See Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: a phenomenology of film experience, 
1992. 
  
 48 
The task of the modernist peripheral elite, then, would be to find ways—
critical or conservative—to deal with such “anthropological ambivalence,” which film 
seems to be constantly emphasizing. Either producing the injunction to “modernize” 
rejecting one’s body, or pushing back against racialized hierarchies. While Faria 
circumvents the restriction of vision by detaching it from the body—and from the 
political—conflating image and its material mediation, Tanizaki does the opposite by 
affirming film as an interruptive perceptual machine of commodification. A close look 
into the theory contained in Tanizaki’s Mr. Aozuka’s Story (Aozuka-shi no Hanashi, 
1926) shows how the absence of a total encompassing concept of the image works as a 
political response to the paradigm of the anthropological ambivalence by emphasizing 
interruption, materiality, and the physical address to the spectator; while de-
emphasizing the epistemic power emanating from the image. 
The novella Mr. Aozuka’s Story was published in the journal Kaizō, in three 
installments over the course of three months (August, September, October) in the year 
of 1926, almost ten years after “The Present and Future of Moving Pictures.” It is 
interesting to see how, in the decade that separates the first essay from the fictional 
text, the status of film as a surface-phenomenon is radicalized to the point of 
dissolution. The fictional text traces a complex, succinct, and multi-layered ontology 
of the moving image and its relation to other types of image, almost as a response to 
the earlier essay on the future of film, and anticipating his 1933 essay on aesthetics In 
Praise of Shadows (In’ei Raisan). It offers what the text calls a “film-philosophy,” in 
which a unified concept of “image” disappears, constituting a system of technology, 
imagination, and commodity that is inseparable from the body of the spectator. 
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The novella tells its story in two temporal layers: one is the posthumous 
epistolary address, in which the narrator, the film director Nakata Susumu, explains to 
his wife, the actress Yurako, the reasons of his death. We read the letter with Yurako, 
the addressee, while we experience the unfolding of the second narrative layer 
contained in it: the chance encounter between Nakata and the old man Mr. Aozuka, an 
anonymous fan of his work, at a bar. Along with Yurako, we discover that Nakata died 
not of tuberculosis, but due to the multiplication of Yurako’s filmic image in Nakata’s 
films. As we get to know, Yurako is a big star, called by Aozuka the “Japanese Marie 
Prevost,” in reference to the Hollywood star, following the same pattern of the 
“complex of whiteness” that haunts Tanizaki’s relation with film.24 Up to the point of 
the narrative, Yurako’s career had consisted in providing her body-as-image to the 
lenses of her film director husband Nakata, whose films are, in the opinion of his fan 
Aozuka, “the only films worth seeing in Japan today,” better than “those of the West,” 
even though they are usually called “American imitations.” (En 280, Jp 170)25 
Through the image of Yurako’s bodies, says Aozuka, Nakata’s films have made Japan 
“become light and radiant.” (En 280, Jp 170)  
Nakata’s films correspond to the future of the moving pictures as theorized by 
Tanizaki a decade earlier, responding to the call for a visual structure centered around 
                                                 
24 Another famous example is the novel Naomi (Chijin no Ai), whose main character is 
described by the narrator as a white-skinned young Japanese woman who resembles 
Mary Pickford. Even her name, he remarks, sounds “Western.” See Tanizaki, Chijin no 
Ai, 1925. 
25 Block translations of “Mr. Aozuka’s Story” are from Thomas Lamarre’s published 
version, whose reference is indicated by “En,” with its correspondent in Japanese 
indicated by “Jp.” Specific terminology, words and expressions are my translations, 
with the Tanizaki’s Japanese terms indicated in brackets. 
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the interruption of the close-up, the capture of the white-skinned female body, to 
achieve a “crystallization” of the physical world through an aesthetic intervention in it. 
Yurako’s presence is necessarily mediated by the filmic medium, turned into a 
chopped-up montage of different poses:  
 
rather than “drama,” they amounted to nothing more than a collage of different 
poses in which she displayed her youthful body, in a shower of lights, in a 
cascade of silks, about to take a bath. All was fine as long as he impressed her 
body, frame after frame, on countless meters of celluloids. Nakata saw her as 
material from which to carve out various seals, which he would stamp with 
great clarity on paper of the finest quality, carefully positioning them with 
close attention to the red inking. (Eng, 277; Jp 164)  
 
This description of Nakata’s filmic style represents exactly the ontology of film 
described by Tanizaki, showing that the “crystallization” of film that he envisions is 
inseparable from the commodification of the female body, decomposed in poses and 
replicated. Nakata’s films are collages of Yurako’s body, which is imprinted on 
celluloid as a reproducible seal. Her body is an image-commodity, an icon of the 
cinema industry, produced by Nakata's lenses; but a commodity whose materiality is 
not reducible to either the filmic celluloid strip nor the image it (re)produces. 
Tanizaki’s theory of the image relies precisely on the open-ended and relational nature 
of the image, which is never unified neither with its medium nor with the spectator. As 
mentioned earlier, the core of his approach to film is the screen-dimension of the 
image: not what it gives access to, but how it makes itself perceived.  
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 The central issue in Tanizaki’s story is the deep knowledge that the old man 
Mr. Aozuka acquires of Yurako’s body through repetitively and obsessively watching 
Nakata’s movies. The obsessed fan’s mental images (gen’ei) reveal the man’s visual 
intimacy with all details of the actress’s body as it is shown in Nakata’s films. Since 
the organic body decays, Aozuka claims in his Platonic “film-philosophy,” it cannot 
hold the Being or Substace (jittai) of the actress. Film, overcoming the effects of time 
on organic matter, would make the physical body disposable. Filmic fascination would 
stem from the rendering of the organic into image, through the dismemberment of the 
totality of the body, as is exemplified by Aozuka’s explanation:  
 
Consider a man who has only studied her on film, who goes to see close-ups of 
certain scenes five or six times in order to pinpoint the details of every part of 
your wife’s body, her shoulders, her breasts, her buttocks, to the point that now 
even with his eyes closed spectral images of her flicker in his head, and thus he 
gained complete knowledge of her. (En 284) 
 
Tanizaki, since his late 1910’s film theory, does not subscribe to the paradigm of the 
absorbed spectatorship in front of a natural mirror, represented by the long take.26 In 
“Mr. Aozuka’s Story,” he takes this premise further: filmic presence is achieved by 
poses, which capture parts of bodies and reproduces them in several different media—
film, still photograms, drawing, mental images, dolls. It is because film does not 
contain movement in itself—but rather produces its synthesis in the spectator’s 
bodies—that it can travel across different territories and establish a relation between 
                                                 
26 Here, I am in disagreement with Lamarre. 
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several media, several bodies, and become a desired commodity. The impression of 
movement, Tanizaki seems to claim, is in the body’s contact with the apparatus of 
film, in the very phenomenon of perception and mediation, which is not just a relay 
but a poietic event in the body that is also what enables its commodification. 
Both Aozuka, who obsessively pursues Yurako’s images and cannot stop 
reproducing in drawing all shots ever taken of her, and Nakata, who is consumed with 
guilt for having exposed his own partner, end the story destroyed by the effect of film 
over the spectators. The “potential semiotic threat” that Mary Ann Doane ascribed to 
the close-up becomes a physical threat in Tanizaki’s story. Film experience is marked 
by the distortion of distance and scale in combination with its capacity to make 
movement seem like an arrest—which is the very process of commodity fetishization: 
to turn a circuit of movement, from workers’ body to product, into an abstract, 
universal, and fixed value. Tanizaki’s writing calls attention to the fact that filmic 
universality is contingent upon its ability to be fetishized. 
It is worth going back to Marx’s definition of the fetishized commodity as “a 
social thing whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the 
senses” (Marx 320-1). The fetish—which itself defines a commodity—comes as a 
metaphysical and transcendental veil that represses the physicality of objects and the 
“peculiar social character of the labor that produces them” (Marx 321). It requires a 
temporal marker that falsifies, producing the transcendental fetish (the hiding of the 
actual labour) as an immanent objectivity, a marker that is actualized precisely in the 
moment of the exchange. Commodity fetishism, as defined by Marx, is the fixity that 
is thrown into circulation in a totalized and equalized market, in which “the magic and 
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necromancy that surrounds the products of labour” standardizes and suppresses those 
isolated workers (Marx 324). 
 If the close-up is the fetish, Tanizaki’s ontology seems to affirm that film is 
par excellence a machine of commodification: since its movement comes from and 
arrives at stasis, but is still perceived as movement. By emphasizing film’s already-
fetishized nature, Tanizaki’s theory comments on the fascination effects of which it is 
captive. We get to know that from “extremely large-scale photographs […] bits of old 
film that had been cut from various pictures,” tirelessly bought from distant movie 
theaters “in segments as short as a frame or two and as long as ten to twenty frames” 
(“Mr. Aozuka’s Story” 300), are used to assemble dolls that the old man “called the 
Substance of Yurako, in various positions such as sleeping, standing, opening your 
thighs, twisting your torso, not to mention all the obscene positions of which I cannot 
write.” (“Mr. Aozuka’s Story” 299) Modeled after illegally purchased frames of the 
actress’s body extracted from Nakata's movies, each doll reproduces a photogram or a 
short fraction of a second—being a body posture, an interruption, and a point of view.  
It is precisely the deconstructability of film’s material quality that makes 
possible the inscription and reproduction of the body in so many different forms of 
image, as an industrial commodity that is spread over the national territory. But the 
montage that emerges can never exhaust all possible ways of seeing and grasping, they 
are different instants of a movement that does not come into being. The flow of 
Yurako's “Substance” is ambiguous, since it can be materialized, by analogy, 
everywhere, on film, drawing, dolls, and even other women's bodies, while at the same 
time it is never contained in a total stable synthesis. The old Aozuka cannot stop 
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making his dolls, because although he believes the substance is there, it is never 
brought to a full closure.  
 
His work resembled that of a paleontologist. Just as the paleontologists would 
excavate, from deep in the earth, skeletal remains from centuries long past, 
then reassemble the animal as it lived thousands of years ago, so he would 
gather together the bits and pieces of your body scattered hither and thither 
through Japan, then try to construct a single total You. (“Mr. Aozuka’s Story” 
301-3) 
   
The analogy between film and paleontology emphasizes film’s archival powers, which 
Philip Rosen has called film’s “mummy complex,” the first fundamental relation 
between film and historicity. Tanizaki places history in an open-ended temporality, 
since every part produces a change in the whole image of history. Based on the 
photogram, to excavate and pursue history as such means that the film, in the 
materiality of its existence, loses its movement with a decrease in the number of 
frames to a point of apparent exhaustion: “It's quite strange, isn't it, that, as the film 
travels, a scene with twenty frames at the start is gradually whittled down to twenty 
frames, then ten, and in particularly bad instances, vanishes all together?” (“Mr. 
Aozuka’s Story” 301) The interesting thing is that this trade, carried out throughout 
the national territory as an “paleontological excavation,” happens on the spatial 
transition from the modern urban center of Tokyo towards the interior and smaller 
towns, precisely where, according to the modern discourse, the “past” does not need to 
be preserved because it is always already there, unlost.  
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Tanizaki draws an ontology of an image-matter that is cinematic inasmuch as it 
produces movement while not moving. It reminds us that the photogram is not the still 
photograph, because it carries with itself the memory and the future suggestion of 
movement. It is a unit that is not self-contained and which exists not as only an index 
of pastness, but also as an index of a future movement produced in the body of the 
viewer. The photogram contains movement in virtuality, which comes to actualization 
through and in the perception of the spectator. It is “the genetic element” of 
perception, as Deleuze has argued, because perception entails change insofar as it 
entails embodiment, binding image and apparatus in the perceiving body. As Deleuze 
explains: 
 
the photogramme is inseparable from the series which makes it vibrate in 
relation to the movement which derives from it. And, if the cinema goes 
beyond perception, it is in the sense that it reaches to the genetic element of all 
possible perception, that is, the point which changes, and which makes 
perception change, the differential of perception itself. (Movement-Image 83) 
 
Paying attention to the terminology deployed by Tanizaki, it is possible to see the 
importance of these differences: the filmic reel on which the images are printed is 
called by the English transliteration of the word “film” (firumu), while when referred 
to as a narrative apparatus it is called “cinema” (eiga). The medium of film is termed 
“moving pictures” (katsudō shashin) but each specific film is called only 
 “movement” (katsudō), while the visual phenomenon of film is simply called 
“photograph” (shashin). That is, the particular visual phenomenon of film is split 
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between movement (katsudō) and photographic stasis (shashin). Tanizaki suggests, by 
his differential terminology, that there is not only one dimension to “film.”  
The same process of differentiation happens in relation to how visible 
phenomena are named. Yurako’s bodily poses are referred to as “figure” or 
“appearance” (sugata), while when rendered in drawing by the old man’s memory 
they are defined by their “shape” (katachi). A mental image produced by the 
encounter with filmic image is termed “illusion” (gen’ei), a word compounded of the 
characters of “phantom” (幻: gen, maboroshi) and “shadow” (影: ei, kage), but the 
filmic image on screen is sometimes called a “shadow” (kage), which the Mr. Aozuka 
opposes to the idea of Substance (jittai), which would carry no visible appearance but 
would, nonetheless, connect Yurako to other physical bodies, such as the white 
Canadian film star Marie Prevost’s.27 Ultimately, the main characteristic of filmic 
visibility is defined by the fact of its luminosity—it is “shadow and light” (kage to 
hinata)—which becomes visible only by the interruption of the screen. (En 286; Jp 
184) Tanizaki suggests, at the level of concepts instead of that of narrative, that the 
minimum element of film consists of a material interruption of light. The visible, it 
seems to suggest, depends on the material condition of visual perception. 
Although mostly rendered in English through the word “image,” the text 
makes use of several different terms to describe what is visible, making constant shifts 
                                                 
27 The translation by Thomas Lamarre privileges fluidity in the reading, so it is not 
consistent in the terminology, sometimes deploying “shadow-image” for kage 
(shadow), “spectral image” for gen’ei (hallucination), sometimes “phantom image” 
(290), which is also used in the case of the drawings (katachi) and the figure of her 
body (sugata). Other times it conflates different visual phenomena in simply the word 
“image.”  
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according to the material support in which visibility happens and is processed. The 
image is part of the apparatus (dispositif) of film, which is defined by its mediation: 
the perception of perception itself, which is neither transcendental nor universal, but 
transnational in its circulation, and localized in its actualization. It, at once, enables 
and dissolves commodification. Against the common fascination with filmic 
transcendental temporality—exemplified by the approach of Octávio de Faria—
Tanizaki refuses to give ontological ground to filmic synthesis by neither unifying a 
concept of film, nor of image.  
Tanizaki’s conceptualization of the filmic image is characterized not by the 
common dichotomy between real/false, interior/exterior, deep/superficial. It does not 
subscribe to a “phenomenology of the inside,” as Akira Lippit describes the particular 
a-visuality of film as related to the search for the “depths” of “the movements of life” 
(58) since movement is neither on the image nor on the screen. It is not even defined 
by the screen’s surface-dimension. It is rather defined by being a product of light—
electrical light—which is neither movement, nor stasis, but a visual matter only once it 
is interrupted. If, on the experience level, Tanizaki’s theory emphasizes the body as 
inescapable, its critical relation to the “anthropological ambivalence” spurred by the 
modernizing discourse also lies in its (non)definition of the image, which emerges as a 
relation between material apparatuses of industrial capitalism’s and its processes of 
commodification. Movement is localized as an assemblage produced within one’s 
body.  
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Geopolitics of Perception: the dislocation of movement  
Much can be read into the two “peripheral” theoretical propositions analyzed 
here. However, as a brief conclusion, I will return to some aspects, convergent and 
divergent, in order to raise some questions about the “geopolitics of perception”: the 
relation between image, apparatus, geopolitics, and body. The starting point of the 
“geopolitics of perception” contained in Octávio de Faria and Tanizaki Jun’ichiro’s 
film theories can be summarized in two statements that derive from the analyses of 
their anxieties and aspirations. They can be thus described: 
 
(1) Film, as an apparatus, responded to, and brought about, a shifting definition 
of visual perception, in which the relation between body, nation 
(geopolitical location), and historical narrative (world-history) seem to be 
on the cusp of changing—and this would be, for the peripheral subject, 
film’s promise and task, in a moment in which its very shape as a medium 
seemed yet to be defined; 
 
(2) While the aesthetic experience of temporal and spatial distortions provided 
by film are related to modern anxieties with the loss of the control over 
time and space—which creates the demand to visualize temporal change 
and of eliminate distance—film dislocates the place of the spectator from 
the centrality of a “pure” detached observer—an eye with a brain—to an 
embodied and located subject, whose dislocation evinces the impossibility 
of the desired control. 
 
The two statements are mutually related and (over)determined by the demands of 
modern capitalism—the management of time required by the production of exchange-
value; and the management of bodies in their existence as labor force for the nation, in 
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which the biopolitics of racial and sexual difference converge in the organization of an 
international division of labor, informing the metaphysics of national difference. 
Filmic experiment on perception thus carries both a historical promise of eliminating 
geopolitical distance; while it also reveals historical, physical, temporal restriction 
through the failed desire for a transcendental universal subject—that is, the failure of 
sameness.  
Although the evolutionary narrative usually places film in the scientific 
timeline of the path to the capture of evidentiary truth, the medium of film has actually 
brought perception to a place of doubt. Instead of affirming objectivity in grasping 
movement, following the scientific discourse of the late nineteenth-century, film has 
actually thrown the relation between movement and visibility under suspicion. The 
question of whether synthetic movement is true or not—that is, if the movement seen 
on screen is actual movement—is fundamental for building disputing ontologies of 
film.28  
Whereas Faria, dreaming with a future in which films would have no cuts, will 
affirm the filmic image as a formless pure continuity and absolute movement that 
delivers a vital force of life—that is, privileging the visible image over the materiality 
of the technological apparatus—Tanizaki will suggest that the ground of film is its 
photogram, which holds an intimate relation to the close-up and the disorientation it 
causes on spectators by the movement-effect it spurs. If to Faria movement is in the 
image, to Tanizaki it is in the spectator’s body. 
                                                 
28 For a rich debate on the relation between movement, scientific discourse, and 
temporal analysis, see Jimena Canales, A Tenth of a Second, 2009. 
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The location of movement, and its visibility, are directly related to the 
definition of perception as a question of time. Faria will desire an image that is 
absolute in a continuity, a totality with no engagement to the body but rather as a 
connection to a transcendental and universal life. His rejection of revolutionary 
politics was based precisely on his rejection of revolutionary time: the possibility of 
the new, the interruption of continuity, stemming from material, localized, and 
physical clashes. As a conservative catholic thinker, Faria’s thought was premised on 
an idea of the human that was devoid of historicity, of place, and body. 
From the periphery, Faria imagines a future for the filmic image that would 
liberate the elite from its peripheral spatial constraints, based on a universality that is 
not of the apparatus, but of an absolute image that would convey a total life, received 
by a disembodied vision. His conservative political thought emerges in his film theory 
through his adamant rejection of interruption in favor of a no-body’s “life” in an 
endless present. Movement, in this sense, becomes the opposite of change. The 
question for the medium shifts from the possibility of seeing movement to the 
desirability of it. Theorizing a pure image with no apparatus, Faria imagines the 
possibility of vision without perception, or an image without mediation—which is the 
only way to make it an object outside of time.   
Tanizaki starts from a different point of departure: there is no escape from the 
body to the racialized subject. Race intervenes as a visible marker of embodiment that 
cannot be escaped. His theory of filmic perception is a material theory of the body: 
movement is in the body, both in its formation and in its fetish effects. The image is 
the passage and the interruption of light received by the spectator’s body. The actual 
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film is a series of frames, each carrying with it a suggestion of movement, but each 
also being a commodity in the modern and global apparatus of cinema. The relation 
between image and temporality is that of a constant change, even when one is halted 
under the fetish. If Tanizaki—like Faria—has to deal with the question of being the 
peripheral spectator for the commodification of the global imaginary of Hollywood, he 
offers a different response to the problem posed by the desire of globality. There is no 
escape from locality, which does not exclude the possibility of seeing. 
Ultimately, the central question is that of a politics of perception that is already 
understood as a relation between image, apparatus, and body. The novelty of film, in 
this sense, was not its sharper realism, but rather its displacement of movement from 
visibility and to the domain of embodied affect. These two propositions represent two 
poles of an ontological dispute that will animate much of the way filmic perception 
and synthetic movement were thought and practiced in the peripheral modernist sphere 
and its position of power and desire. The political implications of opening movement, 
and change, to the physically static will be further explored in the coming chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2: TWO FOSSILS OF THE AVANT-GARDE 
 
Fossils of the Avant-garde 
Limite (Mário Peixoto, 1931) and A Page of Madness (Kurutta Ichipēji, 
Kinugasa Teinosuke, 1926) are two mythological objects. When released around the 
late 1920s to the early 1930s, respectively in Brazil and Japan, both were hailed as the 
first true cinematic accomplishments in their national spaces, but were lost in the 
following decades to reemerge only four decades later. Their long disappearance from 
the public view, however, helped inscribe them deeper in the history of film as lost 
masterpieces, couched in the critical discourses that placed them as missing links of 
global filmic avant-gardes, and evidences for the globality of their local modernities. 
Partaking in the aesthetic experimentation and enthusiasm with the possibilities of the 
filmic medium, they were envisioned as a local response, or sometimes synthesis, to 
the historical avant-gardes that had been coming out of Europe. They were received as 
tokens of a modern achievement, an amalgam of desires for a medium that was still in 
the making. The medium to come, the usual critical discourse asserted, had finally 
arrived in those peripheral spaces with these films.  
The common aspects that join the discursive constructions and the filmic body 
of both objects are unexpectedly numerous. Not only were they products built upon 
publicity campaigns in the print media selling them as national achievements in filmic 
art, but also both films were received in a superlative way, and remained covered in an 
aura of mythological fascination in the following decades until today, even though 
they were much less seen than commented. After a decades-long material absence, in 
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which they produced ostensibly present lacunae in their national filmic imaginaries, 
they re-emerged to the public’s view in the 1970s: in 1971, Kinugasa accidentally 
found the almost complete reels (but one) of his film in his house, which were deemed 
lost to combustion in 1950; and Peixoto’s film had its long process of precarious 
restoration finally concluded in 1977, after its history of material decay that included 
also a confiscation by the civil-military regime. Both films had lost chunks of their 
bodies, due to poor conservation and to their very material existences as highly 
combustible nitrate films. But their non-existence as visible objects had informed their 
roles as landmark films of modern-nations-to-come. The decades of their uncertain 
material presence seem to deepen, not without a hint of irony, their inscriptions in the 
historical narratives of their local modernities.  
"To rediscover a lost film is similar to discovering a new celestial body," wrote 
film critic Yomota Inuhiko in a recent essay on A Page of Madness, revealing the 
enduring fascination with this avant-garde object (181).29 This celestial body travelled 
the world and built its place in film historiographies as a “pure fossil of the glorious 
avant-garde,” in Yomota's words: less as a film, more as an object to be “exhibited” 
and “appreciated” (Yomota 198). Just as in the case of Peixoto’s Limite, which 
repeatedly figured as an enchanted object of film criticism in Brazil over the decades, 
and has just recently been voted, again, the “best Brazilian film of all times” by the 
Brazilian Critics Association, in 2015, and revered with the release of its restored copy 
                                                 
29 All translations from Japanese and Portuguese here are mine, except from when 
otherwise noted. 
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by the canonizing World Film Project run by Martin Scorsese.30 Ever since their first 
screenings, critical discourses tend to repeat the astonishment with both films, seen as 
the first national achievements in “pure film art,” always under a discourse of 
affirmation of the national in a global stage: the achievement of the “universal.” 
Yomota describes A Page of Madness as “a film one can consider the apex of Japanese 
film history, in perfect conditions. It was a big event that filled in a missing link in 
film history" (181). João Luiz Vieira, in 1987, writes about Limite as Brazil’s “best 
contribution to the international avant-garde.” (137) 
Taking Yomota Inuhiko’s celestial cue, I recall Walter Benjamin's notions of 
the image, and of the historical object, to point towards a different constellation for the 
films. In the Arcades Project, Benjamin writes that “History decays into images, not 
into stories” (Benjamin, Arcades Project 476). “It is owing to this monadological 
structure that the historical object finds represented in its interior its own fore-history 
and after-history” (Benjamin, Arcades Project 475). The historicity of the fossil is 
similar to that of the monad, in which a glimpse into its different layers reveals its 
different historical temporalities—lived and imagined—which are produced by the 
repetitive gesture of return to it. Fossilization entails an enchanted unearthing, in a 
repeated gesture of discovery-production of its layers, which I will, at least partially, 
attempt to unfold here not in their “truth” but in their aporias and tensions with the 
very experience that the films spur. 
                                                 
30 Bruce Williams, in “The lie that told the truth: (Self) publicity strategies and the 
myth of Mario Peixoto’s Limite,” does a retrospective of all discourses that built the 
myth of Limite. 
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The fossilization of the films has turned them into monuments—monuments of 
cinema, but also monuments of the modern colonized ethos, constantly shaped by the 
desire to partake in a world-historical mapping defined by the parameters of the 
metropole and its avant-garde. This is attested by the extensive array of monographs 
devoted to deciphering their textualities—sometimes perpetuating their mythology 
through eulogistic close analyses, or at other times in order to understand their origins 
in film-historical researches. A fossil, after all, spurs the desire for origins as a 
constituent part of its mythology. As fossils, these fetish-objects of modernity exist in 
repeated scenes of arrival, under different constellations that illuminate their bodies 
each time.  
The films’ cult value comes largely from their supposed overcoming of their 
locality, achieving a “universal” aesthetic experience that would set the spectators free 
from their geocultural “particularity.”31 The discourses that shape them as myth-
objects usually attribute to them the status of avant-garde not for the destructive ethos 
that would define the idea of avant-garde, but rather for their “suitability” to what was 
happening in Europe then: the discourse and codification of a “peripheral” avant-garde 
functions not as the figure of the rupture and the leap, but rather as a “catching up.” 32 
It is as if the discourse of origins would find in the fossil the image of European 
                                                 
31 For a critique of the dichotomy of particular/universal, see Naoki Sakai, “Modernity 
and Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism,” 1989. 
32 Jonathan Abel has read how critical discourses on A Page of Madness, 
contemporaneous or recent, place the film in the avant-gardes not as “radical breaks” 
away from the past—which is the usual understanding of the (European) avant-gardes, 
but rather as a “catching up” with “European technical trends.” (74) See Abel’s article 
for a succinct overview of the critical reception of the film in the occasion of its 
release. 
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modernity, performing a fascination with sameness that seems almost opposite to the 
ethos of the avant-garde. The point is not that these films are not avant-garde because 
they brought no rupture neither with current aesthetics, nor with institutional 
structures, as Jonathan Abel complains—the point is that the very idea of “avant-
garde” meant something else in both institutional and aesthetic terms for the non-
“Western” nations: the teleology of the avant-garde appears clearly in the future-
desiring peripheral avant-garde that seemed trapped in an inescapable promise and 
longing. This geo-temporal cleavage, present in the very body of the films, is what is 
of interest here, since it connects the temporal structure of filmic perception with the 
world-historical project that housed it not as confirmation but as an evidence of its 
failure. That is their theoretical work. 
In this chapter, I turn away from the fossilized fascination in order to look at 
the discourses that shaped the fossils, and the aesthetic experience they sought to 
engender. What is in and around those objects? How do they theorize film? They 
embody an experimentation on perception that performs and produces a temporal 
anxiety around an impossible desire to overcome their very perceptual restrictions—
mirroring the politics of the peripheral avant-garde that sought to overcome historical 
and geopolitical situatedness. My approach to these films stand not on their 
mythology, but on a point of intersection that seeks to understand what is the media-
political workings of these “fossils of the avant-garde”: which imagens and theories do 
they activate, what aesthetic experience do they aim at, and which desires and 
imaginations do they reveal? 
Several times described as sorts of riddles, mysterious beings followed by their 
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mesmerized spectators, the films’ textual dimension and their lost material parts 
converge to produce an experience of visual endurance and fascination with their 
hermetic refusal of legibility. That is, their aesthetic politics and experience are 
contingent upon their materiality. Common readings since the very moment they 
appeared as discursive objects in the public sphere focus on their experimental and 
rhythmic montage, making use of the notions of purity and absorption, placing them as 
the opposite of “rationality”— “pure and absolute cinema.” Directly connected to 
political-theoretical endeavors of a cosmopolitan local discourse on aesthetics—the 
“New Perception School” in Japan (Shinkankaku-ha), and the Chaplin Club in Brazil 
(see chapter 1)—they respond to certain anxieties regarding perception that reveal 
political questions related to the nature of time and its geopolitical cleavage in world-
historical narratives. Understanding mediation as a political-phenomenological 
question, this chapter will engage a temporal reading of these objects, in dialogue with 
their discursive milieu, in order to unravel the various forces that converged in the 
fascination with film in those peripheral spaces to/of modernity. 
 
Experiments 
What does it mean for a film to be experimental? What does an “experiment” 
consist of? Film theorist Gertrude Koch sees film as an “experiment on human 
beings,” taking the idea of experimental cinema to a different sphere, one that is 
directly related to the modern scientific rationality not through its mechanical 
indexicality. Instead, what defines such an experimentation, she claims, is the capacity 
to dislocate the observer through perception: 
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The fascination that the experiment has held as a technologically grounded 
cultural technique of desiring desire against any and all skepticism is above all 
emphasized where the experimental arrangement directly targets human 
perception, that is, the impact of an experiment, which is supposed to be new 
and to take place in the interplay between the reception of the senses and that 
of affect. (Koch 101)  
 
Inscribed in the scientificist search for visible proof, the filmic medium however 
scaled up the fact that mediation has its thickness, acting upon both sides: 
“observation modifies the fact observed, since there is no such thing as observation 
disembodied from all physical action, nor is there intelligence without an organ nor a 
man without a body.”(Koch 101) In film, Koch suggests, “the spectator is animated by 
the animation and displaced in a specific way into the state of vitality.” (101) What is 
at stake in the “state of vitality” produced by the experimental act of filmic 
observation is precisely the political place of mediation—“the interplay between the 
reception of the senses and that of affect”—that opens up a zone of thrust between the 
physicality of the world and the spectator’s desire, between body and affect. It is in 
this interstitial zone that the two films here discussed work as “experimental films”: 
not only for the fact that they were actively experimenting with their medium, but, 
more importantly, because their fascination with filmic perception reveals the gap 
between sensorial apparatus and historical desire that mirrors the discourse of the 
avant-garde in the “periphery” of the European sphere. 
The story of Kinugasa’s A Page of Madness takes place in a mental hospital. 
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The protagonist is the hospital janitor (Inoue Masao), a former sailor who struggles 
with guilty over his wife's mental condition (Nakagawa Yoshie), hospitalized for 
having drowned their baby child while he was away in the sea. His wife's mental 
illness becomes a threat to the marriage of their teenage daughter (Ījima Ayako) with a 
well-established bourgeois young man. Haunted by the madness of the wife, the film 
shows the gradual loss of the janitor's sanity, as the spectators experience with him a 
series of delirious visual montages, which place him and the viewer alongside the 
confined patients. The actual plot, however, is nearly unintelligible. The most 
important aspect is the aesthetic experience produced by its montage and camera 
work, through the film's relation to madness not only as representation, but also as a 
perceptual regime that is characteristic of film: fast cuts, double exposure, distorted 
images, blurry movements.  
Mario Peixoto's Limite is also a film about perception and perceptual 
restriction, although the general tone of the film is, instead of Kinugasa’s fast paced 
montage, a slow and stretched temporality—albeit always modulated by gusts of 
abrupt movement. The vague plot tells the story of two women (Tatiana Rey, Carmen 
Santos) and a man (Raul Schnoor) adrift on a boat in the open sea. Shot on the 
Southern coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro, the presence of open nature does not 
convey a romantic harmonic existential openness, but rather a situation in which the 
bodies have no physical escape—a sort of temporal trap, an imposed present tense, 
which is doubled in the film form itself through repetition, abrupt camera movements, 
and interplay between fast and slow shots.  
Both films narrate stories of physical restriction and mental disorientation, 
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portraying madness through an “avant-garde” film style that, in its formal 
experimentation, highlights the filmic machine (máquina, kikai) and its presence. 
Their overt explorations of the possibilities of filmic visuality thus relate the human 
bodies on screen not only with the bodies of the spectators, but also suggest a 
convergence between film and body engendered by the modes of interpellation used 
by the very construction of the films: speed, length, clarity. The very constitution of 
the body of the film—the sequence of mobile shots—becomes an experiment on the 
body of the spectator, whose perception assembles the perception of the film. The 
mediated temporality of the films is made constantly visible, revealing a politics of the 
body that will be understood in the specificity of the “film bodies” they animate: the 
materiality of the film itself (the body of the film), the visible space provided to the 
bodies on screen, and their impact of the spectator’s body. 
Through ostensible use of cross-cutting, juxtaposition, rapid and non-narrative 
camera movements, and many other technical devices that manipulate time and space, 
the films draw our attention to what Vivian Sobchack calls their own “bodies”: “the 
physiology and anatomy of cinematic technology,” that is, their materiality as a 
medium. (Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 171) But, if “cinematic technology's 
function of materially embodying perception and expression as a situated, finite, 
centered and decentering lived-body” is a reminder that film brings about the 
inescapable restriction of any subject-consciousness, as Sobchack’s film-
phenomenology claims, Peixoto’s and Kinugasa’s films’ fascination with their own 
film bodies and anatomies demands a step beyond the phenomenological reading. 
(Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 167) 
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If film-phenomenology calls attention to the direct relation between the mode 
of perception of film and the mode of perception of subject in the world, it is not 
enough to stop the assessment there, at the risk of universalizing the categories 
mobilized: subject, world, body. Instead, the relation brought to the fore between the 
body of the film, the body in the film, and the body in front the film, calls for a critical 
reading of the affect of restriction that structures both Kinugasa’s and Peixoto’s film, 
paying attention to the imbrication between these three bodily instances and their 
modes of visibility: the restricted are female bodies, given to be seen by bodies in 
specific geographic contexts, in specific conditions of mobility. To read the 
geopolitics of perception inherent in the mode-of-being produced by film requires that 
we, at once, historicize the fascination with the technically mediated experience of 
film and understand that all bodies are politically determined, some more restricted 
than others. In other words, it is important to keep in mind that the lived-bodies that 
are summoned in dislocation and commutation by filmic mediation are located and 
determined—that is the node of its “experimentation,” the space between body and 
affect that, as Gertrud Koch suggests, is the territory of any experiment. 
The centrality of the filmic technology as an issue addressed by the films 
appears through the exploration of the techniques particular to the medium. It is 
possible to understand the films as geo-historical experiments by the way they are 
invested with a desire for a modernity-to-come not based solely on their 
representation—as is the case of much of peripheral modernism’s visual culture, 
which sought to bring modernity to the present through its representation—but also on 
the belief on the capacity of the filmic perception to surpass the restriction of the 
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human body. It responds, at once, both to the agenda of the international avant-garde, 
and also to a fascination with filmic perception per se, as a sort of disembodied 
sensorial apparatus.  
The two dimensions, of experimentation and of representation, call for a 
politicization of the phenomenological understanding of the technological mediation 
of film; that is, of the several rapports it builds between film and body. Such 
understanding should consider film’s effects on perception, and, at the same time, 
film’s representative space: what it gives visibility to, and how it does so. Following 
these two dimensions—in phenomenology categorized as perception and expression; 
or, in other words, the dimensions of experience (perception) and of visibility 
(representation)—we can unravel the “desire for modernity” in the intersection 
between the invisible and the visible. It is by understanding the spaces of experience—
the film body—in tandem with the spaces of visibility—the bodies in the film—that a 
critical approach to its “geopolitics of perception” can be essayed.  
The question here is not the identification process analyzed by psychoanalytic 
film theory and ideology critique in classical narrative cinema, inasmuch as the films 
of Peixoto and Kinugasa do the opposite from hiding its apparatus: they foreground 
their filmic bodies, as if pointing towards their very being film. Instead of hiding, they 
show—not in a critical self-reflexive way, but rather in the mode of fascination: as if 
to remind the spectator what wonders modern filmic perception is capable of.33  
                                                 
33 Psychoanalytic film theory has posited a convergence between spectator’s eye and 
camera that would elude the apparatus of film. Focusing on classical narrative cinema, 
which privileges diegetic continuity to operate a suture between narrative, apparatus, 
and spectator’s eye, hiding its own process of construction through invisible editing, 
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It is worth remembering that the two films were, so to say, the experimental objects of 
aesthetic agendas that were gaining traction in their cultural contexts. Both were 
considered as the first films “worth seeing” in their national intelligentsia, as if they 
were long-awaited bodies that would provide the modern agenda of the local avant-
garde elites with a true national object of pride. It is even possible to say that both 
were the very first “national films” seen by many in their respective countries, since 
the filmic aspirations of these peripheral spaces were marked by a tacit rejection of the 
national cinema, deemed of lower quality.34 Limite and A Page of Madness were the 
first national films positively received as “real” cinema (which was seen as a 
synonym for modernity) by many intellectuals and artists (including those present in 
this dissertation). Before becoming fossils, they were already seen as rare objects that 
carried an “international” aura, as metonymic objects of a desire that was attached to 
the medium itself both as a perceptual mode (the bodily senses) and as a historical 
fetish for modernity (affect). Animated by a desire for filmic perception, they imply an 
ontological statement on film that exists, precisely, on the gap between those two 
                                                 
now canonical theories such as Christian Metz’s, Laura Mulvey’s, and Jean-Louis 
Baudry’s, have analyzed the convergence between the filmic and the spectator's look, 
who would undergo a process of narcissistic identification with the bodies on screen, 
and scopophilic identification with the camera. Here I move away from this paradigm 
not only because it falls short of the multilayered and negotiated experience of 
spectatorship—such as famously pointed out by critical race theories such as bell 
hooks’s and Manthia Diawara’s—contingent upon many other variables particular to 
each subject and situation of seeing, but also because the films discussed here, I argue, 
have vision not only as means but also as object of fascination. 
34 A late 1940’s quote by famous Brazilian poet and intellectual Vinicius de Moraes 
shows well the state of self-deprecation of national cinema: “Brazilian cinema does not 
exist, or at least [...] is latent in two or three films that some talented directors made out 
of nothing.” (Vinícius de Moraes, quoted in Galvão, p.32) One of the “two or three 
films” is, in effect, Limite, long-idealized by Moraes. 
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dimensions. 
 
Disjointed time: Limite and the universal trap of waiting 
 
 
Figure 1: “Limite and its position in universal cinema”  
(Revista Bazar, January 30, 1932)  
 
Texts about Limite began to appear in several publications already during its pre-
production and shooting. While the film gained special attention in theoretical and 
avant-garde oriented journal O Fan, it also appeared in the famous Hollywood-
centered Brazilian journal Cinearte, showing the range of the spectrum its promise 
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reached. As is stated in big letters in the 30 January 1932 issue of Bazar, Limite 
caused an excitement by supposedly carving a place for Brazil in “universal cinema.” 
(Figure 1, above) The common aspects to all critical assessments include the fact that 
the film was made in Brazil, along with notes on its aesthetic style: its rhythmic and 
non-narrative montage. In the pages of Cinearte, in September 1930, for example, 
many months before Limite’s first screening, an anonymous author writes that:  
 
Brazilian cinema must be different, much different from North-American 
cinema. It must, above all, be Brazilian cinema, in order to achieve its true 
artistic and even industrial objective. That is what the boys that are shooting 
“Limite” are doing. […] “Limite” is the most original of all Brazilian films. It 
is a different film. A sort of Russian cinema… in diapers. Without that superb 
sense of the masses that fills films such as “Storm over Asia.” But already with 
some of the symbolism and strange rhythm of those films. 35 
 
In the historical teleology, Brazilian cinema is an infantile, “Russian cinema in 
diapers.” The fact that such a critical discourse already existed even before the film’s 
public screening reveals the level of expectation spurred by Peixoto’s first film—and 
the cultural capital it disposed of. The discourse around the film is enabled, of course, 
by the social milieu in Peixoto himself circulated: the cultural and economic elite of 
Rio de Janeiro, the capital of the Republic. But If Limite’s “nationality” pleased all 
spectrum of the critic –from the “market” and US-oriented Cinearte to the “artistic” 
aspiring theorists of O Fan—it was its film-body, its material and aesthetic 
                                                 
35 Cinearte, September 1930, p.n/a. 
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constitution, that seemed to make it stand out, almost as a direct outcome of the 
aesthetic positions defended by Octávio de Faria and his peers in the Chaplin Club. 
(see chapter 1)  
In fact, it was the group of Octávio de Faria who organized the film’s first 
screening, on May 17, 1931, at the Cinema Capitólio in the city of Rio de Janeiro 
(Figure 2, below). The introductory essay printed on the back of the invitation presents 
the critical discourse that would define the film in its life from that moment on:  
 
the film is a huge rhythm, of despair and angst, of isolation and of limit, in 
which thousands small details evolve and complement at each moment. All 
image has its very clear inner rhythm and partakes, through its duration, in a 
general rhythm that, along with the others, constitutes the general rhythm of 
the film.  (back of invitation) 
 
Although there is no signature to the text, the vocabulary is reminiscent of Faria’s 
theoretical essays—the focus on duration, the notion of the rhythm, the strive for a 
total pure and wordless image: “A film that is pure, in which the images speak for 
themselves, through their rhythm.” (back of invitation) The drive to totality—to the 
purity of an absolute and non-mediated filmic vision—is actualized in the rhetoric of 
exploration of the medium as generator of autonomous images, a pure and self-
obliterating mediation.  
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Figure 2: back of invitation for Limite’s first screening by the Chaplin Club 
 
On an essay published in July 17, 1931 in O Jornal, commenting on the screening of 
Limite, Octávio de Faria claims that, among many of the qualities of the film, Peixoto 
had managed to, so to say, de-localize nature, avoiding the “embarrassment” brought 
by the usual portrayal of nature exhibited by Brazilian film.36 If natural landscapes 
were, by then, already an imprinted cliché-image of Brazil, Faria welcomes the 
capacity of the film-body—the construction of rhythm through alternation of long and 
short durations, the use of low angles, the possibility of scrutinizing various object—to 
“rip out” [arrancar] the visible from the natural, the landscape from its place. The 
body of the film would, thus, open the possibility of form to make content, its time, 
and space through rhythm, “images of “variable” sizes” and durations, sharp angles of 
                                                 
36 Octávio de Faria, “Natureza e Rhitmo,” O Jornal, July 17, 1931, 14.  It is important 
to remember that “filmes de natureza” (nature films) was also the name given to 
documentary productions made in the early decades of the twentieth century in Brazil, 
as opposed to the “filmes posados” (posed films). 
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the camera, and de-naturalizing juxtapositions. A mere object, such as a coconut tree, 
in this way, becomes, in film and through film, the foreshadowing of an electricity 
pole: an object that not only represents the very condition of possibility of film itself—
electric light—but which signifies a long-awaited yet-to-come modernity (Figures 3–
5).37 To escape the global economy of exoticism, the “anatomy of the film” shows the 
desire of universality through a narcissistic fascination with its own existence as a 
perceptual experiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Vicente de Araújo de Paula, in his canonical and much contested history of early 
cinema in Rio de Janeiro, narrates how the much expected late arrival of electric light 
to the city made possible the flourishing of a supposedly thriving film culture in the 
capital of the first Republic—the much criticized myth of the Belle Époque of 
Brazilian cinema (1908-1911).  
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Figures 3, 4, 5 
 
 
Some three decades after its release, Peixoto wrote a text, signing as Sergei 
Eisenstein—a strategy to attract investors to his new (never shot) project, producing a 
myth that survived for many years—titled “A Film from South America,” published in 
1965. Using the Soviet director’s name, Peixoto described the film as “one inexorable 
scream,” in which “the whole is held up by a total freedom of vision.”38 But the 
totality of visual freedom, in the film, is conveyed by immobile bodies, trapped in a 
boat somewhere in the Brazilian coast. In the now classic and much quoted hoax, the 
dialectics of locality and universality—tropical South America spoken by universal 
film name Eisenstein—is repeated diegetically, now cast upon the affective language 
of anguish and restriction that brings together the film’s melancholy tone, its 
geopolitics of avant-garde, and the very anatomy of its “film-body” to the realm of 
desire: wanting but not granting. The film shows (in its narrative) and performs (in its 
structure) an optical situation in which the body is summoned to the act of a total gaze 
by its impossibility, facing a constant frustration in the mode of a waiting that seems to 
                                                 
38 Mário Peixoto, “Um Filme da América do Sul,” 3. 
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embody the desire for totality inherent in its own fascination with filmic perception.  
    
Figures 6 and 7: the “open” sea and the trapped woman 
    
Figures 8 and 9: the other two trapped bodies in the boat 
 
Whether be it the repetitive looping shots that approach objects and bodies, such as in 
the frantic scream on the top of mountain, or through the arresting close-up shots of 
objects and body parts, or when the camera wanders about by itself, the film highlights 
its capacity of seeing, as if filmic vision were its main object. While it gives off a 
feeling of exploration of filmic vision, it also impacts the visual experience as a 
constant remembrance of our submission to the mediation of the technology: velocity 
comes with repetition, and visibility comes with slow arrest, both producing the desire 
to escape the filmic frame dictated by the camera. The rigid aesthetic construction of 
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the film becomes a commentary on the limits, not freedom, of perception. 
 “South America, at first unknown and strange to my knowledge, stretches out 
to me this night, through the contrition of the images, the much disturbing trap of a 
universal language,” writes the imaginary Eisenstein in Peixoto's text, evoking the 
Griffithian utopia of a universal language, here however rendered a trap. (Peixoto, 
“Um Filme da América do Sul” 92) Is it a trap because an image is not a language? Or 
is it because, coming from South America, nothing can be universal? Rather, the 
“disturbing trap”—the trap of cinema and the trap of the modern discourse of the 
avant-garde—stems from the belief in the liberation through a universal that can only 
appear through the inescapably restrictive phenomenon of filmic perception. The film-
body that calls our attention to the very fact of vision seems to state that a detached, 
universal, and disembodied seeing can only exist as an ever-repeating gesture of 
promise: it never comes, as an arrested movement that is temporally disjointed from 
bodily perception. The “experiment on animation” provided by technologically 
mediated perception functions as a reminder of the intrinsic waiting—never-arriving—
contained in the displaced idea of the avant-garde to the periphery, performed by the 
temporal apparatus of frustration constructed by the film.  
 
Disjointed time: A Page of Madness and the promise of movement 
Kinugasa Teinosuke’s Kurutta Ichipēji, in the English translation A Page of 
Madness, also has its “film-body” as a marker of its history. Scholars such as Aaron 
Gerow and Yomota Inuhiko have paid attention to the changes that the film has 
undergone since its first screening. From the original 2,142 feet negative, the current 
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version has 1,617 feet, shortening the 103-minute length to the current 78 minutes, if 
the projection is made in the original speed of 18 frames per second. The film today is 
composed of more than 800 shots, leaving it at 3.3 seconds per shot, significantly 
faster than the classical narrative code. From the first negative, through the suggestion 
of Yokomitsu Riichi in a preview screening which resulted in the elimination of all 
written words, to the moment of rediscovery of the lost negative followed by more 
editing out of several scenes by Kinugasa himself, what was gradually suppressed was 
precisely its “intelligible” part, the narrative layer in which the family drama evolves: 
the melodramatic sequences that tell the story of the daughter's marriage. The film’s 
subtracted body produces a stronger sense of perceptual experimentation, producing in 
the “avant-garde fossil” as the unintelligible and so-called “purely” cinematic 
experience praised by many at the time of its release.  
Jonathan Abel claims that the original film, with all its reels, would have been 
seen as a fully narrative film, paying attention to how the discourses before and after 
the film’s reappearance in the mid-1970’s follows this route. Despite the absence of 
intertitles or any other verbal inscription, Abel reminds us that the narration of the 
benshi, which was present in the film’s first screenings, worked for joining what might 
seem now radically disjointed images. He suggests that the film—at the point of its 
inception—was more narrative than it might seem today. In fact, in order to further 
argue for his speculative claim, Abel imagines the higher narrativity of the film based 
on an assumption of a cognitive cultural difference. As he defends:  
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Significantly, Eisenstein had not seen Kurutta ichipeiji when he claimed that 
Japanese film was unaware of montage. If he had, he might have claimed that, 
though in the West montage may have been not only a revolutionary film 
technique but also a revolutionary mode of representation, in Japan (where, 
since the adoption of kanji in the 8th century, variously juxtaposed images 
created new meanings) it could be only the former. Thus, to a Japanese 
audience accustomed to finding meaning in combinations of discreet signs in 
both their films and language, Kurutta ichipeiji's "broken" narrative may not 
have been seen as so jarring as it is today by critics who are accustomed to 
more modern forms of filmic narrative. (Abel 77–78)  
 
Following Eisenstein’s famous Orientalist assumption—that the Japanese spectators 
already lived in a constant state of montage, due to the presence of the Chinese 
characters (kanji) in their written language—Abel suggests that, even without a benshi 
narration, Kinugasa’s film’s non-narrative experimental aspects would have been 
sutured by the culturally equipped Japanese cognitive apparatus. This particularizing 
culturalist hypothesis would then confirm the film’s “real” characteristic, that of being 
a “product of its time” (Abel 76). Following many of the “historicizing” critical 
discourses, Abel wants to promote the convergence between the object and its 
historical present, affirming the scheme of difference of world-historical mapping. 
In a 1926 article for the journal Kinema Junpō, the famous Marxist critic and 
theorist Iwasaki Akira wrote about A Page of Madness: "this film is the first world-
class [sekaiteki] film made in Japan. [...] Even though from the start I did not 
understand the plot of the film, I think that the cinema, being more immediate and not 
about a story, from now on, will be something that is not to be understood upon 
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seeing. [...]” (quoted in Yomota 192) The bodily impact of those images, their 
“experimental” agency on the spectator, Iwasaki suggests, were constitutive of their 
mode of mediation: “Watching A Page of Madness, I felt this instinctive bodily fear, 
my body was tensioned, and my eyes were filled with tears of joy. Then I felt this 
respect for Kinugasa that I hadn’t felt for any filmmaker in Japan. He knows the 
cinema.” (quoted in Yomota 192) The first world-class film to bring “true cinema” to 
Japan was, contrary to what Abel imagines, one that could not be understood but only 
sensed. What is interesting to notice is not only that the film available to us— what 
remains after the loss of a big, and explanatory chunk of its narrative dimension —is 
the experimental facet, but also that the current movie was the one seen by the 
commentators’ eyes in 1926. Not only the experiment outlived the longer film, but it is 
almost as if the desire for it brought the experimental to the fore in the repeated 
excavations of the fossil. The impression of unintelligibility was part of the desire for 
a bodily medium to which the film’s aesthetic agenda responded to. 
Just as Peixoto’s Limite, Kinugasa’s A Page of Madness was a film fascinated 
by its own being a film. As Abel himself notes, the film’s aura of modernity lied at the 
intersection of two versions of filmic purity promoted by the modernizing discourse 
called the “Pure Film Movement” (Jun’eigageki Undō): that of a seamless realist 
continuity in the modes of Hollywood classical narrative cinema, defended by 
theorists such as Kaeriyama Norimasa; and that of an embodied medium which blurs 
the boundaries between reality and dream by addressing the spectators as a bodily 
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disorienting experience, defended by Tanizaki Jun’ichirō. 39 Paradoxically, Kinugasa’s 
project was also embraced by the modernist group called the “New Perception 
School” (Shinkankaku-ha), whose activities were concentrated around the literary 
journal Bungei Jidai. As stated in Yokomitsu Riichi’s manifesto “The Perception 
Movement” (Kankaku Katsudō), published in the February 1925 issue of the journal, 
the group was engaged in the search for a “new perception” that would produce “the 
ability to perceive the objects themselves” in a direct sensorial rapport to “a pure 
object, an object that does not exist in relation to a subject,” achieved through a 
modern type of writing that would be unmediated and direct. (Yokomitsu 4) 
Irena Hayter sees this utopian immediate perception as the embodiment of the 
desire for the purification of vision from the other bodily senses, “a sensation that is 
somehow abstract, purged from the fleshy materiality of the body,” part of the project 
of separating rationality from physicality, suitable for the purifying discourse of 
separation and control of the imperial subject in relation to it colonies. (Hayter 304) 
Cinema’s capacity to capture the moving world was thus seen as a big opportunity to 
achieve such an ideal. With writers such as Kawabata Yasunari, Kataoka Teppei, and 
Yokomitsu Riichi, they joined efforts with Kinugasa and wrote the script for A Page of 
Madness under the name of “New Perception Film Association” (Shinkankaku Eiga 
Renmei), which would function as the filmic actualization of their media-
phenomenological agenda. At the intercrossing of all these imaginaries of mediation, 
what was at stake, similarly to the question that animated Peixoto’s Limite, was the 
                                                 
39 See Kaeriyama Norimasa, et al. Katsudō Shashingeki No Sōsaku to Satsueihō. 
Shohan., Yumani Shobō, 2006 [1917]. On Tanizaki, see chapter 1. 
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promise brought by the filmic medium itself: the promise of a pure perception, 
enabled by a modern type of technology, in which the role of mediation was to 
enhance the subject’s capacity of engaging with the physical world, paradoxically, in 
an unmediated way.  
In Kinugasa’s film, the fascination with the medium is performed through the 
experimentation with filmic perception through the visual experience of madness. 
Many scholars have shown how the choice of madness responds to its status as a 
modern social phenomenon. Around late Meiji and early Taishō period, madness was 
present in several media discourses of fear and fascination with mental illness, in the 
medicalization and disciplinarization of bodies central to modern biopolitics, and also 
in the proliferating discourses about the dangers of movie going and modern 
entertainment culture.40 As a social phenomenon, madness was a prime index of 
modernization, and filmic realism would be suited to give visibility to such a modern 
subjectivity. As a modern endeavor, Kinugasa’s filmic narrative, almost fully 
restricted to the confinement space of the psychiatric hospital, shows the gradual 
contagion of madness displayed by the janitor’s wife to the janitor himself. Unlike 
other contemporaneous avant-garde films that would use madness as a trope for 
modernity—Robert Wiener’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Das Cabinet des Dr. 
Caligari, 1920) might be the most iconic one—in Kinugasa's film madness is not only 
                                                 
40 See, for example, Aaron Gerow, Visions of Japanese Modernity, 2010; Aaron 
Gerow, A Page of Madness: Cinema and Modernity in 1920s Japan, 2008; Erc 
Cazdyn, Flash of Capital: Film and Geopolitics in Japan, 2002; and the previously 
mentioned Yomota Inuhiko. “Kinugasa Teinosuke Kurutta Ichipeji to 1920nen dai,” 
2015; Jonathan Abel, “Different from Difference: Revisiting Kurutta Ichipeji,” 2001. 
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the object of representation, but it is representation’s perceptual condition of 
possibility (Figures 10–11). If filmic perception promised the autonomy of vision—a 
vision without a body, born out of a machine—the dysfunctionality of madness is a 
suitable method through which to explore the medium, since it is vision beyond 
control.   
 
 
Figures 10 and 11 
 
Also an object of representation, madness functions to explore the medium of film, 
since its visibility emerges precisely on the outburst of movement out of stillness, in 
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the incongruous gestures that seem to exist for no reason, born out of those female 
bodies portrayed in the film. The mad gesture becomes the filmic sight/site par 
excellence: as a sheer exhibition of movement, movement per se, it reveals the use of 
the body as a medium for potential movement. But in Kinugasa’s film, madness is 
also doubled by the very visual organization of the film, which strives to mirror the 
incongruous movements of those bodies in a fast-paced montage. The film’s deep 
exploration of cinematic perception, with double exposures, distorted images, and 
invested in speed, delivers madness to/as the sensorial apparatus of the spectators, 
which is fully showcased already in the opening sequence, comprised of very quick 
intercalations of shots of an inmate dancing in a delirious way, a thunderstorm, 
musical instruments (a non-diegetic element that evokes the feeling of rhythm), and 
the confinement space of the hospital and its patients (Figures 12–17). The 
interpellation of the perception of movement happens through moving phenomena—
the body, the rain—and as a moving mode of mediation—lighting, framing, and 
montage. The sequence reaches such a fast speed that, towards its end, it becomes 
close to unintelligible. 
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Figures 12–17: opening sequence. 
 
It is known that the film’s first cut had a few intertitles, which were completely 
excluded in its last cut upon Yokomitsu Riichi’s request. Kinugasa, welcoming 
Yokomitsu's suggestion of cutting out all verbal inscriptions, explains it as a gesture of 
respect towards the filmic image (eizō). He writes: “When one, from the start, thinks 
excessively on the form of the screenplay and writes it down, it ends up becoming 
"literary" word, and we are deceived by such a word” (Kinugasa 73). He continues, 
about the opening sequence:  
 
For example, in the first scene of A Page of Madness, the one in the mental 
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hospital during the night and the heavy rain, the notes read “heavy rain, 
downpour” [...] Then we place the notes in front of our eyes repeatedly, and 
think of the screen. Or, better, we wait for the image to unfold itself. [...] It is 
not uncommon that scenes written on a simple way on the notes will gradually 
swell up [fukureagaru] as image [eizō]. (Kinugasa 73, my emphasis)  
 
In a brief commentary, Kinugasa sketches a system in which the visual filmic image—
the one that moves—is a living force of truth latent in the deceiving written image 
(imēji), waiting to be discovered and revealed.41 It is as if the filmic image would 
move as a living being that can “swell up”—and, as a living and moving entity, any 
stillness would harbor the potentiality for movement. Transforming the deceiving dead 
verbal imēji into the living filmic eizō, what takes place in his system would be a 
gradual process enabled by the camera, but necessarily mediated by the waiting of the 
spectator. Kinugasa thus implies that the filmic vitality would needs a state of waiting: 
it is a promise (or a trap, if we follow Peixoto’s words) of potential movement. 
 
What Time Is Movement?  
The fascination of both Kinugasa’s and Peixoto’s films with their very being 
films reveals, ultimately, a fascination with an autonomous movement that does not 
require actual movement to be felt. In different ways, they both strive to give visibility 
to movement as engendered by the filmic machine—be it either through the mobility 
                                                 
41 The distinction between the word imēji and eizō corresponds to the different type of 
mediation of the visual phenomenon. While first one, written in the kana phonetic 
script, corresponds to any type of visual image, the second one is used for the 
technically produced image of film and photography. To read more about the 
historicity of this distinction, see Yuriko Furuhata’s Cinema of Actuality, 2013. 
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of the camera; or be it within the image, through the manipulations of montage and 
film exposure—which makes it precisely a mechanical movement, generated by the 
technological mediation. From the evoked image (imēji) to the technical image (eizō), 
what happens is the emergence of movement, engendered in the machine but produced 
by the screen-mediated perception. The production of filmic vitality—the movement 
that emerges once the still photogram is animated by the projector—is not under the 
control of the subject: as Kinugasa hinted at, waiting constitutes the liminal 
temporality that animates the films themselves. 
Vivian Sobchack argues that film “has being in the sense that it behaves. A still 
photograph, however, does not behave; rather, it waits—as a vacancy—for us to 
possess it” (Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 61). This quote encapsulates much of 
the phenomenological debate around media ontology and filmic movement. It 
describes photography's ambiguous relation with time as a type of waiting, a denial of 
the living experience. In this sense, the “living” quality of film would be its capacity 
for movement, which would be directly related to life: one moves because one is a 
body, which is finite, situated, and limited. In a binary view—according to which 
photography is that which film is not— photography would be the opposite of life for 
its lack of movement. Because a still photography does not move, it would thus stand 
outside lived time in its “compelling emptiness,” which Sobchack sees as a desire for 
infinitude (Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 58). In this sense, the phenomenological 
argument would claim that photography, as a waiting to be acted upon, would strive 
for an escape from time, while filmic duration would represent a full embracing of the 
temporal becoming of the present. Movement, in this sense, would represent the 
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visibility and the experience of the present, the non-waiting. 
But waiting is transitive and interstitial, a liminal state in which one acts on 
and is acted upon by one’s desire—one waits for something to (maybe) arrive. It 
requires a bodily engagement. It is a relation with time as potentiality that requires the 
experience of its unfolding in the present. Just as waiting is not out of time—rather the 
opposite, it is an acute experience of time—filmic movement cannot be purified from 
photographic stasis. It is temporally and technologically impure. Although the 
photographic is usually thought of as the static interruption of movement, the filmic 
photogram inhabits a temporal conundrum, revealing stillness neither before nor after 
movement, but indiscernible from it.42 The photogram, which Gilles Deleuze has 
called the “genetic element of all possible perception,” since it is “inseparable from the 
series which makes it vibrate,” harbors not only the possibility of movement—the 
potentiality of moving—but it is an integral part of it: its condition of possibility of 
movement and of its perception itself (Deleuze, Cinema I: the movement-image 83). 
The photogram would be an image of change instead of fixity. It reveals stasis as 
inherent to the technology of film, turning to the unanswerable question that defines 
(filmic) vitalism on its head: the search for ‘where movement starts,’ which implies 
separation and control of origins stops making sense. The matter is more about the 
temporality of the arrival of the body of the observer into the perceptual scene.  
As previously noted, this intermedial tension appears in different, but 
                                                 
42 Besides film-phenomenological approaches such as Sobchack’s, other canonical 
photography theory works such as Roland Barthes’s will also cling on to the temporal 
difference of the two media in the same terms. See Barthes’s Camera Lucida, 2010. 
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structural, ways in both Kinugasa’s and Peixoto’s films. Being objects fascinated with 
themselves, the films think their own materiality and mediation. Their central concern 
is the exploration of the filmic body and the limits of the visibility of movement: the 
desire to see the liminal space between stillness and movement is what builds their 
very apparatuses of visibility. Either through the clash between the long static poses 
held by the bodies and the camera, and the irruptions of repetitive camera movement 
in Limite; or in the fast-paced montage and visual distortions in front of the 
incongruous gestures of the bodies—apathetic, repetitive, violent— in A Page of 
Madness, the threshold between stasis and movement is felt as a probing into the 
medium, as if the to make movement (and time) visible required the visualization of 
the moment of its emergence. But if the verbal is eliminated in the pursue of the purely 
cinematic, the photographic is always there as a haunting presence that intrudes in the 
moving image, imposing restriction onto the drive for a total control and definition of 
the moving.  
Kinugasa attributes his film’s “relatively correct” depiction of madness to the 
guided visit he undertook to the Matsuzawa Mental Hospital, in Tokyo’s Setagaya 
district. Highlighting the impact that the mentally ill had on him, Kinugasa narrates his 
encounter with patients of the hospital, a space of modern confinement characteristic 
of late Meiji-early Taishō, as the moment when he realized the high dramatic element 
contained in the lives of the mentally ill (kyōki no hito): "Having the image of human 
madness as a backdrop, can't a drama emerge?, I asked to Yokomitsu and Kawabata as 
I narrated the visit to the hospital, on the same day's night." (Kinugasa 64) Kinugasa 
was shown around the modern psychiatric hospital by Kure Shūzō, the director of the 
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institution and one of the central figures in the modernization of the medical and legal 
discourse on madness in Japan. (Abel 85)  
 
Figure 18: the psychiatric hospital in the film. 
 
In Yomota Inuhiko's words, "At the basis [of Kinugasa's idea of filming madness] was 
his enthusiasm with re-creating as faithfully as possible, in film, the gestures and 
behaviors of the mad, their spasmodic discontinuous movement, presenting it to the 
audience's scopophilic desire." (226) Yomota reads a political assessment of modern 
confinement in the “realistic depiction of madness” achieved by such a physical 
encounter, later translated into moving image. For him, the film stands out among its 
avant-garde peers exactly due to its, so to say, ethnographic drive and realistic 
depiction. A drive whose fulfilment is achieved by the distinctive “spasmodic 
discontinuous movement” of the bodies. The affinity between the moving medium and 
the moving body suggested a mutual attraction between the two, making the ill body 
on film a suitable technological spectacle of the medium’s capacity to capture and 
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display movement.  
The movie presents us to a sort of catalogue of madness, evoking Albert 
Londe’s photographs of the hysterics that Jean-Martin Charcot would collect during 
his initial investigations in the Salpérière hospital, published in the volumes of the 
Iconographie Photographique de la Salpétrière (1878-1880). These images help 
understand what is at stake in Kinugasa's film. Charcot, who was Freud's mentor and 
the “discoverer of hysteria,” used to orchestrate weekly voyeuristic spectacles centered 
around those squirming female bodies, which Londe would photograph. As Georges 
Didi-Huberman puts it, hysteria was born out of a performative spectacle that 
orchestrated an “event of signifiers” (Didi-Huberman 3). In Charcot's catalogues, what 
one can see is an organization of the photographs according to the retrospective 
inscription of emotions signified by those female faces and bodies: repugnance, 
melancholy, passion, etc. In Kinugasa's film, the same drive that moved Charcot seems 
to be present in the myriad faces of madness we are shown (Figures 19–22). 
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Figure 20: Still from A Page of Madness. 
 
Figure 19: “Attitude of the Face.” Iconographie Photographique de la Salpétrière, plaque 
XXIII.  
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Figure 21: “Terminal Period: Ecstasis.” Iconographie Photographique de la 
Salpétrière, plaque XXIII.  
 
 
Figure 22: Still from A Page of Madness. 
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If, in “the period of innocence” of psychoanalysis, as Joan Copjec names it, “images 
could be plucked from thoughts, symptoms from bodies, meanings from dreams” 
(Copjec 298) precisely because of the photographic logic, in which the lines were 
clearly drawn: “the analysand is on one side with images, the analyst is on the other 
with thoughts” (Copjec 197). Rendering madness visible on the body was possible 
only insofar as the border was stable: the hysterics inside of their bodies-images, the 
“sane” inside of their observer-minds. The idea of spectatorship as an intellectual and 
distant activity informed the first step to regulate female subjectivity by photographic 
mediation.  
However, as Zoe Beloff calls attention, the drive to fixate mental states in 
photography present in Charcot was played out in a field of tensions produced by the 
medium: “Hysteria was primarily an illness that manifested itself through 
performance, through motion, whether it was uncontrollable jerking and twitching of 
the body, crippling partial paralysis that caused distortions of movement, or delirium 
and all kinds of unruly acting out” (Beloff 229). The physical performance of hysteria 
pushed the limits of the photographic medium precisely because its defining aspect—
movement—needed to be halted in a pose for a technology that required long 
exposure. The limits of the medium opened a zone of tension between the medicalized 
female body under the scrutiny of science, and the submission of the image 
technology to those bodies, which would lead to the risk of loss of “truth” in their 
gestural performance.  
The need to make movement visible was a demand that suited well the desire 
for a purified perception central to A Page of Madness—just as the control over the 
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subaltern body it implied. Kinugasa's film, as the first and only production of the 
“New Perception Film League” (Shinkankaku Eiga Renmei), represented the 
opportunity to test the modernist immediate perception desired by the group, using the 
female body to expunge photographic stillness from film. Unlike in the photographic 
experience of the Salpétrière, Kinugasa's movie fundamentally avoids the stillness of 
the photograph, making use of madness as a perceptual technology to explore filmic 
perception.  
However, in Kinugasa’s film once we step into the rush towards this pure 
(visual) sensation, the images become “illegible”, as if the drive for full transparent 
visibility enabled by the medium would find its obstacle in the very temporality of 
vision. It reveals vision as an inescapably embodied sense, which requires time and is 
always “in delay.” The moving images—deemed “pure” movement—resulting from 
the speedy visuality of the film not only blocks the visibility and the control over the 
impure female bodies, but it also turns the film into an experiment, in Gertrude Koch’s 
terms, that addresses and affects the spectator in her bodily senses. If the experimental 
aspect of the film—that of exploring its own technical materiality—is constantly on 
the verge of dismantling its narrative layer, it is because by stressing “perception over 
what is perceived,” as Aaron Gerow puts it, the film is confronted within the 
inescapable fact that perception exists in the time of the body, irreducible to 
immediatism and totalization (Gerow, A Page of Madness 81). The “difference 
between body and affect,” described by Koch as the effect of any experiment lies 
precisely in the temporal gap that constitutes perception. The “ethnographic” desire to 
frame the female body under the avant-garde desire for a disembodied and pure 
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visuality ends up in failure precisely due to the fact and thickness of embodied 
mediation. The striking similarities between the images (Figures 19–22) reveal a 
deeper connection between the two media in their incapacity to capture movement if 
not by performance (it is worth to keep in mind that the film’s images are made clear 
here by the extraction of their frame, their poses). 
 The temporality of perception also becomes a problem in Peixoto’s film. 
Emphasizing rhythm over narration, Mário Peixoto's Limite centers its aesthetic 
organization around a problematic relation to photographic stasis, in order to produce a 
feeling of temporal suspension. In order to “exit time,” as critic Saulo Pereira de Mello 
puts it, Peixoto’s film lengthen the gaze towards its objects, stretching the photogram 
and producing an overwhelming experience of the temporal duration of the image 
(Mello 40). If Kinugasa's film was overall excessively fast, performing movement to 
the limits of visibility, Peixoto's is overall excessively slow. Under the same project of 
achieving the “purely cinematic,” it invests its images with an arrest reminiscent of 
photography, occasionally interrupted by sudden outbursts of fast repetitive mobile 
shots. Peixoto’s film could be read as an obsessive quest for the moment of the 
emergence of movement, built as an aesthetic apparatus that grants visibility to the 
moving by contrast to the non-moving. Showing us a man and two women drifting on 
a lost boat in the open sea, through its long takes of the boat, it turns the openness of the 
vast nature into a locus of a feeling of timeless entrapment.  
As Peixoto has narrated, the idea of Limite came from a photograph taken by 
André Kertész that he saw on the cover of a modernist magazine called Vu, when he 
was in Paris (Mello 40). The photograph, showing a woman’s face behind the 
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handcuffed hands of man, was on the cover of Vu no.74, 14 August 1929, and made its 
way into the film as its first and last images (Figures 24–25). Again, a photograph of 
female incarceration, immobilized in captivity. Showing us those three bodies in the 
boat, intercalated with flashbacks of their previous stories in a very tenuous narrative 
thread, we get to know that one of the women escaped from prison to be again entrapped 
in a tedious job by a sewing machine; the other woman leaves her alcoholic lover and 
wanders through deserted landscapes; and the man had lost his female lover to leprosy. 
The threat of destruction, constantly latent throughout the film, and which culminates 
with the destruction of the three by the sea, in the end, is conveyed by sustained long 
shots of parts of their bodies, objects and natural elements.  
 
   
Figure 24: André Kertész’s photograph on the cover of Vu, 14 August 1929. 
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Figure 25: Still from opening of Limite. 
 
 
The film works as a close observation of the material world as if trying to render its 
movement bare. It seems contradictory that stillness is so prevalent as a general aspect 
of the film’s visual construction. Through long-held close-ups, the camera either freezes 
the bodies, or chops them up and gives us only their parts. At other times, it presents us 
an inventory of things, through a slow scrutiny of objects, trees, and rocks, in an 
inversion of the usual anthropomorphic medium of narrative cinema, as if the 
temporality of the image itself would be trapping bodies and things in their poses. 
Peixoto himself described it as “movement frozen in the air,” in which the bodies and 
the objects seem to be trapped in stillness, just as the characters are trapped in the boat.  
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Figures 26 and 27: Isolated movement. 
    
Figures 28 and 29: Isolated movement. 
 
Rejecting classical-narrative conventions of identification, the film does not lead the 
spectator to occupy the place of any character, but rather it pushes the viewer to a 
fascination with the possibilities of filmic perception, produced by these rigidly framed 
shots, in which movement is seen in isolation from non-movement, as if purified from 
the rest of the image: a ray of light on a surface, the subtle shaking of the tip of a 
newspaper page, a lock of a hair on a static head (Figures 26–29, above). On the other 
hand, these shots are interrupted by abrupt camera movements that dislocate the frame 
at increasingly changing pace, making seeing impossible (Figures 30–31, below) The 
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film builds a constant separation between movement and non-movement, within and 
without the frame. Instead of the scopophilic logic of narrative cinema, it does not 
operate on the desire to see more, but rather on the desire to see less, in a “pure” and 
timeless visibility. As critic José Carlos Avellar says that the film “causes us to see less 
and less well,” conveying the message that “cinema, the film suggests, makes the 
visibile invisible” (Avellar 18). But, despite desired as an object of a disembodied 
visuality, it nonetheless conveys such a “purified” perception as waiting and repetition, 
an obsession that keeps returning—the “trap” of a universal cinema, as Peixoto himself 
had put it. As Kuniichi Uno reminds us, the photographic frame in combination with 
cinematic movement and duration reshapes ceaselessly what one cannot see, what is 
lying outside of the visible space of the screen. It constantly produces invisibility. 
Getting closer results in pushing the object away. 
 
Figure 30: outburst of camera movement 
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Figure 31: outburst of camera movement 
 
If, as Vivian Sobchack claims, the “anatomy and physiology of the film”  (Address of 
the Eye 171) necessarily reminds the spectators of their own restricted existence, the 
experiment architected by Peixoto performs its failure as ontological: desiring a 
totality of being, its temporal apparatus seem to show that “being is not being,” no 
transcendental communion is possible. In its exploration of the image, the enduring 
gaze works through what Rei Terada has read as a mode of engagement she terms the 
“phenomenophilia” of looking away, exemplified by the fixating of one’s gaze over 
minor physical phenomena. In her words, “Phenomenophilia is looking away at the 
colored shadow on the wall, or keeping the head turned to the angle at which the 
sunspot stays in view.” (Terada 4) It becomes the other to the Kantian aesthetic 
community—sensus communis—because, like the filmic duration, it is bound end. It 
performs perception as the embodiment of temporal difference. Terada thus defines the 
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ethical and political implications of such phenomenological fascination: “Unlike 
straightforward derogations of the given world that believers in an-other reality feel 
free to express, phenomenophilic dissatisfaction insinuates a reservation it never 
articulates” (Terada 24). It would work, ultimately, in favor of a displacement of 
dissatisfaction that, she suggests, “raises questions of queer desire” (Terada 24). 
Indeed, there are readings of Peixoto’s work as a queer melancholy object.43 But I 
suggest here that the very process of its fossilization within its “original” avant-garde 
attachment to a pure, disembodied, and transcendental timeless visuality strives to un-
queer what the very temporality of perception resists. Its queerness and embrace of 
phenomenality emerge from the very failure of its endeavor. The political task is 
matter of a queer reading of the apparatus beyond what the layers of fossilization have 
fixated under its avant-garde universalist discourse. 
Limite was informed and embraced by the filmic theories of Octávio de Faria 
and the theorists of the Rio de Janeiro’s Chaplin Club. Its rejection of classical-
narrative elements goes along with from their interest in a universalist mode of 
cinema, which would produce a visual experience that transcends the physicality of 
one’s body and location towards a total vitality, best represented by Faria’s own 
writings. Faria, the biggest enthusiast of Peixoto’s film, would even dream with what 
he termed “absolute visuality”: a film with no cuts, which would flow seamlessly, 
avoiding the need to adjust one’s sight along cuts between shots, evading the fact that 
                                                 
43 Bruce Williams, for example, has read in the film’s visual relation to the female 
body an index of Peixoto’s queerness. See Bruce Williams, “Straight from Brazil? 
National and Sexual Disavowal in Mário Peixoto’s Limite,” Luso-Brazilian Review, 
vol. 38 n.1, 2001. 
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one has a body, delimited by space and time, in favor a transcendental aesthetic 
experience.44 Phenomenophilic fascination, enhanced by filmic mediation since it is 
attached to an ephemeral object, would open up a an experimental space between body 
and affect, or in Terada’s words, “the space before the acceptance of any perceived 
fact,” that reveals the impossibility of such a universalist transcendental project into 
question (Terada 5). 
 
The Masochistic Spectator 
 If Kinugasa’s fast images evince the delay in the spectator’s perception, 
Peixoto’s slow images evince the delay in the apparatus to fulfil the spectator’s desire 
for movement. In both cases, the non-convergence between body and image reveals a 
temporality of perception that is never immediate or under control. Their promises of 
universality are constantly frustrated. It is possible to say that, differently in each case, 
what is produced is a “masochistic spectator” that somehow takes pleasure in the 
suspended time of a promise—which is, indeed, a way the modern filmic spectator has 
been described by people such as Siegfried Kracauer.  
As Deleuze reminds us, "Waiting and suspense are essential characteristics of 
the masochistic experience. (...) The masochist is morose: but his moroseness should 
be related to the experience of waiting and delay” (Deleuze, Masochism 70). Both 
films, it is possible to say, work masochistically around fetish-objects embodied by 
themselves—or rather, the type of vision that they promise but never deliver. 
Deleuze’s radical reading of Freud and Masoch, claims that, unlike the sadist, who 
                                                 
44 For a detailed reading of Faria’s theory, see chapter 1. 
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negates the world and violates the fetish, in masochism the political/ethical function is 
that of displacing the subject. It is a dialectical modulation between stillness and 
movement that inflicts the pain of waiting onto one’s body. The structure of the 
masochistic frustration appears as the very structure of filmic perception as performed 
by Kinugasa’s and Peixoto’s works—embodied, disjunctive, and open-ended—
producing a dislocation of difference with the sudden suspension of naturalized 
perception. 
By working around structures of frustration, as “cluster of promises,” the 
political side-effects brought about by both “fossils of the avant-garde” might be to bring 
the modernist will to the forefront of their experiment as a failure through embodied 
perception. Less as an evidence of the trauma of the encounter with the “West,” as 
argued by William Gardner in relation to A Page of Madness, or a plain desire to become 
European, as suggests Bruce Williams about Limite, they reveal, in spite of their own 
authorial and political-aesthetic projects, the avant-garde universalist will as impossible, 
dislocating vision onto the temporality of the body.45 Their process of fossilization—the 
repetitive return to their bodies and mythologies—only re-enacts the gap of frustration 
that they perform in their very temporal unfoldings. 
 
 
                                                 
45 See William Gardner, "New Perceptions: Kinugasa Teinosuke's Films and Japanese 
Modernism," Cinema Journal, vol. XLIII, no. 3, 2004; Bruce Williams, “Straight from 
Brazil? National and Sexual Disavowal in Mário Peixoto's ‘Limitel’” Luso-Brazilian 
Review, vol. 38, no. 1, 2001. 
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CHAPTER 3: LIVING FOLDS: MURAYAMA TOMOYOSHI’S VARIATION ON 
THE VISIBLE 
 
Murayama Tomoyoshi’s Images 46 
In the mid-1920s, Hungarian film theorist Béla Balázs wrote that “an image 
speaks only for itself.” (21) Only, and not for anything else. Somewhat similarly to 
Tanizaki Jun'ichirō’s film theory,47 for Balázs, the defining characteristic of the filmic 
image is that there is “nothing 'behind' the image surface, and no 'hidden' meaning” 
(20). In his search for a filmic specificity, he emphasized the absence of meaning, the 
particular nature of texture and surface that composes a filmic image, its coming into 
being through and in time and movement. But, nonetheless, Balázs remarks that film 
has an atmosphere of “vitality,” its images can become a “flood of details of material 
life” (22). 
 It is precisely this lessened aspect of the image that will be central to this 
chapter, the zone of indeterminacy, the gap it opens up as a space for change or doubt, 
at the moment of the encounter between image and subject, the fold that confounds 
exteriority with interiority, material conditions and aesthetic experience. The vitality 
of the filmic image is a peculiar one, different from the concept of a transcendental 
life, as defended by Octávio de Faria: it presents us details of material life through 
nothing but a flow of surfaces, of light and shadow, as Tanizaki Jun’ichirō 
                                                 
46 The figures in this chapter are reproduction of Hanzai Kagaku, vol. 13, December 
1931, as reprinted in Horino Masao, Maboroshi no Modanisuto: Shashinka Horino 
Masao no Sekai, 2012. 
47 See chapter one. 
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suggested.48 In Balázs's words: “film is a surface art, whatever is inside is outside” 
(19). What to do with such a fleeting object? “In front of each image, what we should 
ask is how it gazes (us), how it thinks (us), and how it touches (us), all at once,” says 
image advocate Georges Didi-Huberman (“Cómo Abrir los Ojos” 14).49 An image, 
establishing this zone of relation, installs a time of negotiation in which all terms 
involved are bound to be dislocated. This chapter will address precisely the encounter 
with this fundamental absence, or disrupted presence, of the technical image—still and 
moving—to think ways in which it can suggest a different openness to history, a non-
sovereign political place of the subject, and a specific mode of perceptual engagement 
with the world. This basic paradoxical fold, in which the materiality of the image 
encounters the ephemerality of an experience, will serve here as the point of tension 
and undoing that unfolds in multiple ways onto politics, history, and theory.  
 The subject in case, here, is the Japanese multimedia artist Murayama 
Tomoyoshi (1901-1977), whose work in theory and image in the 1920s and 1930s 
undergoes a significant, albeit subtle, shift alongside the ongoing historical and 
political space surrounding him. But Murayama, for whom the defining aspect of art 
was its politicality, its capacity to act upon and change the world, had a problem with 
cinema. For him, film could never fulfill art's political task. Why does Murayama 
dislike so much the moving image? But why can't he stop writing, thinking, making it? 
                                                 
48 See chapter one for a closer look into Octário de Faria and Tanizaki Jun’ichirō’s 
ontologies of the filmic image. 
49 Translation from Spanish by me. 
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 The idea here will be to follow the conflicts that arise within Murayama's own 
avant-garde program by a certain experience of fascination and attraction that the 
filmic image caused, but neither in order to form a statement on the history of the 
avant-garde or even on Murayama's body of work. Rather, through reading the points 
of conflict and tension, I will address the nuances and contradictions that the filmic 
image brings into the modes of engagement between subject, body, and history, which 
suggest a different relation between the political and the aesthetic experience. In this 
chapter, the media theorist Vilém Flusser is summoned to the dialogue because he was 
one of the first to theorize the technologically produced image as an aesthetic object 
that instills doubt and disturbs the linearity of history through its materiality, an effect 
seen in the trajectory of Murayama’s own relation with film. 
 Murayama, like his non-Euro-North-American avant-garde peers, spent a 
formative period in Europe, more specifically Germany, where he had gone as a 
theology student in 1922. Growing up Catholic, then turned into an atheist, he gave up 
his university studies to engage with the avant-garde world that was bustling in 
recently formed Weimar Germany. In his one-year period in Berlin he starts his 
engagement with the visual arts as a painter, taking part in collective exhibitions in 
Europe which provided him with the opportunity to encounter artists such as 
Marinetti, Kandinsky, Georg Grozs, and partaking in the aesthetic discourse of the 
avant-garde. Also, importantly, it is during his period in Germany that Murayama 
confronts the material aspect of modernity: the decaying urban environment, the 
poverty of post-war Germany, the strong labor movement (soon to be smashed), and 
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the experience of his own racial difference in a predominantly white environment.50 
His interest in what he saw as the fate of modernity—its decay, which would give 
space for the new—was intertwined with a fascination for new media and new modes 
of aesthetic expression. 
 From his first major theoretical work, in which he coined the term conscious 
constructivism [ishikiteki kōseishugi], through his work with the Dadaist group Mavo, 
his engagement with social realism in the proletarian arts movement, and his works 
and essays on film and photography, it is possible to see a conflict between an idea of 
the self-determined engaged political subject—a model for the political itself—ideas 
of distance, and the geopolitical historical timeline of modernity. Murayama, here, will 
be read through the tensions that arise at the encounter between film and his political-
aesthetic program, which reflect and evince the problems of an imagined self-image of 
the avant-garde. Through Murayama’s thought on film, this image emerges as 
contingent upon specific ways of understanding the relation between aesthetic 
experience, geopolitical distance, and political expressivity, which the encounter with 
the filmic image seems to trouble. Can an image—or a screen—call for a new 
ontology that resists the theoretical model that tries to frame it? What are the 
implications of this shift, what does it entail? Thinking with Murayama and the filmic 
machine, I will show how some terms—such as history, image, and political agency—
get dislocated once the idea of movement is transformed within the experience of 
film.51 
                                                 
50 See Murayama Tomoyoshi. Engekiteki Jijoden. Tokyo: Tōhō Shuppansha, 1971. 
51 The “film experience” has been conceptualized in different ways, from 
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 To think this, I will activate different constellations that will help ground and 
move a process of dislocation that I read in Murayama, focusing on the gradual 
unfolding of different notions of agency, split between life and nonlife (image, 
technology): a politics of restriction emerging through the encounter with film, which 
is theorized by Murayama as Ωa technology of absence. Reading Murayama against 
the grain, focusing on the moments in which his scheme is disrupted, or when his 
body is addressed against his own will, I will see how a zone of ontological dispute 
through the image acquires a different aesthetic-political role. 
 My interest here is to see how the encounter with the technical image, for 
Murayama, opens a different horizon of speculation, one that deals with the future as 
potentiality for the unknown, rather than the actualization of the expected. If 
Murayama’s thought firstly echoed the Hegelian metaphysics according to which 
history is “a continuous concretization of the abstract, an approximation to a 
paradigmatic purity which appears as both sense and direction of the process," in the 
words of Laclau and Mouffe (15), seeing as a spectator of the moving image troubles 
his theoretical scheme to a point of conflict, opening the possibility of a counter-
reading to a different politics. 
 
                                                 
psychoanalysis to phenomenology. Vivian Sobchack, for example, defines it as a 
process of individuation through vision, in which we “take possession of our vision 
and make it visible.” (“The Address of the Eye” 54) Sobchack's recasting of Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology sees the film experience as the moment of awareness of one's 
becoming though the embodied phenomenon of vision. This claim will reverberate 
more in the next chapter's discussion of Mário de Andrade, but here what I am calling 
the “experience of film” is, for now, the situation of an immobile body engaged in 
seeing moving/mobile images unfold in time. 
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All of life: historicism, avant-garde, and totality 
Murayama Tomoyoshi's prominent role in the formation of the avant-garde 
environment in Japan is long and complicated, and will not be the main object of 
consideration here.52 His vast body of work—in theory and practice—spans almost all 
possible media, from his early paintings, through sculpture, installation, performance, 
theater (as a set designer, costume designer, playwright, and director), to architecture, 
photography, and film. First associated with the post-dadaist anarchist group Mavo, in 
the mid-1920s, by the late 1920s to the early 1930s he became one of the most 
important names in the Marxist proletarian arts movement—concentrating much of his 
efforts in the theatrical activity of the experimental Tsukiji Little Theater and 
becoming a notorious theater person, but also participating actively in publications and 
projects of the Proletarian Film League (Prokino). Murayama was also a translator of 
avant-garde aesthetic theory and literature of people such as Wassily Kandisnky and 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, was part of the first stagings of Expressionist theater in 
Japan, and was an emphatic defender of an intermedia approach to art, engaging with 
experiments in the theater-film mixed performance called rensageki. 53 
                                                 
52 Good sources of in-depth historical information on his relation to the avant-
garde groups are Gennifer Weisenfeld's Mavo : Japanese Artists and the Avant-garde, 
1905-1931. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; Omuka Toshiharu's Nihon 
no Avagyarudo Geijutsu: Mavo to Sono Jidai. Tokyo: Seidosha, 2001; Iwamoto 
Kenji's Murayama Tomoyoshi, Gekiteki Sentan. Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2012; Peter 
Eckersall's “From Liminality to Ideology: the politics of embodiment in prewar avant-
garde theater in Japan.” Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. 
53 On his writings and works on rensageki, see Lee Jungwook's “Murayama 
Tomoyoshi ni okeru 'engeki' to 'eizō' no tsūgō',” 2012; and Diane Wei Lewis's, “ 
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  After several times arrested in the 1930s during the rise of state persecution of 
communists under the Peace Preservation Law, Murayama publicly recanted his 
political engagements in 1934 but continued his activities in the theater, while 
publishing as a critic and theorist on film, photography, and visual arts. Although 
vastly discussed in the context of modern theater studies and visual arts, his interest in 
the technical images of film and photography is hardly ever mentioned, not only 
because it was marginal to his own self-narrative, but also because it destabilized his 
own aesthetic-political program--one that centered around the rejection of 
representation, the critique of the position of the spectator, and the importance of the 
physical presence of body and objects.   
Murayama's work begins in his year in Weimar Berlin (1922-1923), marked by 
his encounter with two narratives of historical time: the decaying historical present of 
post-World War I Germany, with an increasingly impoverished population and an 
urban landscape turned into ruins; and the disruptive future imaginations of the avant-
garde through formal experimentations. In March 1923, he publishes one of his early 
and main pieces on aesthetic theory and history, “Beyond Expressionism” (Sugiyuku 
Hyōgenha), and shortly after, along with a group of artists, he founds the Mavo 
collective, which directly followed the ideas contained in his text, self-declared as a 
“negative entity,” the newest thing among all avant-gardes. (Weisenfeld 66) His 
image, alongside Mavo, is seen as central for the period, what Takizawa Kyōji calls a 
“magnetic field” for the whole avant-garde discourses and practices in Japan (85). 54 
                                                 
54 All Takizawa Kyōji and Murayama Tomoyoshi's quotation are my translations 
from Japanese. 
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 As Nicole Brenez (2006) notices, the term “avant-garde” creates a spatialized 
image. From its militaristic origin (the avant-garde were the leaders of the infantry in 
medieval France), to its artistic connotations, to its use in revolutionary politics, the 
term usually implies an advancement through unknown territory, either discovering or 
producing that which is advanced through, ahead in time and space—and in time as 
space: 
 
As a counter-attack, as assault against the world, it [the avant-garde's] work 
consists, in effect, of developing the forms, practical and theoretical, of 
refusing domination and submission to the established order. But on the 
affirmative side of its proposition, the work consists on deploying ideas, forms, 
without worrying about what was already there, to confront the unknown, the 
unthinkable, the inadmissible.” (10-11) 55   
 
 The idea of avant-garde, and the historical-political role of art and aesthetics, 
for Murayama, was caught in the paradox of what writer and theorist Octavio Paz 
called the modern “tradition of rupture” (la tradición de la ruptura): the future 
becomes the new point of origin, with, as noticed Peter Bürger, the constant 
absorption of disruptive practices by the market, an aspect that Murayama himself 
notices during his stay in Berlin.56 What is of interest here is less the identity of a 
movement, but rather the fact that the avant-garde as a concept needs the spatialization 
of a forward-moving time, in order to place both subjectivity and form as agents in the 
                                                 
55 Brenez's quotations are my translations from French.  
56 Octavio Paz. Los Hijos del Limo, 1981. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-
garde, 1984. Murayama, Engekiteki Jijoden, 1972, pp. 22-23. 
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production of a future that can be completed in its distinction from the present. The 
speculative character of the discourse of the avant-garde that Brenez sees is not so 
speculative, and, in the peripheral spaces to the so-called “West,” it is based on a 
certain denial of the present evidenced by the anxiety of not being “fully modern” or 
mere “receivers” of modernity, as Murayama expresses in many of his texts. It does 
not move away from Hegelian historicism. 
 To understand the double movement that granted aesthetic form with a 
historical task, I shall turn to Murayama's idea of both form and history contained in 
his 1923 text “Beyond Expressionism,” the theoretical essay that introduces his 
concept of “conscious constructivism” [ishikiteki kōseishugi]. The text opens with a 
statement: “It seems that, in its original German soil, Expressionism has reached its 
full realization” (145). He pays attention to the process by which, just like 
Impressionism, Expressionism by that time would have already become the 
normalized mode of conceptualizing art, what he calls its absorption into “mannerism” 
and “lack of consciousness” [manerizumu, muishiki], reading in art history a 
confirmation of an inevitable timeline. 
 His art historical timeline sees the entrance of subjectivity into the sphere of 
art, and the gradual disappearance of the object of art itself, dissolved into general life: 
"That is to say, the object of the plastic arts is on the process of disappearing. Then, 
not a simple primary visual aspect, but something of a complex sense of sight, 
temporal and spatial, was introduced" (146-7). Following the descriptive statement put 
forth by the ethos of the avant-garde, according to which “Nowadays, the whole 
storage room has been used," in Kandisnky's words, he sees the present as a moment 
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of exhaustion and intrinsic demand for the new through the destruction of the border 
between art and life represented by the artistic object. 
 
But now [art's] object has become the entirety of life [zenjinsei]. All limits 
have disappeared. Therefore, the means to express it must also have no limits. 
Moreover, in the “comfortable world of expression,” for one object there was 
no more than one means of expression. That is to say, despite some 
differences, there used to be nothing but imitation [mosha]. However, now, to 
each object, there are limitless possible means of expression. (148)  
  
It is in the question of mediation that Murayama finds one of the flaws of the 
Expressionist program, one of the reasons for its exhaustion. Using a marked language 
of totality, if all is about life, he asks, how can its mode of transmission go 
unproblematized? Where does the split happen? He criticizes the fascination with 
expressive forms, and the reliance on “mere” visuality, which would fall short of the 
task to perform the historical need of art to convey all. He asks whether a mode of 
expression which relies purely on sight could even take up such a comprehensive task. 
His struggle against form is, fundamentally, a struggle against distance and mediation 
itself. The demand of limitlessness points toward a politics of (im)mediation that 
requires that the thing itself be present to the observer/participant of the life/art, based 
on an image premised on the possibility of an exhaustible totality, an inextinguishable 
perceptual territory.  
 For Murayama, the turning point of the political capacity of modern art (for 
him, art is art insofar as it is political, that is, when it provokes change in the world), 
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comes as a culmination of his avant-garde paradigm according to which the artwork 
needs “not to “express” something, but [to follow] the desire to truly become practical 
things themselves,” at which point, he claims, the border between constructivist object 
and architecture is overcome. (Murayama, “Engekiteki Jijoden” 61) The rejection of 
form would mean the rejection of mediation, seen by Murayama as a necessary 
condition for the political to enter the aesthetic, hence of art's fulfillment.57 More 
importantly, it is a subsumption of all things into a paradigm of action, which he links 
to desire [yokubō]: a desire for the object, ultimately a desire for the world understood 
as a desire for direct tactile contact and movement. 
 The solution, for Murayama, then lies in the life of the body: for him, the 
movement of history would tend to the dissolution of the boundaries between object, 
representation, and world, accompanied by a task carried out through a sensorial shift 
away from occularcentrism. What he calls the “complexification of vision” will mean 
almost its rejection. Not unlike people such as Benjamin, in the introduction to his 
translation of Marinetti's essay on “Tactilism” [Taktilismus, Chokkakushugi], 
Murayama foresees the historical need for people to explore new senses. He sees in 
the essay by the Italian Futurist, who would later become a center figure in 
Mussollini's Fascist Party, an evidence of “how post-WWI Europe has fallen into a 
dreadful situation, and for that reason people have entered in a distal relation with their 
own senses.” (Murayama, “Taktilismus” 199) The sensorial shift, a historical task to 
                                                 
57 One could read it as a rejection of negativity or, even, of difference itself, especially 
if we read in it echoes of Hegelian metaphysics. I thank Naoki Sakai for bringing up 
this relation.  
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cope with a political-aesthetic condition, is located on a spatialized historical timeline 
of necessity announcing the future to come: “Such times will also come to Japan.” 
(“Taktilismus” 200)   
 Murayama's claim for art is a program for a future, in order to bring to the 
local present the future that was being lived elsewhere. A future that, albeit 
unavoidable, could be accelerated by “consciously” embracing art's fate to eliminate 
distinctions between art and life, representation and object, spectator and image, and 
the differences among media. It rejects form in favor of circulation of “life,” on a 
circuit of different media in which the subject's desiring body—a desire for the new in 
the world through the presence of things—would be at the center of a historical-
political desire. He writes:  
 
From now on everything, yes, everything must be thought, understood, 
resolved by a new principle. Furthermore, aesthetics [bigaku] should be taken 
from its unauthorized throne and placed anew in a just position. Then, after 
overthrowing the ridiculous still aesthetics [seiteki bigaku] created by those 
who are not artists, a new exquisite moving aesthetics [dōteki bigaku] should 
be born. The fate of the plastic arts, philosophy and religious artists, the fate of 
the six fields of plastic art—painting, sculpture, moving pictures, theater, 
dance—, the fate of the spectator, all should be bound together. (Murayama, 
“Beyond Expressionism” 193) 
  
Movement, here, entails an action emerging and ending in the body of the spectator, 
taking place in order to have art and the subject achieve their common fate: to merge 
with the movement of history, synonymous with an idea of a life that needs to me 
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mobilized. This “almost fluid and multidimensional sense of corporeality,” which 
Peter Eckersall describes (desires?) as a way to a “radical Japanese selfhood” that 
could break the national imperial body, was animated by an intense desire for the 
political present in an urge to immediacy and an absolute circulation (Eckersall 233). 
This new totalized territory of life implies that what was at stake is less a formalist 
issue but rather life itself, and its mediation. The discourse on form is displaced by the 
centrality that life acquires. 
 Life, we notice, emerges as overwhelming and overpowering precisely when 
visual representation is questioned: at the moment when mediation turns into a 
problem to be overcome, when mimetic representation needs to be thrown away not 
because, as in Brechtian self-reflexive critical modernism, it represents an illusionist 
object-like veil over structures of systemic abstraction, but rather because it fails to 
convey the objects of life themselves. It is not surprising that the question of life and 
mediation arises when the photographic image also makes its entrance into the 
discursive field of art, questioning precisely the boundaries between life, image, and 
aesthetics that Murayama himself embraced as an avant-garde program against the 
organized system of the art market. With the wider access to photographic cameras, 
and to amateur small-gauge film cameras, alongside the booming entertainment 
culture fueled by the film industry and the internationalization of capital—with 
increased Hollywood commercial films, Japanese films, and avant-garde screenings in 
Japan—the technical image was all around, and shaped much of the Taishō (1912-
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1926) and Early Showa (1926-1989) media ecology, as in any place of the 
modernizing world.58  
 The relation between physical world and technical image necessarily posed a 
question to issues of life. The photographic image, after all, at first glance, brings the 
promise of transmitting life as it is through an “unmediated” and objective technical 
method that could bring the world to one's hands—the “pencil of nature,” as William 
Henry Fox Talbot had named it in 1844-46. Moreover, the technical image, after all, 
allows one to see, as Béla Balázs suggested, “the flood of details of life” in a medium 
that travelled across spaces, making it accessible to one's eyes and hands. It promised 
the end of distance between objects and subjects, and among spaces—in Thomas 
Lamarre's (2005) words, “the collapse of geopolitical distance”. This is when, 
nonetheless, the contradictions, tensions, and different forces working within this 
politics of life and of the image become evident in Murayama: when his historical 
narrative of movement and agency encounters a critical moment of restriction and 
suspension. Here I shall first return to a consideration of different ideas of life, to 
gradually move to questions of image and history. 
 
Life as method: the political evasion of the present 
In Murayama's writing, two different notions of life appear—jinsei, that is, 
human life, that which dies; and seikatsu, which is material, daily, or even historical 
                                                 
58 On the use of small-gauge cameras and amateur practices in avant-garde film 
in Japan see Markus Nornes's Japanese Documentary Film: the Meiji Era Through 
Hiroshima; and, in Japanese, Nishimura Tomohiro's “Amachua Eiga no Avangyarudo” 
(The Avant-garde of Amateur Film), 2006.   
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life. Most of the scholarly work on Murayama, on the Mavo group, and on the 
historical avant-gardes in general, usually conflate both, retaining the idea of life as 
the second one: a historically determined sphere of daily practices, in which the 
objects of industrial production, automatization, and consumption invade the private 
space of life. However, the convergence or co-existence of these two notions needs to 
be kept unresolved, since, as I will suggest, it is precisely in their tension, difference, 
and mutual folding onto each other that the aesthetic anxiety exerted by Murayama's 
own politics of circulation is driven onto a zone of indetermination when life and 
technical object merge in the technical image.  
 Working with assemblages and collages, Murayama and his Mavo peers 
engaged in a process of construction of aesthetic entities in different media—painting, 
sculpture, architecture—born out of the combination of disparate materials and 
objects: shoes, boxes, posters, metal scraps, hair, newspaper cutouts. Scholars such as 
Gennifer Weisenfeld and Takizaka Kyōji have done extensive readings of the relations 
between the use of objects and what Murayama called “the feeling of life” (seikatsu 
kanjō), as a response to the growing mass culture, industrialization, and 
commodification of the social environment described by the word seikatsu, in 1920s 
Japan. “The term seikatsu appeared frequently in both popular and scholarly 
publications. It was used so widely in the prewar period that seikatsu was often 
synonymous with the practice of modern life itself, with all its psychological and 
material implications,” briefly describes Weisenfeld (125). 59 In Murayama's words: 
                                                 
59 Several works have been done on the emergence of the idea of “cultural life.”  
(bunka seikatsu) or “everyday life,” and its important new temporal, spatial, and 
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Hair and fabric, being thus far unused physical materials for art making 
(construction making), it allowed to address not only the sense of sight, but 
also the sense of touch. Moreover, they are not only merely sensorial materials, 
but different from paint or wood or concrete, they hold their own intrinsic uses. 
A fabric can be a handkerchief, a chemise. As for the hair, it is a half-living 
thing. That is to say, they have their feeling of life (seikatsu kanjō), their 
meaning, which follow their respective intrinsic uses. (Engekiteki Jijoden 62) 
 
Murayama would understand the use of actual objects, “as they are”, or rather the 
post-life of modern capitalist commodities, as a solution for the restriction imposed by 
the mimetic paradigm and the limitations of the sense of sight: it connected the 
historical present with an address by the aesthetic object that was both visual, tactile, 
and subjectively in dialogue with each individualized modern experience encapsulated 
in the objects. In Murayama's theory, he distinguished it from a practice concerned 
only with the sensorial dimension of materials, which in his view made his practice 
different from Constructivists and Dadaists such as El Lissitzky and Kurt Schwitters. 
He saw those objects as channeling a life inherent in themselves, a historical life that 
pointed to a certain condition of the present. Takizawa Kyōji suggests that “By using 
the feeling of life (seikatsu kanjō) soaked in the raw material [of the objects] as an 
                                                 
material implications. Harry Harootunian in History's Disquiet (2000) offers an 
enriching analysis of the issue of modernity in practices and theory, in Japan, but also 
in other places “peripheral” to the European space. Another work is Miriam 
Silverberg's Erotic, Grotesque, Nonsense (2006), which offers a cultural studies 
perspective on the Taishō Period's mass culture and its relation to ideas of everyday 
life. 
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expressive method, we can even see his principle [of “conscious constructivism”] 
arising from 'life' as a medium.” (86)  
 If mediation through formalism and “primary sight” was an obstacle to reach 
life, the use of objects—a realist and sarcastic embracing of commodity fetishism—
seemed to be a way out in the object-equals-life logic: life is made present by its 
double abstraction on the post-life of the commodity. A vitality of life that would be 
conveyed through the object's death. The object is already not there, it points towards 
a ghost from within the system of value production, despite Murayama's own idea of 
the political informed by an economy of desire based on movement, acceleration, and 
presence. 
 Murayama saw materiality and physicality as that which conveys the point of 
decay of modernity: “in other words, the destruction of the old was seen as a necessary 
precondition for construction of the new.” (Weisenfeld 125) The destruction of the old 
and production of the new, in history, was predicated upon a politics of space that 
aimed at destroying the distance among media, and between spectator and object, but 
which, ironically, valued whatever in the object was not the object's materiality. The 
object, beyond bringing in the material dimension of the everyday commodified social 
landscape, was also a node in the circuit of life drives (jinsei, life that dies, biological 
and invisible) that carried the role of a production of history centered around the 
subject. This appears less in the logics of the actual object, but in the process of 
accumulation and negativity that prevails in Murayama's works, in spite of his 
seemingly opposite position.  
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 Under the “radical Japanese selfhood” seen by Eckersall there is a temporal 
paradigm working on several overlapping totalities: history, life, subject. The 
supposed radicality was based on an identitarian subjectivity that represents a sutured 
subject who can organize the future of a sutured nation—the political for Murayama, 
is premised on a sovereign subject who no more than confirms a future that, despite its 
claim for novelty, is not actually open to radical change. 
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have argued that this idea of the political, 
one that fails to achieve a “renunciation of the category of subject as a unitary, 
transparent, and sutured entity,” (166) also fails to understand “politics as a practice of 
creation.” (153) Relying on an imaginary built upon a foundational entity—the 
historical future—Murayama's ontology of movement as action, and of closeness as 
presence, ends up relying on what Laclau and Mouffe describe as an “the conviction 
that the social is sutured at some point, from which it is possible to fix the meaning of 
any event independently of any articulatory practice,” (177) which denies the 
precariousness of subject, life, and history, imagining a transcendental founding 
principle to which all political struggles and changes respond. It is the opposite of an 
open-ended idea of the political horizon, the constant articulation of a movement that 
is not movement forward, rather it is contingent upon the specific constellations that 
are formed within each given circumstance. 
  Even though Murayama experiences a shift from anarchism to communism, 
joining the Japanese Communist Party, leaving Mavo's project and engaging in the 
proletarian art movement, the relation between subject, mediation, and history remains 
the same: a life, actualized in matter, that is synthesized and pushes a previously set 
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historical narrative to its point of culmination. The limits of the virtual in life, for 
Murayama, are set by historical necessity and inevitability. 
 Although Murayama’s thought rejected representational mimesis, it replaced it 
with a bio-mimesis of history, so to say, since the life stemming from an active 
desiring subject, in this sense, could produce all. Although “the artist needed 
“consciously” to manifest the construction or artificiality of the work of art to break 
through the image of totality,” as Weisenfeld argues (45), in Murayama’s theory 
totality is restored on the level of political desire. The idea of political desire here, 
although in tangential and indirect ways, performs what Ariella Azoulay (2012) calls 
“the anxiety concerning the disappearance of the political” on the level of the body, 
seen as an entity that should not gaze but needs to act—activities that are placed in 
opposed poles. Likewise, action and movement in Murayama's aesthetic economy of 
political desire are contingent upon motor transformations. 
 But if the political needs to engage with visible action in a motor 
understanding of movement that presupposes the possibility and constant risk of its 
opposite, we would always be on the verge of its disappearance once we stop to look. 
This is what Azoulay terms the third type of aesthetic judgment—which answers the 
question: is this political or non-political?--which usually assumes that the political is 
a choice, stemming exclusively from the “active” subject of the artist—and that it can 
disappear. As she puts it:  
 
When thought regarding the political is bound to the judgment of taste, 
whether toward historical events or toward the present, then the actualization 
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of the political becomes something exceptional and rare. The pursuit of the 
political (“This is political”), as well as sophisticated forms of its negation 
(“This is not political”), become ends in themselves. (Azoulay, Civil 
Imagination 96) 
  
In Murayama's theory, judgment is formed as follows: in order to be art, it would need 
to be political; in order to be political, it would need to actualize life as totality. There 
are three central ideas for the political in art within Murayama's thought: closeness, 
physicality, and movement/action. Seeing, for him, was not enough, because it implied 
distance, a contemplative inaction. In the need to destroy distance between object and 
spectator, the political art lies on the equivalence of two antitheses, two series of 
exclusions: action versus sight, body versus eye, since one should avoid only seeing.  
 Aligning with Guy Debord’s axiom that says that “the more he contemplates, 
the less he lives,” for Murayama to be political means to have one's body be affected 
by other bodies (human and non-human): one could not fall on the passivity of the 
spectator distant from the world.60 The problem that organizes Murayama's aesthetic-
political program is that of the distance between subject and life, when mediated by 
representation, understood as a twofold issue: the spectator's distance to the world as 
imposed by its reliance on the sense of sight, doubled in the distance of the local 
present of Japan in relation to whatever historical modernity could be. For example, 
writing about Prokino (Proletarian Film League), Murayama states that truly modern 
                                                 
60 A great discussion on the critical problems of this axiom can be found in 
Jacques Rancière's The Emancipated Spectator (2009). The quote, from Guy Debord's 
Society of the Spectacle, can be found cited in Rancière, p.6. 
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cinema is “a cinema that stands on a new worldview,” “a cinema that is not a slave to 
the capitalist. A cinema that struggles. A cinema that propagates [senden suru]. A 
cinema that exposes. A cinema that organizes. A cinema that educates.” (Murayama, 
“Film People and The Modern Taste” 7) Following his program, in order to be 
modern, film needs to be political: that is, it needs to act as a modern subject. 
 Not only a question of distance between work and spectator, it was also a 
matter of media. Against art genres "sadly squirmed in their own forceless fields," 
Murayama found the political in art's capacity to re-construct the sensorial apparatus 
of the subjects, transposing media and matters: theater, film, photography, painting, 
architecture. (Murayama, “Photography's New Function” 232) Praising the multimedia 
performance format of rensageki, which combined stage theater with filmic 
projection, for him the truly modern and political art form needed to extrapolate the 
limitations of media. The anxiety over the disappearance of the political entailed a 
discourse on media supports, human senses, and representational regimes. 
 
The technical image: dislocations 
The series of equivalences that Murayama builds can be thus described: all of 
life (zenjinsei) needs to be accessible to the body through art; this life is actualized in 
the objects of modern life (seikatsu) and made available, on a direct communication, 
to the senses once they are arranged in a “moving aesthetics” (dōteki bigaku) that 
spurs the desire for life itself. Murayama proposes a closed circuit. And, through this, 
history can be actualized towards the future. For Murayama, life would emerge with/in 
movement—and to that extent, the political is the active, and the paradigm of the 
 130 
visual image, which demands a distant subject to “only” look, would need to be 
avoided. In this aesthetic-political program, life would be a force of territorialization 
of the body through objects and media, in which movement should be produced, never 
halted, and always expanded in spite of the restrictions of matter.  
 It is a politics of endless desire: against the biopower of the modern State, it 
would be necessary to always activate a counter biopolitics of perfecting modernity so 
as to accelerate it. The objects were seen as traces of a ruined present and evidences of 
a future to come, placed in an enclosed historical timeline that excludes contingency 
and difference. But it was another type of object that troubled Murayama's political 
economy of boundless desire, his equivalence of the political to action, and his 
definition of life as that which is not distant: the object of the moving image of film—
or, rather, the impossibility of the moving image to become an object.  
 Usually left aside as minor or marginal, photography and film occupied an 
important part of Murayama's thought. The still photographic image is for him a point 
of political inflection of art for its actuality can grasp the ugly aspects of the material 
world, releasing it from its beautiful abstraction. Seeing Ernst Friedrich's 1924 War on 
War, the photographs of German military atrocities that Susan Sontag characterized as 
“photography as shock therapy,”61 he states that photography introduces politics into 
aesthetic form through its public politicization of the senses by showing the evidences 
of failure of modernity. (Murayama, “The Turn Towards Art Photography” 253)  
                                                 
61 See Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York, 2003), p.13. 
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 In 1930, Murayama directs a photomontage with photographer Horino Masao, 
titled “Flowing through the capital: Sumida River Album” (Shutokanryū: Sumidagawa 
no Arubamu) published in the journal Hanzai Kagaku, in December 1931. There, his 
idea of the photographic as a tool for capturing the traces of modernity's decay appears 
clearly, along with his emphasis on movement and circulation. Adding to Horino’s 
recent fascination with Lázló Moholy-Nagy and Marianne Brandt’s Bauhaus 
experimentation with photomontage, Murayama and Horino’s work focuses on the 
river Sumida in Tokyo and the trashes of the city, the visual essay spans several pages, 
suggesting movement by the sequence of photographs of garbage and working 
populations along the river. Predominantly grey and with low contrast, the sequence 
starts and ends with industrial, smokey landscapes along the river (Figures 29–30), 
closing with a juxtaposition of frames that gives an effect of zooming out (Figure 31). 
Movement within and among the frames is intercut with writings, opening with the 
sentence: “while flowing through the metropolis, the river pushes forth its garbage.”  
 In the photo-sequence, comparable to establishing shots of an opening 
sequence of a movie, we see buildings, machines, boats, industrial chimneys and 
waste. Some working bodies, and very few individualized human subjects. The 
structure of repetition appears at inscriptions such as “waste, waste, waste.” (Figure 
30) The desire of movement is made visible by the cartographic sequence that 
structures a mapping of the city, following the river's flow, and placing the images in 
an order that is intended to move across the space of the metropolis: a victory of the 
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spectator over space and time. If the photos show the ruins of modernity, its structure 
suggest the triumph of the spectator.62 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 It is worth to note that the iconography of waste, urban decay, or abjection is present 
in early works of photography, avant-garde or not, in several parts of the world—as 
Murayama himself notes. I thank Amy Villarejo for pointing this out. Here, instead, I 
focus on precisely what is not only the iconography per se, but what in Murayama 
appears as a search for the conquest of a particular space, which reveals a specific 
demand of movement.  
Figure 29. 
Reprinted in Maboroshi no 
Modanisuto, 2012, p. 65. 
Figure 30. Reprinted in 
Maboroshi no Modanisuto, 
2012, p.69. 
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In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of a “machine vision”, or “camera eye,” 
was usually celebrated, in Japan and elsewhere, as a way of delivering a more accurate 
non-subjective representation of the world's actuality (genjitsusei). As Murayama 
writes in his essay “The new function of photography,” for having such a visual 
accuracy and technical actuality, "photography is the first element that can bring art to 
an indispensable place in modern life." (232)  
The possibility of a non-human, inorganic and unmediated vision, was present 
in many theories of the global avant-garde such as in Jean Epstein's, Lazlo Moholy-
Nagy's, Dziga Vertov's, and, in Japan, in the work of people like Itagaki Takao, who 
was a major influence on Horino. But different from the celebration of a cold machine 
Figure 31.  
Reprinted in Maboroshi no 
Modanisuto, 2012,  p.82 
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vision, Murayama's concern was to find life in movement, an inversion of the 
Marinetti-style Futurist ideal of a militaristic aesthetics of death.63 In his 1923 text 
“Introduction to An Art With Machine Elements,” Murayama seeks to map the recent 
history of the fascination of contemporary art with machines, paying attention to how 
the mechanical object could be included in his politics precisely by the way it would 
suggest a “dynamic, mechanic spirit” that appears as movement (236).  
 The machine would enter the sphere of life when it reveals movement, which 
Murayama finds in his own practice as a Mavo member: a combination of Léger's 
approach with a “direct sensual enjoyment of the form of the machine itself, not 
related to matters of the spirit" (“Introduction to an art with machine elements” 236). 
Looking at El Lissitzky's photo-montage, he writes that "There are moments in which 
the machinic product called "photography" is not machinic" (243). Adjoining different 
surfaces, or different faktura (the sensorial feeling of the work's surface), Lissitzky 
would be able to turn "expression" (hyōgen, Darstellen) into "construction" (kōsei, 
Dastellen) (243). Photography, due to its "actuality, clarity, quickness, vividness, 
practicality," would serve well Murayama’s project of constructivism because it 
assembles objects collected by the subject (245). Through assemblage, it would be 
capable of stressing the low aspects of modern life and hence bring about change. The 
possibility of printing, collecting, and handling the photographs would make them, for 
Murayama, just another type objects in themselves, which can impose their presence 
                                                 
63 Indeed, one interesting aspect to notice is precisely the obliteration of the 
militaristic parts of Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto in Murayama's quotes and 
translations. 
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and enter the world of movement and circulation. But, it is with film that the technical 
image becomes absence, rather than presence, troubling Murayama’s fascination with 
the machine.  
 The photographic image carries some specificities which, for media theorist 
Vilém Flusser (2000), stem from the very obvious fact that “The technical image is an 
image produced by apparatuses” (Towards a Philosophy of Photography 14).64 Their 
mode of production itself is dependent on an industrial machine. But the technological 
event of the formation of the photographic image defines it, for Flusser, as “the first of 
all post-industrial objects,” (Towards a Philosophy 51) or rather an “inobject”: a type 
of object whose qualities and meanings are not restricted to the materiality of the 
surface on which they reside, producing a different relation or (im)material mode of 
friction with the subject. (Flusser, “Do Inobjeto” 2006)65 The category of the inobject, 
represented most predominantly by photography, in Flusser's narrative marks the 
entrance of a new paradigm into history, one of information, data, and of media-
infrastructures. While this debate is historically pinned down usually at the late 
twentieth century in discussions of “post-modernism” such as Jean Baudrillard's and 
Bernard Stiegler's, Flusser traces it back to the very modern advent of photography. 
 If the industrial paradigm placed us among objects, against which the human 
was thus “objectified,” Flusser argues, a concomitant but new paradigm arises with the 
advent of the technical images, their mode of production, circulation, accumulation as 
“inobjects.” “It is no longer a matter of owning another pair of shoes or another piece 
                                                 
64 Hereafter referred to as “Towards a Philosophy.” 
65 All translations of Flusser’s texts in Portuguese are mine. 
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of furniture,” writes Flusser in Towards a Philosophy of Photography (51), but a 
matter of the production of a “state of things”: “a scenario in which what is 
significant are the relationships between things and things themselves” (Towards a 
Philosophy 85) With photography, events would have been turned into scenes that can 
move from surface to surface. This new paradigm brings with it not only an 
understanding of one difference between the industrial object—considered raw 
material for political art by Muryama—and the image-(in)object, but it also demands a 
different understanding of life itself, or the horizon of human agency. 
 At the center of Flusser's discussion of the technical image there is a 
potentiality to a non-humanist understanding of technology that makes it an important 
backdrop against which to read Murayama's work and experience as a conflict arising 
from the medium. As a mechanical apparatus built upon concepts, calculations, and 
discourses of instrumental reason, the camera produces its images out of an abstraction 
that Flusser calls the camera's program, that is, the possibilities through which the 
apparatus can act upon the subject. Instead of an individual using the camera, Flusser 
describes a “photographer/camera complex” in which the camera’s program is 
necessarily in dispute and tension with the subject’s intention, a matter of mutual 
restriction:  
 
the choice is limited to the categories of the camera, and the freedom of the 
photographer remains a programmed freedom. [...] In the act of 
photography the camera does the will of the photographer but the 
photographer has to will what the camera can do. (Towards a Philosophy 
35)  
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Flusser suggests that the technical image establishes a negotiation of will from 
the moment of its formation. In this sense, the subject would have no control 
over the image, rather she would be driven to an impossible exhaustion of the 
program, repeating and adjusting her body to the machine.  
 It is this inscrutable desire-making nature of the camera that Flusser calls 
a “black-box”: a zone of indeterminacy between subject and machine. (Flusser, 
Towards a Philosophy 27) Since one cannot know what happens in the 
apparatus—the set of transmissions, reactions, and calculations—, the subject 
needs to work around the restriction of her action down to the mere exploration 
of inputs and outputs: 
 
Photographers endeavor to exhaust the photographic program by realizing all 
their possibilities. If they look through the camera into the world, this is not 
because the world interests them but because they are pursuing new 
possibilities of producing information and evaluating the photographic 
program. Their interest is concentrated on the camera; for them, the world is 
purely a pretext for the realization of camera possibilities. (Towards a 
Philosophy 26) 
 
This operates two important inversions: the world is for the camera, rather than the 
camera being for the world; and the camera has an agency that is negotiated but 
irreducible to the subject's intentionality. It means that the technical image is a process 
of “indeterminacy” in which the relation between subject and world mediated through 
the camera can never be ascertained. Flusser calls it the “phenomenological doubt” 
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between body and machine, a zone of negotiation between subject and world mediated 
by the camera, in which the technical image—not merely its product, but ultimately its 
horizon—acts upon the whole body producing an infinite process of desire that drives 
the individual to approach reality through suspicion and repetition. (Flusser 2000, 38) 
It is a (negative) process of undoing individuation, since one can only be sure of their 
body and nothing else.  
 
Dialectic of Seeing: Film, Race, and Body 
 
“We are attracted to film to the extent that we cannot 
imagine our lives without film anymore."  
(Murayama Tomoyoshi,”On Film's Realism”)  
 
 
 
In a text from 1936 published in the journal Japanese Film (Nihon Eiga) called 
“Foreign Film Versus Japanese Film,” (Gaikoku Eiga tai Nihon Eiga) Murayama 
writes:  
 
What exerts fascination on Japanese people in foreign films is, firstly, the 
developed culture and life environment that are shown there. One can see life 
styles/forms that are not yet available in Japan. Skyscrapers, flying boat China 
Clipper, cars with radios, private light guns, machines that print words cut into 
tubes, travel vans with beds--all of this we can only see in foreign films. 
Female secretaries, mannequins, review girls, typists: even though those are 
somewhat not rare in Japanese life, they were introduced to us by the cinema 
before their appearance in Japan. (...) Modern prisons, bright big factories, 
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collective residential buildings, fast cabin cruisers, grills, streamline trains, 
cabaret, car races, American football, there is no end to this list. It is not a 
matter of listing individual things, but because modern life (seikatsu) itself 
progresses in such a fast pace, it is natural that the fact of seeing it exerts a big 
fascination." (28)  
 
Film is described as a traveling apparatus/commodity that presents the spectacle of 
different spaces of the world stirred in a sort of fast mise-en-abîme of objects and 
bodies that would mirror modernity's own progressive speed. But it is also seen as a 
time machine that confirms the belatedness of the Japanese material life (seikatsu) 
with images from a future that will come. The modern woman becomes another 
evidentiary modern object among many others. By the left side of the second page, we 
can see two photographs (maybe produced as still images, or maybe frames extracted 
from movies): U.S. American actress Judith Barrett embodies the white modern body 
on the top, and, on the bottom, the Japanese actress Yamada Isuzu, on a kimono, 
embodies what is to be changed. (29) The images of things, acts, and bodies here 
become still objects themselves, modern commodities accumulated under a type of 
ethnographic collectionism. He continues:   
Lots of people do not understand the beauty of foreigners. But it is an 
inescapable fact that a great part of young Japanese people places the typical 
beauty on the foreigner. One can find many reasons for this. One cannot help 
feeling that the Greek-type face is more beautiful than the Mongolian-type 
face; that the white color is more beautiful than the yellow color; that high 
stature is more beautiful than the short one; that the long foot is more beautiful 
than the short foot; that a big eye is more beautiful than a small one; that a long 
nose is more beautiful than a short nose; that unevenness is more beautiful than 
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flatness; that more expressiveness is more beautiful than little expressiveness. 
(28) 
 
Murayama’s writings on film evince the medium as also a site of comparison between 
national and foreign images and bodies. He performs the “anthropological 
ambivalence”66 manifested by the racial complex powerfully analyzed by Frantz 
Fanon's 67 description of the visual injunction--“Look! A Negro!”—which pins a body 
and a subject in motion down to the fixity of hierarchical identities, albeit a split one: 
“an image in third person” (Fanon) or a “third eye” (Rony), since it pulls one’s eye 
from the scene placing it as a spectator (Black Skin, White Masks 90). Murayama sees 
himself occupying the split position of the peripheral elite subject who is reminded by 
film of his non-whiteness and feels entitled to dictate a judgment to his racial-national 
peers. Arising the self-consciousness of the peripheral national subject, it is yet 
another example of the “menace” and aggressiveness that Rey Chow has read in the 
visual encounters of the peripheral subaltern subject with the filmic image on screen: 
that moment when being a spectator means to understand what it is to be, at once, the 
object seen and the subject seer, to be seen as other, “a spectator who is equally caught 
up in the dialectic of seeing.” (Chow 13)  
As many of the non-“Western” avant-garde intellectuals and critics, Murayama 
as a spectator was displeased with local cinema precisely because it did not embody 
the white modern ideal seen in films from the US and Europe (he was particularly 
                                                 
66 On the idea of “anthropological ambivalence,”  see Chapter one, pp. 33–34. 
67 Fanon: “I want to be recognized not as Black, but as White.” (45) 
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drawn to German cinema).68 His encounter with film produces an injunction to 
modernize the Japanese body and life under the model of whiteness. The text, written 
as a critique of the censorship system—a struggle from the times of Prokino—would 
acknowledge cinema's political valence insofar as it could become a collection of 
evidences of the inferiority of the nation's bodies: "One cannot escape nationalism in 
this aspect. We need to work to elevate our cultural and life levels. We should work to 
have the nation fed, rationalized in their lives, physically strengthened, and to improve 
the human outer appearances.” (29) The pedagogical role of film, based on an 
evidentiary display of images, appears as a form of listing, possible only once it 
became a photographic inventory grounded in a regime of equivalence of its parts: it 
does not produce a dialectical montage, and neither a continuum between them. It 
turns film into an iconographic accumulation, which calls for an understanding of 
Murayama’s differentiation between the still and the moving technical image.  
For Murayama, the photographic image is still an object that can be handled. 
Photography, for him, has the capacity to deliver “events, things, important historical 
instants (shunkan)' to future times, and distant spaces; to summon people's minds in 
just ways; to threaten the enemy; and to catch and put together, in a just, fast, and 
simple way, the obsolete "materials" of the world." (Murayama, “Film and Painting” 
41–42) Opposite to Flusser's theory, Murayama's still guarantees photography's 
                                                 
68 Ironically, one of the few Japanese films towards which he expresses a positive 
opinion—even without having seen it—was Kinugasa Teinosuke’s A Page of Madness 
(1926). About Kinugasa’s film, see chapter two of this dissertation. Murayama would 
work with Kinugasa in the 1937 rensageki titled Warahu Tegami, in which he would 
experiment with film projections on stage. About this, see Lee Jungwook, “Murayama 
Tomoyoshi ni okeru 'engeki' to 'eizō' no tsūgō',” 2012. 
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materiality by its capacity to be handled, touched, and acted upon. It is only when the 
image moves, and the subject needs to remain still, that the locus of desire is thrown 
onto shifting grounds. 
Indeed, as a film spectator, Murayama's encounter with the moving image 
produces an unstable relation that constantly pulls him back, despite all negativity that 
emerges from this encounter. Murayama oftentimes remarks that the filmic image is 
ontologically less, because it lacks that “sense of actuality” (genjitsukan) of the real 
presence of bodies. (Murayama, “Rensageki” 15) Different from the theater, film does 
not offer the “physiological negotiation” between bodies on and off screen. 
(Murayama, “Rensageki” 15) "There is a difference between a real woman and a 
woman on a photograph just like the difference between heaven and earth, cloud and 
mud," he writes in the essay “The Good and Bad Aspects of Film” (Eiga no Yosa, 
Warusa) in 1926. (31)  
The tension brought by the encounter with white modernity on film spurred a 
contradiction that would need to be balanced and negotiated: while film could work as 
a pedagogical accumulation of objects and bodies, it was also problematic for it was, 
ultimately, “nothing” but light and shadow on screen, falling short of being an 
“effective” medium. Murayama’s main complaint was precisely that film would be an 
“inobject”: not concrete, less material than matter. 
 Although film's ontologically lessened corporeality might seem to stem from 
its photographic technical base, the fact that still photography does not spur the same 
frustration reveals that film's problem comes from its moving quality that operates on 
a specific duration—a movement that starts from the machine, and not from the 
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observer, who should necessarily not physically move in order to watch. In contrast, 
he would emphasize the importance of the photo album, which can tell a visual 
narrative, as film would, in a freer and more intimate way, independent from a 
projector and fully respondent to the gestures of the viewer's body. Proposing a media-
ontological dichotomy, what would differentiate film from other media would not be 
its nature of a technical image, but its nature of a technical image that necessarily 
exists in the passing of time. Film, he remarks, is not "moving photography," not a 
sequence of still photographs: "film is a spatial and temporal art" (“Film and Painting” 
42). And this, for him, opens an unsurmountable gap between film and photographs: 
'inbjecthood' lies on mechanical movement. If it appears to be a question of the 
technical image, it is rather a question of the technical movement.  
 His avant-garde position as a subject who can dictate the biopolitical program 
of modernization—the separation between cosmopolitan modern and local non-
modern—stands precisely on this gap, since it requires a type of gaze that strips away 
movement from the moving images, turning them into iconic objects and types to be 
collected, listed, and compared. If the experience of a non-white modernism is 
necessarily haunted by racial difference—“whiteness complex,” as Deguchi Takehito 
names it—it is because of the negation of a temporal perception. In film, the effect of 
an inverted mirror stage that shows modernity through racial negativity re-emerges in 
Murayama’s engagement with imperialist endeavors in Korea in the late 1930s.69  
                                                 
69 Nayoung Aimee Kwon (2015), for example, analyzes the later engagements of 
Murayama with colonial Korea as a spokesperson of the avant-garde, in the occasion 
of his 1938 modernist theatrical production of canonical Korean tale Ch'unhyangjon 
(Tale of Spring Fragrance), in which the “whiteness complex” emerges under the 
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Movement and Absence: a minor vitality 
Unlike photography, who was granted its historical role within Murayama's 
political economy of desire, the in-object of the moving filmic image was more 
problematic. What is the specific nature of the movement in film that would trouble his 
idea of political ontology of movement? What, in film's movement itself, could 
become an obstacle to a program for the cinema? 
 On a note that preceded one of his screenplays (“Joyū”) published in the 
journal Eija Jidai (Movie Time) in 1926, Murayama writes that “poetry, essay, color, 
and smell, through the particular techniques of the cinema, are transformed into film.” 
(241).70 Murayama projects his idea of life (jinsei) onto a medium that, clearly, could 
not fulfill the desire of acquiring life's physical aspects such as smell. By placing into 
film all sorts of media and senses, he draws at once the promise of a filmic medium—
to capture life in all senses—and its failure. Film's “victory,” for him, relates to the 
possibility of tearing down the stable distance between image and spectator through 
the close-up, “which bravely started the conquest of distance between camera and 
object.” (Murayama, “Film and Painting” 44) But, although he sees film as a means to 
end the individual's submission to space, for Murayama film's most fundamental 
                                                 
imperialist gesture of a “colonial kitsch” that Murayama brings into the colonized 
space. Her reading is crucial to understand Murayama's imperial unconscious working 
under his avant-garde excursions in colonial Korea, evincing a common contradiction 
present in Left-wing peripheral avant-gardist's self-image as border controllers that 
manage the difference between West and the Rest. She sums it as “the act of severing 
an essentialized and stagnant notion of Koreanness as content from the dynamic 
formal level of modern Japan.” (120) 
70 I thank professor Iwamoto Kenji for introducing me to this text. 
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problem was that it lacks the physical, biological body. It promises life, but delivers 
“only” images. What for people like Béla Balázs was film's most important aspect—
the fact that the “image, unlike the word, cannot be 'looked through'” (Balázs 2011, 
20)—or Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, who emphasized filmic image’s light and shadow 
constitution, was for Murayama what prevented him from embracing film as a useful 
medium.71 
 Flusser compares the technical images to “surfaces that function in the same 
way as dams.” (Towards a Philosophy 19) If historical imagination is contingent upon 
the technologies of mediation, he argues, the technical image's particular mode of 
relation to time—one that is born out of a doubt produced by a nonhuman technical 
apparatus—disrupts the model of historical temporality from the linearity of writing to 
a field of desire for magical repetition in what Flusser calls a “post-historical” 
paradigm.72 A technical image, as a dam, is seen as something that can retain whatever 
is moving forward and continuously. Producing an endless process of turning 
concepts, events, objects, and things into scenes that can slip from inobject to inobject, 
“every action simultaneously loses its historical character and turns into a magic 
ritual and an endlessly repeatable movement.” (Flusser, Towards a Philosophy 20) 
This is the source of their hallucinatory power: a drive to repetition through their 
suspended temporality. (Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images 10).  
                                                 
71 See chapter one for a closer discussion of Tanizaki’s film theory. 
72 This is not the same as the “end of history” of Francis Fukuyama, but rather a 
different mode of relation to time, which does not move linearly forward. 
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 However, in Murayama, precisely this hallucinatory animation, this 
suspending dam, will evince the paradoxical nature of repetition as a frustrated desire 
for samenesss: as reminds Gilles Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, repetition is 
never the repetition of the same, rather it is the evidence of its impossibility.73 Film is 
precisely the medium that turns movement into an object of recording, staging, and 
reproducibility. Mary Ann Doane (2002) has argued that the novelty of the cinema 
was that, through the recording of movement, it made duration itself archivable for 
the first time. It makes time visible, and repeatable—hence, open to difference in 
itself. Not a static dam, but a different type of suspension: making movement itself 
repeatable, film singularizes the very experience of change inscribed in movement. 
 Murayama's problem with film was not the usual avant-garde despise for 
narrative, and also not the usual critique of the spectator's passivity, but rather it was 
spurred by the duration that produces an inescapable movement that defies the 
controlled and foreseeable temporality that validated his own position: movement as 
non-reason, since it cannot be controlled by the subject's will. In this sense, Murayama 
experiences in film the radicalization of Flusser's idea of photography's “black box” 
paradigm—not only the machine imposes its program on you, but it only exists as a 
full apparatus during the very process of imposition. It strikes Murayama as politically 
negative because, being ontologically less but implementing such a strong ground of 
negotiation between spectator and image, it requires a different ontology in order to 
                                                 
73 A similar experience happens in the case of Mário de Andrade, in Brazil, whose 
encounter with the filmic experience produces a counter-temporality that disrupts that 
of the teleological peripheral avant-garde. See, in detail, in chapter four.
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escape the spatialized logic of judgment. Such a negotiation arising from a restricted 
control over the image will throw Murayama's aesthetic politics onto a different 
modulation, shifting the idea of action from one based on an understanding of 
movement as a motor transformation of the visible, towards a temporal understanding 
of movement. A political shift of ontologies of movement, hence of life.  
 Movement, which is absent in Flusser's theorizations, opens up a space for a 
different type of relation between subject and the world, producing a different politics 
of aesthetic engagement of present to future. Although for Murayama history moves 
(or should move) forward, his reading of film as an evidence of racial and social 
inferiority, needs a theoretical obliteration of the immaterial synthetic movement of 
film into the photographic stasis. Filmic movement goes against Murayama’s idea of 
historical time and agency, and thus needs to be rejected. The unanswerable question 
of where movement arises—in the subject, in the image, or in the apparatus—
ultimately disrupts the question of the clear boundaries between acting and seeing, 
modern and non-modern.  
 Another of film's restrictions, Murayama writes in the short essay “The 
restrictions of film” (Eiga no Genkaisei) in the journal Kinema Junpō in June 1, 1931, 
would be the fact that the technical image of film needs to produce, with no respite, an 
irrevocable visual sphere:  
 
The technical image [eizō] can express actuality [genjitsusei] in a way that 
words cannot. However, this actuality is no more than a purely visual one. The 
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fact that talkies need to follow the restless [koyaminaku] visual reality makes 
their content very narrow. (67)  
 
Murayama sees in the technical image, besides the absence of the body, the restriction 
that comes from its insubordination: the image will always and necessarily be on the 
screen. The visual has no silence.  
For Murayama, visibility leads to uncontrollability, threatening the field of the 
non-visual. Although he stresses that the entrance of sound into film promised to bring 
music and word into the cinematic experience, he laments that it remains a purely 
visually oriented medium, always on the need to follow visual reality (shikakuteki 
genjitsu), and thus failing to grasp the invisible aspects of the world: feelings (kanjō) 
and sensations (kankaku). Besides the absence of the bodies, for him visibility also 
would exclude the affective dimension from the filmic, taking away life itself from it.  
 Superficiality, absence, and the injunction of the visible—the fact there needs 
to always be an image on the screen—sets Murayama on a denial for the same reason 
that Balázs praised it: “Words, concepts and thoughts are timeless. The image, 
however, lives only in the concrete present. Words contain memories; we can use 
them to refer to what is absent. An image speaks only for itself.” (Balázs 21) For 
Balázs the “pure visuality” of the filmic image creates a particular engagement with an 
inescapable present; or rather it reveals the present as inescapable. The most subtle—
albeit huge—implication of the inescapability of the image on the screen is that it 
brings, from surface to surface, the filmic inobject's temporal aspect, in which the 
concrete present of the image constantly reminds the spectator of life's random 
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unfolding. If, as writes Murayama, “the deeper and more interior is a truth, the more 
inaccessible it is to a visual means,” (“The Restrictions of Film” 67) the problem of 
film would be that it does not subscribe to the equivalence between the invisible and 
the truth. 
 Being only surface, but containing an uncanny vitality, film can be threatening. 
Placing Murayama against Flusser, and vice-versa, allows us to think the problematic 
hallucinatory power that Flusser reads in the technical images as an emancipatory 
capacity of movement to place the sovereign subject under suspicion—which is what 
troubles Murayama. In the clash between an ontology of depth and one of surface, 
what is at stake therefore is a political capacity to inhabit the present. What joins the 
two statements of Murayama on filmic visuality—namely, the educational value of the 
white bodies on screen; and the threat of the unavoidable presence of any image on 
screen—is the relation between seeing and/in the present: respectively negation of the 
present through the pedagogy of an improved future, and the discomfort caused by the 
inexorability of the present. The absence of the physical world in the image opens up a 
different—temporal and moving—experience of presence. 
 In 1936, on a text published on the journal Kinema Junpō, titled “On Film’s 
Realism” (Eiga no Hakushinsei ni Tsuite), Murayama uses a sequence of Josef Von 
Sternberg's film The Salvation Hunters (1925) to describe what he considers to be 
film's capacity to grasp reality, introducing a different idea for the medium and for the 
very act of seeing. Murayama writes:  
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This movie holds a dazzling reality [rearitii], amidst the mud of 
commercialism, vulgarity, and sentimentalism that it is. But I was amazed and 
astonished at this movie. The abandoned beach and the crane lifting mud from 
the bottom of the water are repeatedly shot. It is not a beautified setting, but 
the actual things on their real place. There is no need to beautify: it is meant to 
express the ugly as ugly. (Murayama, “On Film's Realism” 130) 
 
The iconography that catches Murayama's attention is similar to that of his photos 
with Horino Masao: the wasteful ugly, the modern decaying. In his words, the ugliness 
of these "stinky wasted planks and animal corpses" is bravely exhausted by the 
camera. But one thing that is not on Horino's photographs, is precisely what astonishes 
Murayama in the film: repetition and time, that which is not iconographic. Here, 
different from the photographs, the image itself is moving, but the action is stuck on 
the same space: it's a sequence of time instead of space. What catches the eye is not 
flow and circulation, but retention and repetition. In a new attempt to grasp film's 
capacity to engage with reality, Murayama's lament over absence reappears inverted, 
as a mode of immersion. By the second half of the 1930s, a new relation between 
vision and reality emerges through film, in what he calls film's “hakushinsei”: “let's 
understand the word hakushinsei that I use here in a narrower sense, as something that 
includes a sensorial reality, a scientific accuracy, and a vividness (namanamashisa), 
more than just the general attitude of an artist in relation to reality, or just a realism 
that is developed as a creative method. " (“On Film's Realism” 130)  
 Focusing on the phenomenological experience made possible by the filmic 
machine—rather than a convention of language or the attitude of a single artist—this 
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shift comes at a moment when the magnitude of the major historical events proves 
history and reality uncontrollable in their totality, after the crushing of the optimism of 
avant-garde Leftist movements under state repression. Listing photographic images 
that promise to deliver reality in full, Murayama states his suspicion and frustration:  
 
I have felt suspicious of the unconditional belief on the hakushinsei of 
photography. [...] photos of corpses of victims of cruel murders in crime books, 
photos of the deceived and injured of war, medical films, films about garbage 
waste, photos of sick bodies [...] (“On Film’s Realism” 130) 
 
Unlike the false promise of photography, filmic hakushinsei would reveal a cleavage 
in reality itself: a mode of getting close to the vivid and sensorial aspect of the world's 
reality (rearitii), instead of capturing an objectifiable spatial aspect of it (genjitsu), 
which is not capturable because human access to it is itself restricted. By implying 
(not so consistently) a difference between genjitsu and rearitii, Murayama places film 
at the second pole, in which it would act—unlike photography—by the introduction of 
difference through montage. “It is not possible to vividly represent an object by simply 
photographing it. The object’s analysis and montage is essential. It’s not about merely 
photographing a face or an expression, but one needs to reconstruct them.” (“On 
Film’s Realism” 131) He writes, at this point, that art's task is to take up “reality's 
(genjitsu) truth from the bottom.” (130) And this not about delivering the actual, 
biological human, “but to reconstruct the human being through a totally unique 
technique,” which would be film's unexplored potentiality. The visible absence of the 
body in the image is thought now as a different sort of invisible presence. Rearitii, in 
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this sense, is restricted and corporeal life that, under its intrinsic epistemological 
restriction, can provide openness to history.74 The restriction of film is, thus, 
analogous to the restriction of life: it points toward a minor vitality. 
 As in a later text, called “On the realism of the historical film” (Jidai Geki 
Eiga no Rearizumu, 1937), movement acquires a different ontology in which the idea 
of history itself needs to be altered. Looking at jidaigeki, or historical films, 
Murayama proposes an idea of history as a result of a type of complex movement 
whose temporality follows no pre-set rules and leaves random traces to whatever is 
called history. "Most things remain in history by chance (gūzen)," (272) and history, 
he writes, under the exposure to the moving image, is in the present itself and not an 
image of the past:  
 
Although feudal morality is still present in current days and around us, it is 
necessarily something that will gradually disappear or shift. In sum, it is 
something that is constantly in movement. If this movement is not represented 
as something that moves, one cannot say that it is true reality. We say, in old 
times it used be like this. But, even in those old times, it was moving in rather 
complex ways. Precisely because it was moving, it reaches the present. To 
ascertain such a moving figure is something rather difficult." (“On the Realism 
of the Historical Film” 271, my emphasis)  
 
                                                 
74 It is somewhat similar to Siegfried Kracauer’s notion of “camera-life” a life 
mediated, framed, with affinity (but not identity) to actual biological life. See 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film: the Redemption of Physical Reality, Princeton University 
Press, 1997. 
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Movement is described as a constantly and inescapable disruptive condition of 
possibility for history, in a diffuse and ungraspable relation between past, present, and 
future. It is only at this point that movement is embraced in Murayama’s theory as an 
uncertainty introduced by film, instead of the previous understanding of it as a willed 
action that would not find its place in filmic medium. Murayama's writing does not 
form a system, but rather exposes points of tension, paradox, and conflict, spurred by 
the technical movement. If film, as in Murayama's own initial idea, is the ambivalent 
evidence of a modernity yet to come, a negativity in relation to a point in the present 
stemming from a future origin, looking at feudal times as something inseparable in the 
present reveals a shift on the idea of the image, of history, and, ultimately of 
movement itself. Movement, here, has turned into an experience of time, instead of the 
conquest of space. And, more importantly, it is a time that follows no unified agent—
not the Hegelian spirit, neither the modernizing will.   
 
Screens 
Besides working on several screenplays (mostly not shot), Murayama directed 
two films in the late 1930s (Ren'ai no Sekinin, 1936; Hatsukoi, 1939); staged some 
rensageki performances (a form that combined film and theater), and wrote several 
essays on film and photography, compiled in the 1928 book Introduction to 
Proletarian Film (Puroretaria Eiga no Nyūmon) and scattered in journals through the 
1930s. His political interest on cinema is present in his engagement with the 
Proletarian Film League (Prokino), producing an important contribution to the 
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emerging movement, which left deep marks in the theory and practice of political 
cinema in Japan. 
 In 1932, Murayama also contributed the essay “History of Japanese Film” to 
the book Theory of Proletarian Film, where he writes a historical materialist narrative 
of the development of cinema as industry, its conditions in Japan in terms of capital 
accumulation, studio system, censorship, and their relation to style and modes of 
consumption. Although not an official member of the Proletarian Film League 
(Prokino), he was one of its most regular contributors as critic and theorist, apart from 
having his screenplays published in the group's journal Film Transit (Eiga Ōrai). 
Prokino was a very active movement, among the most remarkable Leftist documentary 
collectives in the prewar world, spread all over the country in its peak, and engaged in 
both practice and theory based on the idea that film had an active political-pedagogical 
function, inspired by Soviet film theory and producing a great number of documentary 
films.75  
 Murayama's serious commitment to the group comes as no surprise, 
considering his belief in the political potential of art, but also in movement itself, the 
fundamental element of the medium of film. However, from his first writings on film, 
in the late 1920s, the medium is theorized as a lacking medium, and the visual 
experience of seeing the filmic image characterized as one in which negative affects 
are mixed with feelings of fascination. Not only is the body of the proletarian rarely 
                                                 
75 For a richly detailed history of the movement, see Abé Markus Nornes's 
Japanese Documentary Film: the Meiji Era Through Hiroshima, 2003, and Makino 
Mamoru's "Rethinking the Emergence of the Proletarian Film League of Japan 
(Prokino)," 2001. 
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actually present in his Introduction to the Proletarian Film, but film as a whole is 
thought as a medium of absence, attraction, and repulsion. Marginal as it is, it 
nevertheless emerges as a strange aesthetic body that seems to not fit quite so well in 
the aesthetic-political program of Murayama—who, nonetheless, would repeatedly go 
back to it. His repulsion and attraction reveal the tension that is opened by the 
different ways of receiving and theorizing movement, history, embodied perception 
that were brought about by the moving image projected onto a screen. 
 Scholars such as Wanda Strauven and Guiliana Bruno have recently reminded 
us that a “screen” can be different things, sometimes an obstacle between two worlds, 
but other times a mode of sensorial encounter and even co-inhabiting.  At a moment of 
a historical crisis, the screened image imposes on Murayama a shift on his theory of 
presence and a possible different notion of history, emphasizing the restrictions of the 
spectator in the face of time. Film's incapacity to deliver reality as unity—as the 
scientificist discourse would claim—introduces a different notion of reality, which is 
not given but reconstructed, which is based on the frustration of the desire to know 
and to move, interrupted by the power of fascination exerted precisely on the invisible 
level of the interstices of repetition. If, as to WJT Mitchell's argues, an image does 
nothing, it is precisely in that nothing that a political poiesis of different folds of life, 
history, and politics, might come forth. 
 156 
CHAPTER 4: BECOMING A CLOUD: PHOTOGRAPHY, FILM, AND NON-
MOTRICITY IN MÁRIO DE ANDRADE 
 
“Everyone was in the most functional intimacy of life, they were 
only movement; and this obscure force, unnoticed, of animal life, 
became so to say palpable and enjoyable, rising from the 
monotonous chant.” (Andrade, Café 52) 
 
Cloud-media, Cloud-bodies 76  
Writer, essayist, theorist, and photographer Mário de Andrade, a central name 
in Brazilian modernismo, was fascinated by the limits of movement. In a fleeting 
passage, Chico Antônio, the main character in his posthumous novel Café (2016), 
imagines a perceptual state that would turn his body into a cloud. Looking but not 
seeing, merely “receiving the existence of the world,” Chico Antônio performs a slow, 
embodied gaze that reappears in several of Andrade’s works—photographic, literary, 
and theoretical. When Andrade creates the fictive indigenous group Índios Dó-Mi-Sol, 
he imagines a sort of virtual movement that only exists in potentiality: “for not 
accepting the existence of movement, the Índios Dó-Mi-Dol only deploy the verbs of 
movement, motion, locomotion, in the conditional.” (O Turista Aprendiz, 147)  
In this chapter I will think this cloud-like perception as the threshold of 
movement and non-movement, through a media-theoretical approach that sheds light 
on a particular politics of embodied vision. Instead of fixating the “primitive” or non-
                                                 
76 Figures 32, 35, and 36, in this chapter, are reproductions of the original photographs 
from the Arquivo Mário de Andrade hosted at Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros – 
Universidade de São Paulo. Figures 33 and 34 are found in the CD-ROM “Os Diários 
do Fotógrafo,” released with the latest edition of O Turista Aprendiz, Iphan, 2015. 
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modern in stillness, as would be the easy reading of Andrade, my approach points to a 
logic of contagion and desire for optical inaction that is constantly mediated by the 
filmic imaginary and its perceptual situation. Stillness is not the opposite of 
movement, as photography is not necessarily the opposite of film. I will think 
Andrade’s politics of movement through his photographic work, in which the cloud-
like rhythms of vision imagined by him are affected by a dialectics of movement and 
non-movement produced by the filmic medium. I will approach the photographic 
images produced by him through Andrade’s performance of the filmic look, premised 
on the dislocation of different ontologies of the technical image—the photographic 
stasis through the cinematic movement—in order to foreground the presence of the 
spectator’s body.  
Although rarely used to describe media, clouds bear some similarities to the 
technical image. With their steady, subtle, almost imperceptible movement, clouds are 
amorphous objects: suspended, comprised of small water droplets almost in an in-
between state, not fully liquid, nor solid, neither gas. They enjoy a temporally 
impermanent existence. Once we get too close, they cease to be a discrete object, 
becoming fog-like: their separation from what is not-them becomes less clear. Clouds 
are figures of lightness, embodied weightlessness, similar to technical images, which 
media philosopher Vilém Flusser has described as “inobjects” (see Chapter 3). To 
grasp their ephemeral materiality and slow movement, they require an enduring gaze 
that surrenders to their phenomenal duration, merging with their temporality. 
I follow the thread of this mode of embodiment, in order to read a political 
theory of movement that emerges from Andrade’s photographs through the possibility 
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of a cinematic ontology of the photographic. From its early iterations, filmic ontology 
has been commonly grounded on film’s photographic indexicality, which emphasizes 
the temporality of the archive, of the physical transmission of past into present—
although, one must notice, to very different political claims and with very disparate 
theoretical inflections. Or else, in a more phenomenological vein, exemplified by 
works such as Vivian Sobchack’s, film is seen as radically different from photographic 
stillness for its nature of lived experience of the present. As Sobchack puts it, such a 
phenomenological emphasis on the lived experience would radically distinguish “the 
transcendental, posited moment of the photograph and the existential momentum of 
the cinema, between the scene to be contemplated, and the scene as it is lived.” (145) 
From photographic moment to cinematic momentum, she sees the transition of static 
photograph to moving film as the shift from a temporal emptiness of “unbecoming” to 
one of temporal flow of becoming. 
My argument here does not go against theirs on an exclusionary way, but 
moves away from their clear-cut dichotomy. I invert the order, reading the possibility 
of a filmic gaze to photography in Mário de Andrade, by thinking of film as a 
perceptual state that establishes a particular relation to movement in the body: a body 
that is the condition of possibility for an optical situation that makes an image endure, 
in whose immobility the movement of the apparatus comes to reside. If, as Sobchack 
argues, filmic technology brought the subjective and embodied experience of vision 
itself to the realm of the public, “hitherto only directly available to human beings as an 
invisible and private structure that each of us experiences as “our own”” (149), it was 
also the first technology that rendered embodied vision—embodied since mobile—to a 
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group of immobile bodies. It delivered movement to non-moving bodies, detaching the 
embodied visual experience of movement from physical mobility.77  Instead of 
mapping Andrade’s references to the cinema, as other have done, I will read the filmic 
as the embodied and dialectical relation of movement to non-movement as it appears 
in his work. 
Thinking through and with Mário de Andrade, I look at the exposure of the 
immobile body to movement, seeing how the encounter between spectator and moving 
image unfolds as a politics of movement that gets transported to other situations of 
encounter. I read in his work a different political angle for movement and action, 
informed by (and against) the historical imagination that pushed Brazilian 
modernismo, and the avant-garde in general, ‘forward.’ Montaging different images 
and texts, this chapter pays attention to the transformation of movement and its 
political consequences, interweaving the movements and images that were floating in 
the Brazilian early twentieth century imaginary.  
During his two ethnographic trips to the North and Northeast of Brazil, with 
brief border-crossing to Bolivia and Peru, Andrade produced around nine hundred 
photographs, which make up the biggest portion of his practice. His interest in 
ethnography and modern media such as film places his photographic work and theory 
in a network of images—still and moving. The image below is the first photograph 
taken by Mário de Andrade with his Kodak camera, affectionately named Codaquinha, 
in his 1927 trip to the Amazon (Figure 32). Andrade's travels unfold in many different 
                                                 
77 It is a hint a this experience that I address in the previous chapter: Murayama discovers non-motor 
movement when the fascist nation-state denied movement even to the most privileged of its subjects. 
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artifacts: a travel diary titled O Turista Aprendiz; several articles published in the 
newspaper Diário Nacional; the novel Macunaíma, which made use of his travel 
notes, observations, and researches, along with readings of European ethnographies of 
Brazil—notoriously Theodor Koch-Grünberg’s 1917 Vom Roraima Zum Orinoco; and 
hundreds of photographs that were only sparsely published during his life, and which 
only recently became objects of study in their own right. During the process of my 
research in his archive at the Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros of the University of São 
Paulo (IEB-USP), the photographs were made public in digital form, in a 2015 re-
edition of his travel diaries. None of the images here analyzed were published while he 
was alive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: “Abrolhos, May 13 1927.” IEB-USP archive code MA-F-0142 
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Besides being an aesthetic object whose composition could place it with no difficulty 
in the glossary of the avant-garde, as many have argued,78 the image is also a 
photograph of looking. It is an image of a restricted gaze that points towards the sea 
and bits of land, which could be read as directed to the “national territory” as the gaze 
of the Western discoverer, but which also refuses to set up any sort of perspectival 
stability. Although functioning as the curious gaze of the mobile explorer, it 
nonetheless fails to offer the promise of freedom, while also not delivering the 
protected space usually reserved for the voyeur: the peephole goes off-frame, and 
flares of light create over-exposed graphic patterns in the dark areas of the image. It 
becomes unclear whether the landscape inside the circle is beyond or on the black 
space that surrounds it, but in the confusion of depth and surface, movement seems to 
pertain both to the image seen and to the body that sees.  
This photograph captures the workings of mediated vision for Andrade as the 
instance of exposure not to an object, but to an indeterminate movement of a restricted 
body. Unlike other readings of Andrade’s photographs, such as Esther Gabara’s and 
Luciana Martins’s, which stress the dimensions of proximity, intimacy, and close 
encounters, here I will essay a temporal reading of it, through a film-
phenomenological problematic, which finds distance instead of closeness. The images 
will guide the way to think about the political relation between perception and 
technological mediation to draw a film theory, located in a geo-historical situation, 
that emerges from it. 
                                                 
78 See, for example, Canjani 2013, Carnicel 1993, Gabara 2008. 
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Traveling for Andrade was the cause of much discomfort. Troubled by the 
relation between moving and looking, he described himself as an “anti-traveler, . . .  
always traveling wounded, alarmed, and incomplete.” (O Turista Aprendiz 1976, 49) 
The mediation of the camera—and through the camera, of other images—is where the 
privileged mobile body of the modernizing explorer is problematized in its aesthetic 
experience. The question revealed by the mediated encounters here discussed is that 
they provide nothing to knowledge, but rather call for a specific type of perceptual 
engagement that dislocates the potentialities of moving for those of non-moving that 
Andrade sees in the fulfilment of the cinematic machine as a performance of a slowed 
and embodied gaze in his photographs. As a friction that appears in moments of failed 
encounters, they do not signify, or narrate, but they rather summon an inactive 
presence. Instead of the modern call for forward-movement entailed by the avant-
garde—and by his own project—, the experience brings Andrade to a suspension that 
enables to see other things, such as labor and race. 
I suggest through Andrade that the immobile body of the spectator is a medium 
for friction in the transnational network of moving images established by the cinema, 
enticed by the movement that is thrown at the spectator.79 Friction, as anthropologist 
Anna Tsing writes, is the local grip that establishes “awkward zones” in the circulation 
of ideas, bodies, and objects, in global capital. If friction is the condition for 
movement, it also generates new directions to the forward moving motions in which 
images originally engage. This chapter looks at the temporalities of friction spurred by 
                                                 
79 In Hans Belting words, “bodies themselves operate as a living medium by processing, receiving, and 
transmitting images,” that is, they are part of the lives of the images. (5) 
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the entanglement between body and images that traveled—through and as capital—
mediated by a body whose action’s politicality is placed under question. Charles 
Chaplin, film theory, ethnographic photography, the sick body with malaria, all get 
entangled in the particular experience that the technical image and the mechanical 
movement of film make possible. At the center, the body as a medium, suspended like 
a cloud. 
 
Un-moving the politics of action 
 Mario de Andrade (1893-1945) was one of the most active participants of the 
São Paulo 1922 Modern Art Week (Semana de Arte Moderna), which figures in the 
official historiography as the beginning of the modernist movement in Brazil, or the 
point of entrance of avant-garde practices into the country.80 Andrade also authored 
one of the most notorious twentieth century Brazilian novels, Macunaíma (1929), 
deemed a landmark for its experimentation with colloquial and indigenous 
vocabularies and its portrayal of an “amoral” trans-racial main character. The work 
became a paradigm for the image of the modern Brazilian identity, later turned into 
film by Joaquim Pedro de Andrade’s notorious late Cinema Novo work, in 1972. Also 
a musicologist, art critic, theorist, photographer, Andrade was arguably one of the 
most influential intellectuals of modern Brazil, such that his work is inseparable from 
the very idea of Brazilian modernity.  
In a 1942 speech, delivered on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the 
São Paulo Modern Art Week of 1922, Mário de Andrade recast its political-aesthetic 
                                                 
80 For a detailed historical account of the 1922 Modernist Art Week, see Nicolau Sevcenko 1992. 
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narrative in what would be one of the harshest critiques of the movement. In the midst 
of a general historical disenchantment, with the devastation of the war in Europe and 
Asia, and the Estado Novo dictatorial regime of Getúlio Vargas (1937-1945), which 
had pulled him out of his position as secretary of culture for the city of São Paulo, a 
melancholic Andrade pronounces a verdict on the failure of his generation to bring 
formal experimentation to the service of social transformation: 
 
I am convinced that we should have transformed ourselves from 
speculative into speculators. There is always some way to slip into an 
angle of vision, a choice of values, into the blur of a teardrop that 
swells the unbearable of the world’s conditions. No. We became 
abstemious and transcendental abstentionists. But that is precisely why 
I was very sincere [sinceríssimo], that I wished to be fruitful and that I 
played with all the cards at sight, now I reach this consciousness that 
we have been rather out of date [inatual]. Vanity, all vanity… (“O 
Movimento Modernista” 253) 
 
His critique is aimed at their “abstemious and transcendental abstentionism” which, he 
implies, led him and his generation to a position of passive speculative spectatorship. 
The problem is less of the world, whose condition is not reducible to one’s will, but 
rather of the mode of engagement with it—of how to visualize beyond the “blur of a 
teardrop” that maximizes the world’s negative condition. His distaste for their present 
situation, the “unbearable of the world’s conditions,” is based on the fact that they are 
not in the present, that they are out-of-date, that they do not correspond to the call of 
the times. The failure to properly see out of the “blur of a teardrop” means to be in the 
temporal structure that Johannes Fabian calls the “denial of coevalness”: to be placed 
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outside the (modern, European, white) historical present, to be the object of the 
modern episteme. 
The narrative that traces an arc from the fast-paced optimism of the 1920s 
formal experimentations to the dark and arrested pessimism of the 1930s—a shift that 
Andrade performs in his own speech—fits well into the consolidated narrative that, as 
Pedro Fragelli recalls, tells that “the disappointment with the conservative tones of the 
1930 Revolution81 led the main Brazilian intellectuals, in Antonio Cândido’s 
expression, to become aware of the underdevelopment of the country.” (87) Hinging 
questions of action (being a spectator), distance (being peripheral/underdeveloped), 
and temporality (being non-contemporaneous), it is as if being non-active—letting go 
off the “leash” of political reality—had contributed to the country’s fall into the state 
of a belatedness in relation to the advanced row of nations. In the same speech, 
Andrade further complicates the binary relations: 
 
I don’t have the least reservation in affirming that my work represents a 
happy dedication to problems of my time and my land. I helped with 
things, machined things, did things, so many things! And, nonetheless, 
I’m left with the sentence that I did too little, because all my 
achievements derived from a vast illusion. (“O Movimento 
Modernista” 252)82 
                                                 
81 The 1930 Revolution refers to the coup that gave power to Getúlio Vargas, who had lost the 
presidential elections in the same year. The new government brought the “Old Republic” (República 
Velha) to an end, gaining the support of sectors of the Left by the social democratic hopes of taking the 
country out of the hands of the São Paulo and Minas Gerais oligarchies. Mario de Andrade was part of 
the Partido Democrático, one of the few political parties in São Paulo that supported Vargas for the 
1930 elections. But as the Vargas government rose to growing authoritarian tones, with communist 
persecution, finally culminating in the second coup of 1937 that initiated the authoritarian regime of 
Estado Novo, those hopes and political support were proven wrong. See Leandro Konder 43-51. 
82  “Não tenho a mínima reserva em afirmar que a minha obra representa uma dedicação feliz a 
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The “many things” that he had done include centrally the period in which Andrade 
“sacrificed” his activities as a writer and artist in order to actively implement policies 
for the democratization of culture and education as a secretary to the city of São 
Paulo.83 From 1935 to 1938, during the rise of Vargas’ state of exception, and the 
purge on communist activities in the country, Andrade served as head of the 
Department of Culture of the Municipality São Paulo, playing an important role in 
carving out and consolidating a space for popular culture in the political agenda of the 
country. Through institutional breaches, he became the first intellectual to implement 
cultural policy as a means of social inclusion, implementing a leftist agenda in an 
increasingly conservative environment, until he was tacitly forced out of office.84 As 
has become notorious, Andrade’s political commitment comes through his ideas on 
culture as common good, the promotion of inclusion of Afro-Brazilian population, his 
support for proletarian arts and culture, the establishment of the Society for 
Ethnography and Folklore, directed by Dina Lévi-Strauss, in 1936, and the creation of 
the Mission for Folklore Researches in 1938, which produced several audio and visual 
                                                 
problemas do meu tempo e minha terra. Ajudei coisas, maquinei coisas, fiz coisas, muita coisa! E no 
entanto me sobra a sentença de que fiz muito pouco, porque todos os meus feitos derivaram de uma 
ilusão vasta.” (252) 
83 Pedro Fragelli uses the notion of “sacrifice” to read how Andrade understood his own political 
activities in detriment to his creative work. I would point out that this very notion, which does not 
appear consistently in Andrade’s writings, is nonetheless consistent with his ambivalent relation to the 
notion of artistic autonomy.  
84 See the very rich edition on his period in office by Carlos Augusto Calil and Flávio Rodrigo 
Penteado (2016). Also see Martins 2013. In 1935, just after the failed Communist Revolution (Intentona 
Comunista), members of the Communist party and Marxist intellectuals suffered persecution and faced 
imprisonment by the Vargas regime. Leandro Konder calls attention to the fact that Andrade never fully 
declared alignment with Marxism but he was a supporter of contemporary communist struggles, as is 
clear in his article “Comunismo,” published in Diário Nacional, on November 30, 1930. 
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recordings of indigenous music and performance in the interior of the country.85 All of 
which, he evaluates in 1942, “derived from a vast illusion.”  
 Most of the vast array of commentators and scholars of his life and work are 
ready to praise Andrade as an engaged intellectual.86 Drawing a positive picture of 
Andrade, the usual narrative tends to read his affective negativity as a sign of his 
elevated moral standards. However, for Andrade, the problem was one of positionality: 
“My aristocratism has punished me. My intentions deceived me,” (“O Movimento 
Modernista” 252) he writes. Although the narrative is delivered as a realization at its 
point of closure—“I am suspicious of my past” (254)—, the problem of action and of 
political will had constantly haunted Andrade. “I don’t imagine myself as a politician 
of action [político de ação]. But we are living in the political age of man, and I needed 
to serve this purpose.” (253) If, on the one hand, Andrade did not want to abstain 
himself from the issues of his time, as he puts, “behind the contemplative doors of a 
monastery,” on the other, he also refused to “write explosive pages, fighting for 
ideologies and winning the easy glories of the prison. All this is not me and not for 
me.” (253) He seemed to doubt the reach of his own political will: the politicality of 
his possibility of action, which entails a space in which one can move. He experienced 
a polarized tension which would never be resolved that demanded another idea of 
action that could imagine a way through the restriction of one’s possibility of effective 
movement.  
                                                 
85 For example, during his time in office, he commissioned the construction of parks, libraries, and 
other cultural venues in proletarian neighborhoods of São Paulo. He also commissioned events for Afro-
Brazilian culture, celebration of the abolishment of slavery, and for proletarian arts. 
86 See for example, Penteado 2015, Calil 2015, Cândido 2011, Moraes 1999. 
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The frustration and negative tone of his analysis do not stem from the failure to 
act, but rather from the failure to find a particular mode of non-action, or a way out of 
the dichotomy action/non-action. In other words, the problem of how to leave behind 
the equation of action to the political, which, as I hope to show in the coming sections, 
had been latent in his work as an issue of embodiment. An aesthetic problem: how to 
be a body, physical and perceptual, within a world that is mapped by power relations 
that are inseparable from one’s very presence.  
Andrade, in his speech, seems to evoke the dichotomy between acting and 
contemplating, according to which, as Ariella Azoulay (2012) reminds us, the political 
lies in the sphere of action, from which seeing would be excluded. It is from this 
framework—the relation between action, movement, and seeing—that I will read his 
images in what follows. Placed in dialogue, or friction, Andrade’s Amazonian 
photographs and his thought on visual media suggest that the political in seeing 
emerges through the blurring between action and non-action, movement and stillness, 
and, ultimately, absence and presence. The optical situation in which Andrade finds 
himself—the restriction of a physical body that nonetheless enjoys the freedom to 
move, as a modernizing urban subject—reverberates in his writings and in his 
photographs. His recurrent return to an idea of movement, instead of foregrounding 
motion as an engagement of a future-oriented present, reveals the encounter with a 
mediated optical situation as an opening of the present for a type of dwelling through 
the receiving of movement.  
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Malarial Gaze and the Cinematic Situation: receiving movement, becoming time 
On June 18, 1927, Mario de Andrade and his travel companions Olívia Guedes 
Penteado, her niece Margarida Guedes Nogueira (Mag), and modernist painter Tarsila 
do Amaral’s daughter Dulce do Amaral Pinto (Dolur), crossed the border between 
Peru and Brazil. Arriving at Remate de Males, they go off-board into a “disgraced 
land” where “no one does anything” (Turista Aprendiz 2015, 117), as he is informed. 
Dona Olivia, the rich coffee capitalist, “had taken not even ten steps on land, went 
back to hide in the cabin, in order not to see those people, without exception, eaten by 
malaria” (Turista Aprendiz 2015, 117). She stays onboard. During the trip, the question 
of whether to look is central to Andrade, who experiences the cleavage between being, 
looking, and seeing. However, in order to experience, one needs to bring one’s body 
into the scene—so the question is not whether to look, but how to look.  
Among the 530 pictures from his 1927 trip, Andrade took only five pictures 
during that day. None of those include any human subject. The absence of the human 
in the land devastated by malaria is one of the moments in which the image and the 
text of the diary appear in disjunction. In a “research” trip animated by the concern 
with cataloguing indigenous words, objects, and mapping unknown lands, the fact that 
the image does not follow the same route is revealing, although not that surprising. In 
the midst of his discomfort with traveling, the sign of a diseased body, “eaten by 
malaria,” could become the most obvious token for the spectator’s own self-comfort. 
 
 170 
 
Figure 33: Remate de Males, June 18, 1927. Photograph by Mario de Andrade.  
Caption: “Here erstwhile showers were taken.” From CD-ROM “Os Diários do 
Fotógrafo.” Iphan, 2015. 
 
 Among the images of that day, he printed twice the one above, in different 
sizes. His usual prints were of small size (3,7cm x 6,1cm), but he would choose 
specific images to undergo a second and bigger enlargement of 12,5cm x 17,5 cm, in 
sepia with contrast correction. This was one of those. The first caption, on the smaller 
print, reads “Here, erstwhile, showers were taken,” (Figure 33) the second, in the 
larger photograph, more descriptive, says “Amazonian bathrooms.” (Figure 34) Unlike 
Dona Olivia, who actively decides not to see, Andrade decides to enter the “disgraced 
land”–whose disgrace was actualized in its inhabitant's bodies—while, at the same 
time, not photographing any of them. Instead, the photo that he finds most appealing 
is, indeed, a photograph of time: “erstwhile” (Figure 2). 
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Figure 34: Photograph by Mario de Andrade. Caption: “Amazonian bathrooms.” From 
CD-ROM “Os Diários do Fotógrafo.” Iphan, 2015. 
 
What lies not between the photographs, but somehow within them, is not the 
visible-sayable conundrum, and neither the jouissance of the Barthesian punctum, but 
a stretch of time that affects the mode of physical engagement in the very act of 
looking. The first image points to a temporality of the bygone, “erstwhile,” while the 
second, as almost a correction to the first approach to the image, erases that 
temporality in favor of a more seemingly straightforward description: “Amazonian 
bathrooms.”  
The particularity of the image is that what it describes as “bathrooms,” the 
place where “erstwhile” showers were taken, is not clear.87 It seems to function as a 
                                                 
87 I thank José Gatti, who in a bright and stimulating conversation during the seminar “Displacing Latin 
America Film, Media, Literature” at the ACLA 2017 pointed to the unclearness of the photo. I also 
thank for the organizers Ramayana Lira and Alessandra Brandão, and all participants, for the very 
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deictic—here are the bathrooms—but actually performs a disorientation: what is the 
image showing? Does the caption refer to the constructions by the river shore? Or are 
the bathrooms the water of the river itself? Erasing “erstwhile,” Andrade erases not 
only any possibility of nostalgia, but he also opens the image to a sort of ongoing-
ness, in a temporality of becoming that Vivan Sobchack associates to the cinematic: 
“coming into being” instead of the Barthesian “has-been” of photography.  
What is there to be seen? Not clear whether the object of the gaze is the river 
or the sheds, Andrade calls for an open mode of perceptual engagement that will 
enable to see the present as the indiscernibility between natural (the river) and 
constructed (the bathroom). Despite the initial goal of experiencing Amazonian purity, 
the timeless ground zero of the nation, on several occasions Andrade, through the 
mediation of the technical image and its uncertain mode of looking, finds an entangled 
temporality that is never abstract. The time of the river is the time of its extraction: 
shed, boats, and water are equally historical. The wild, timeless, primitive nature, is 
neither wild nor primitive, as much as it has never been: its time is embodied in the 
ongoing slow violence of capitalism, always-already a ruin of the present.88 The 
image, instead of “erstwhile,” does not point to an elsewhere, neither does it exist in 
the gaps, but it is installed and embodied in the process of the material existence—and 
extraction—of that space.  
Only by engaging such a slow gaze this juxtaposition can be perceived. The 
slight shift of temporal focus seems to emphasize the ambivalent status of what is 
                                                 
engaged conversation about my paper. 
88 I borrow the expression “slow violence” from Rob Nixon, for its capacity to grasp the semi-
inivisibility of extractivist capitalism’s long temporality. See Nixon 2011. 
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there to be seen, bringing the viewer’s attention to the present of that space in front of 
the camera, while refusing to pin it down to a closed and fixed state. We are asked to 
dwell on the present of the act of looking. It establishes the photograph not as trace, 
but rather as the opening of a drifting relation, making the image a temporal object —
durational like a film—through the way it produces a cinematic situation of looking. 
I bring the concept of the temporal object from philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s 
work on cinematic time, through a rather idiosyncratic conceptual move.89 By 
definition, a temporal object—a concept that Stiegler himself idiosyncratically 
borrows from Edmund Husserl—could never be a still image, since it is an object 
whose appearance is contingent with its disappearance. Its existence does not endure. 
Husserl uses the example of the melody: it exists not only in time but through time. 
Mirroring the temporal structure of consciousness, the temporal object would give 
access to the very act of perception. Stiegler sees film as a temporal object for its 
durational nature, disagreeing with Husserl, for whom the recorded nature of film 
already places it outside of the realm of “pure perception.”90 As writes Stiegler, film 
“weaves itself into our time; it becomes the temporal fabric of those ninety or fifty-
two minutes of unconscious consciousness that is characteristic of a being, a film 
viewer, strangely immobilized by motion." (Stiegler 11) A film is a temporal object 
because it imposes the experience of its unfolding duration onto our perception—
                                                 
89 For a more detailed debate over the different media temporalities, in and out of Stiegler, see Villarejo 
2014, 66-80. 
90 The difference between Husserl and Stiegler will not be fully addressed here, but one could say that 
they differ in their very premises: Husserl doing a phenomenology of presence—that Derrida calls a 
recasting of metaphysics—with its belief on an “outside” to language; and Stiegler engaging in the post-
structuralist deconstruction paradigm. One could say, however, that the two agree as their critique of 
sight as a sense: for Husserl because it is too embodied and deceiving, and for Stiegler because it is too 
passive and uncontrollable. 
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which Stiegler sees, following Adorno and Horkheimer, as a political danger in the 
context of the “broadcasting industry.”91  
If, as Sobchack argues, unlike photography, film offers a lived experience of 
the situation of viewing, it is precisely because film is such a temporal object: its 
unfolding is the very structure of becoming, of “coming into being.” In her words, “the 
cinema’s visible inscription of the dual, reversible, and animated visual structure of 
embodied and mobile vision radically transforms the temporal and spatial structure of 
the photograph” (Carnal Thoughts 150). Such a perceptive structure resists its own 
reduction into the photographic unit of time and space (Carnal Thoughts 150). As she 
writes, the photographic “abstraction of its visible space, its single and static point of 
view,” would not open time to be inhabited: instead of living the image as in film, she 
argues that photography produces only contemplation. Not being a temporal object, it 
would give itself to be only looked. 
Being lived, film requires a lived situation to exist. And, not being a spatial 
object, which can be possessed, but rather a temporal object whose experience 
demands time, the cinematic situation is that of surrendering to another’s time. For its 
inescapable duration, the filmic experience reminds us, in Stiegler words, that “my 
time is always the time of the other” (Stiegler31–32). As Sobchack emphasizes, 
cinematic time constitutes a situation of viewing, in which mobility is not performed 
                                                 
91 That is precisely where Stiegler, following Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the culture industry, 
flags film’s danger: the risk of a full capture of human consciousness by the temporality of a machine 
serving capital’s interests. If film is equal to consciousness, the mass adoption of industrialized filmic 
time opens the way to "the commerce of bodies, ideas, and goods.” (90)  
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by the spectator’s body, but rather felt as the unfolding of an autonomous and situated 
temporality of the film-body: “The very mobility of [film’s] vision structures the 
cinematic subject (both film and spectator) as always in the act of displacing itself in 
time, space, and the world … it is always eluding its own (as well as our) 
containment” (Sobchack Carnal Thoughts 150). Film would perform the very 
structure of embodied, subjective vision (that is, vision as we experience it), and make 
it shared. The filmic situation of disorientation and loss of the exclusivity of seeing, 
which stems from the movement on the screen, delivers temporal uncertainty to the 
immobile spectator’s body. 
What I want to retain here is this filmic experience of a body, which 
experiences seeing as an embodied experience of time as suspended movement in 
front of an image—or of the visible world. An embodied experience of both opening 
time and becoming (in) time, made possible by the encounter with the filmic screen. 
Living intensely the film-saturated media environment of modernizing Brazil, 
Andrade had the encounter with the moving image already embedded in his sensorial 
apparatus.92 It is the (privileged, modernizing, but also guilty) body, inhabiting this 
particular experience of movement and disorientation, that emerges “strangely 
immobilized by motion,” as Stiegler put it (11). If we follow Wendy Chun’s 
suggestion that media make their way into the habitual temporalities of our lives, 
becoming ingrained in our corporeal rhythms and attitudes, it is possible to see the 
filmic performance of looking in Andrade transposed to his other mediated images 
                                                 
92 For historical accounts on the boom of movie-going in the modern urban spaces in early twentieth-
century Brazil, see, among others, Sevcenko 1992, Schvarzman 2005, Navitski 2017.  
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through his relation to time.  
Indeed, as Telê Ancona Lopez suggests, Andrade’s incursion into the Amazon 
is deeply steeped in film culture, theory, and criticism, reflected in his discontentment 
with “being just an enchanted spectator.” (quoted in Cunha 155) Andrade, for whom 
“the true material for the artist is the spectator,” believed that the position of spectator 
was a democratic one: “the more objectified the creation, the artist ceases to exist 
becoming a spectator like all.” (“Inerência do Deslumbramento à Beleza”) A traveler 
and photographer, he was also a film spectator who, as Cunha reminds us, was a 
frequent visitor of movie theaters not only in the bourgeois environment of São Paulo 
but also during his trip to the interior of Brazil. This media-corporeal attitude of the 
immobile filmic spectator, which turned himself into a medium for cinematic images, 
mediates and politically dislocates his encounters.  
Upon going back aboard, Andrade sees a boat carrying a “dark skinned, strong 
Peruvian man, with live blood behind his dark skin.” (Turista Aprendiz 2015, 117) The 
Peruvian man, who “looked like [the Hollywood actor] Richard Barthelmess,” 
fascinates the group of travelers, who cannot help staring. He adds, “but entirely 
devoured by malaria, his skin, of an absurd smoothness, was of an earthy brown 
devoid of pleasure.” (117–8) The two girls, Mag and Dolur, try calling his attention, 
but he does not look. “All the noise that we made, nothing interested him not even for 
a peep, he did not look.” (118) After this encounter, Andrade, he writes, “desired 
malaria, but a malaria like this, that ends the curiosities of body and soul … to have 
malaria like this, so nothing more would interest me in this world in which everything 
interests me too much.” (118) The “face of an extraordinary beauty” (117) of the 
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Hollywood actor Richard Barthelmess reveals filmic imaginary as the primary 
mediation for the situation of looking, betraying a perception pervasively mediated by 
the filmic situation.  
As an infected spectator, in this scene of gazes and non-gazes, what Andrade 
desires is the mode of looking that is at once purely physical, present, consonant with 
the drifty gaze called for by his “Amazonian bathrooms” photograph. The malaria 
gaze, “a gaze that only received the notion of what existed,” (“Maleita II” 458) is an 
embodied gaze, contingent upon the subject's body in its present situatedness that sees 
nothing: it opens the present to a ‘waiting without an object.’ Andrade experiences a 
gaze that emerges from the desire for non-desire—the desire for mere embodiment—
spurred by the filmic mediation of Richard Barthelmess in the black Peruvian body, 
performing no futurity and no nostalgia. He desires, through malaria, the cinematic 
situation itself: to be a spectator’s body, gazing immobile and inactive, exposed like a 
photographic film to the world.  
Sergei Eisenstein, in 1924, had already used a biological analogy to theorize 
film. As is commonly known, Eisenstein suggested that the core of the filmic medium 
lies not on the image per se, but on the relation established by image and spectator. 
Different from photography, film, he claims, is an “art of comparison” that unfolds in 
time and that, more importantly, through montage, produces a “physical 
infectiousness.” (Eisenstein 42) The vocabulary of biological contagion, which works 
for Eisenstein’s investigation of the transmission of on-screen motion to the muscular 
structure of the spectators—aiming for revolutionary agitation—in Andrade is 
imagined for the opposite purpose: a contagion of non-motricity.  
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Four years later, in 1931, Andrade revisits this experience and names it the 
“philosophy of malaria” (filosofia da maleita), in a revision of the diary entry 
published as a series of two texts for the newspaper Diário Nacional. (“Maleita I” 
454) In this version, he erases any reference to the imaginary mediation of Richard 
Barthelmess and, instead, describes it as an experience of direct contact, a sort of 
natural sublime in the encounter with the man’s malarial gaze. It shows, at once, the 
desire and the failure of the primitivist fetish: between placing and displacing the 
“malaria gaze” in and out of a natural state, repressing the “impurity” of the mediated 
imaginary along with the image of the white male actor. He writes that, in the 
Amazon, 
 
all notions disappear, of time, of life, of need, of progress, all 
activities, even the most precarious, of verifying, of judging. It 
is not worth moving anymore, not even a gesture. (…) curiosity 
is the primary element of progress... it has produced suffering 
and produces suffering. Above all, it de-deifies man. Curiosity 
is a curse. And in the lands of vast heat it is simply made in 
Germany (…) That is why I dream with malaria, which is 
bound to end my curiosity and will soothe my disgraced vanity 
of needing to be someone in this competition here in the South. 
(“Maleita II” 457)  
 
The cinematic state imagined by Andrade exists in an infected body—infected by a 
“third-world” disease. If Andrade’s queer gesture emerges through his drive towards 
Barthelmess’s “face of an extraordinaty beauty,” it is further politicized in its 
geopolitical restrictedness. Sara Ahmed’s queer phenomenology offers a productive 
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way to read these two instances: the queer gesture towards movement, she suggests, 
entails the dislocation of the centers that orient our motions, confusing “objects and 
subjects according to how they already appear.” (Ahmed 33) The disorientation 
dreamt by Andrade is queered also inasmuch as, centered in the marginal zone of the 
malaria-filled Amazon, it rejects motion. Through the friction of the Hollywood film 
star with the Peruvian body, a disorientation emerges. Emphasizing the locatedness of 
this malarial gaze “here in the South,” Andrade disorients, on the dimension of desire 
(for non-motricity), the geo-historical question that set the avant-garde in motion: to 
be oriented towards the (metropolitan) center.  
Malaria embodied the ambivalence of a perceptive state of detachment 
associated with backwardness, immobility, and unproductivity, but which was the very 
product of the drive to modernization.93 From the late nineteenth century to the end of 
the first World War, malaria went beyond an endemic issue to an epidemic problem to 
the Amazon region, as a result of the boom of the rubber extraction industry. In the 
period, Brazil produced half of the world’s rubber, and in the Amazon malaria had an 
eighty-percent morbidity rate. (Stepan 26-27) Malaria was only primitive in its 
embeddedness in the process of capitalist accumulation. 
During the construction of the monumental railway project of the Madeira-
Mamoré Railway, which would provide efficient distribution for rubber extracted from 
the Amazon to overseas markets, malaria became an urgent problem because it risked 
halting the construction works (1907-1912). Attracting a large number of 
                                                 
93 See Stepan 27. 
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impoverished workers from the Brazilian Northeast and elsewhere, malaria infected 
ninety-percent of the Madeira-Mamoré Railway Company’s workforce of thousands 
of men. (Stepan 29) Indeed, it was necessary for capital to eradicate static inertia to 
keep the workers’ bodies mobile—from tree to tree, from poor areas to the unfulfilled 
promises of extractive modernity. Malaria, as a state of immobility, threatened to 
interrupt the movement of capital almost as an autoimmune contagion: the faster the 
movement, the stronger the interruption.  
Andrade himself is struck with the realization that his presence in the Amazon 
is already implicated in the extractive forces that turned malaria into a deadly 
epidemic in the region. Traveling on the Madeira-Mamoré train, he writes:  
 
Thousands of Chinese, Portuguese, Bolivians, Barbadians, 
Italians, Arabs, Greeks, have come for some Money. All types 
of noses and skins walked around here lying themselves with a 
bit of a fever at dawn to rise in the never more. What have I 
come here for!... Today the poet travels with his friends, in the 
Madeira-Mamoré, in a tidy inspection car, well seated in shit-
vine seats, sorry for the expression, strictly made by the strong 
men of Manaus. (…) Sometimes we stop, the landscapes will be 
kodakized, even cinema is brought in! (Turista Aprendiz 2015, 
158)  
 
In the train, the immobile spectator—the train passenger itself was the prototype for 
the cinematic situation—infected by the moving images, finds himself politically 
interpellated through non-action, not as a mode of withdrawal, but rather as an 
exposure to his own presence: exposed to the slow temporality of capital, throwing the 
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extracting subject into a sick and disoriented presence.94 The malarial gaze, unfolds in 
the action of not acting, of looking without seeing, or seeing without looking. 
Mediated by the technical image of the cinema, it establishes a relation to the 
unfolding duration of the present as an intransitive waiting; waiting for nothing. In the 
embodied filmic situation, it produces an encounter with the very act of seeing. 
What the malarial/filmic gaze finds is labor. Consonant with how Sara Ahmed 
critically reads Husserlian phenomenology through Marx, the immobile body, 
“receiving the notion of what exists,” finds the motion that is abstracted into static 
self-identity on the surface of the commodified spaces and object. It is reminded that 
“what arrives not only depends on time, but is shaped by the conditions of its arrival.” 
(Ahmed 40) Andrade’s optical situation undoes the phenomenological self-presence of 
objects and bodies (the workers, the train seats) through their history of labor, their 
“what comes before” that is abstracted into the present is returned as temporal depth. 
As an inactive spectator receiving movement, Andrade’s inaction as contamination 
emerges as a way to scavenge what is made invisible for the curious gaze of the 
ethnographer in its act of fetishizing the pure atemporality of the primitive origin. But, 
at the limit, it also leads to his own erasure, exposing the spectator to its participation 
                                                 
94 Exposure here has a twofold meaning. One is the analogy to the process of exposure that the 
photographic film goes through to be affected by the environment. The other one refers to the anti-
Kantian aesthetic experience that it suggests. Although the similarities seem obvious at first—even 
Andrade will rehearse this connection—it is clear that this “malarial gaze” is not a Kantian disinterested 
aesthetic judgment, since it produces an entangled, the opposite of the detached subject.94 Instead of a 
normative call for a sensus communis in the unity in feeling, the perceptual state that Andrade imagines 
is a more ambivalent one: a type of exposure as thought by Jean-Luc Nancy as a mode of being-together 
premised on the impossibility of a total communion of subjects within and among themselves, an ethics 
of exteriority of “being-in-common” inasmuch as it “is not a common being.” (Nancy 29)  
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in the process of slow violence that turns the present in an open ruin of itself: “What is 
the reason of all these international dead that are reborn in the sound of the train and 
come with their dimly lit little eyes peep me through the car window?” (Andrade, 
Turista Aprendiz 2015 159) When the gaze returns, the spectator himself is reminded 
of the conditions for his own arrival, as the condition of possibility for the very 
extraction that makes the commodified bodies and spaces to arrive in front of him. 
Disorienting movement, it dislocates the moving subject.  
This ambivalent mode of looking appears repeatedly in other moments of 
Andrade’s work. In his novel Café, the character of Chico Antônio, coming from the 
interior of the Northeast to the big city of São Paulo, overwhelmed by the fast pace of 
the modern space, is described by his particular perceptual presence:  
[He had] his most absolute pleasure and most constant vice in the 
moments of absolute, a-intellectual dilution of personality that he 
reached in the coco singing circle, in certain gazes directed to the sun, 
or in front of surprises such as the recent one crossing the Carmo 
meadow: the constant emptiness that kept him in a state of armistice so 
vegetable that didn’t even arrive to an acknowledgment of vitality—an 
endless monotony. (Café 97) 
 
Chico Antônio embodies the malarial gaze, which can turn him in into a non-human 
being, as we know by our first encounter with this state: “Everyone was in the most 
functional intimacy of life, they were only movement; and this obscure force, 
unnoticed, of animal life, became so to say palpable and enjoyable, rising from the 
monotonous chant.” (Café 52, my emhpasis) The sort of immobility that opened his 
body so that “sensations flew within him” (Café 98) entails, instead, an intimate 
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relation to movement, in which movement becomes non-movement by the repetitive 
nature of addictive inertia. To be “only movement” is to be beyond the human, to 
“abandon one’s body to become a cloud.” (Café 133)  
The image of movement, which begins as a vital functionality and exceeds 
vitality to become emptiness, is born out of type of gaze that does not imply stillness, 
but that also does not lead to action. Andrade’s desire of immobility betrays the fact 
that his physical mobility is enjoyed due to his “internal colonizer” position: the call 
for immobility reveals the paradoxes of movement in the very contradiction of being 
an avant-garde intellectual that can think and unthink the nation. 
Regaining Time 
Fleshing out different temporalities within the “now,” this cloud-like filmic 
perception produces different forms of inhabiting time—and returns time to bodies 
and spaces deemed atemporal. As wrote Jean Epstein, one of the few film theorists 
Andrade is known to have read, “That our time is the framework of a variable 
dimension, in the same way as our space is the place for three kinds of relative 
dimensions, can now be understood by everyone because we can now see the 
lengthening or shortening of time on screen” (Epstein 21).95 If time was an object that 
became uncertain through filmic technology in the early twentieth century, its political 
stakes lie in what it reveals about the role of time in national-historical projects.96 
What other dislocations can this temporal friction evoke?  
                                                 
95 Epstein, besides appearing as a metonym for the cinema in the early poetry of Andrade, also figured 
in his collections of film criticism. See Cunha 2011. 
96 For this, see the richly researched book of Jimena Canales A Tenth of a Second.  
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On 17 June, 1927, one day before encountering the Amazonian bathrooms and 
the malarial gaze, Andrade takes the picture below at the port of Assacaio. (Figure 35) 
This photograph seems to capture his attention. He enlarges it in different sizes and 
tonalities. Something that seems to go beyond the usual ethnographic portraiture 
brings him back to the image. In his travel diary, he writes: “Legitimate indians, 
playing black [bancando o negro], painted with jenipapo. They do not paint the 
knucklebones, which remain resembling light-colored scars, it is horrible. I 
photographed.” (Turista Aprendiz 2015, 115) 
 
 
Figure 35. Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros (IEB-USP), archive code MA-F-0282.  
 
 
 185 
On the back of the first and smallest copy, the caption reads: “The taller is blackened 
[enegrecido], painted with jenipapo.” (Figure 36) We can see that, at first, the caption 
included the word “black” (negro) which gets crossed out in favor of one that denotes 
the result of a process, “enegrecido”--blackened. Also, the first choice was a verb of 
state, estar, which he chooses midway to substitute for a verb of being, ser.   
 
 
Figure 36. Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros (IEB-USP). Archive code MA-F-0282, 
verse. 
 
The temporal order of the inscription, from “black”, through “blackened”, to 
“playing black” (bancando o negro) reveals a gradual shift from interior to surface, 
from state to performance. Instead of estar negro, which implies the state of black as a 
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momentary detour from identity, the choice of ser enegrecido turns the transitory into 
a state of process. It acknowledges what is seen as surface, and being as process. 
There is no proper end or beginning to return to: from “black” to “blackened,” from 
estar to ser, it is a matter of openness, or becoming, instead of change. His arrival, to 
use Sara Ahmed’s terminology, is his very open becoming (through) time.  
The series of looks undoes its own seriality. First, the awkwardness of the 
aesthetic displeasure brings Andrade to the act of photographing. And from the 
encounter, through the words on the diary, to the examination of the developed 
photograph, the act of looking returning to the image its temporal depth, by placing it 
on a structure that eludes chronology. Moreover, from an aesthetic discomfort, it 
refuses the idea of state as atemporal, to one that presupposes a gesture, first with an 
agent (playing), then a diffuse action (blackened) whose agency is dislocated. It 
designates a movement that, ironically, does not appear on the image itself, but which 
gets displaced to the photographer in its immobile situation as a spectator. 
Andrade’s photographs have been read as “close and intimate” encounters that, 
so suggests Esther Gabara, lead to the dissolution of racial typology into a shared 
humanity that emerges from the mutual presence of object and subject.97 Looking at 
the signs of his own presence left by Andrade in the images, Gabara argues that “he 
pictures the pain of the colonial encounter in his doubled position both in front of and 
behind the camera, as both the authorial subject and the powerless object.” (Errant 
Modernism 91) But the temporal reading I propose, instead of activating a politics of 
                                                 
97 She sees this, for example, in the photograph of an indigenous boy (“Tapuio de Parintins”), in which 
the boy’s face is blurred and not fully framed. As if captured in motion. (Gabara 2011, 89) 
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proximity that could redeem his position as an “internal colonizer” through a humanist 
closeness and “understanding”—while tacitly reviving the split between eye and 
body—, emphasizes how distance is kept, even under the desire of an impossible 
proximity. And precisely in this consists the political gesture. Through the latent, but 
not actual, movement, the spectator’s own presence gets destabilized by duration as 
belatedness—as opposed to an affirmative and capturing immediacy.  
The cloud-like suspended and restricted (im)mobility of looking in the malarial 
gaze keeps time open in alterity. For Andrade, each medium exists in a relation of 
entanglement to one another—whose entanglement is actualized in the body of the 
beholder. Looking at an image meant, thus, to disavow the gazer’s epistemological 
power over the signifier through a regime of slowed gaze in intransitive waiting. The 
disidentification of the visual object with itself entails the disidentification of the 
looker with himself. The temporality of the medium and the temporality of the gaze 
merge. 
 In a 1934 article, published in Espírito Novo, it is through the mediation of the 
filmic image of Charles Chaplin that Andrade addresses this assemblage between slow 
gaze, body, and image. It shows how similar aesthetic experiences of looking are made 
possible by different media, opening up the immobile body of the spectator to 
difference. The image of Charlie's face, he writes, “gives the feeling of a real man 
with the face of still drawing, amidst equally real men with moving faces.”98 (“Caras” 
                                                 
 
98 Esther Gabara, mistakenly, translates “cara de desenho parado” as “designed face,” (2008 95) which I 
translate as “face of still drawing,” in order to keep Andrade’s attention to the contradiction between 
movement and stillness. I keep, however, her suggestion of “visage” for rosto, and “face” for cara. 
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55, my emphasis) Again, the indetermination of moving is what calls Andrade’s 
attention to the fact of mediation. 
 
What is most admirable in the creation of Charlie's face [cara] is that all 
its effect is produced by the cinematographic99 machine. Charles Chaplin 
has managed to give it an anticinegraphic quality, to which shadows and 
planes lack enormously. And it is mainly because of this that his face is 
comic in itself, violently contrasting with other visages [rostos] that 
appear on screen, and which we perceive as visages from real life. 
(“Caras” 55) 
  
In the comparison between Chaplin and Buster Keaton, Andrade sees an inferiority of 
Keaton precisely at the moment of encounter between viscera, skin, and filmic 
machine: “[Keaton's aesthetic element] is not part of the structure of the face, does not 
come from the bone carcass, does not come from the flesh, the epidermis. And, much 
less, it does not come from the cinematographic machine.” (“Caras” 57) Andrade 
praises an intermediality of the body: if the aesthetic element in Keaton does not 
originate from the materiality of his body, in Chaplin it is, at once, a product of the 
cinematographic machine and a corporeal element, one cannot be separated from the 
other. He sees in it an excess of medium and body: the stillness of drawing emerges 
from the moving image of film, causing bone and epidermis to equally pertain to the 
technical apparatus and to the body.  
                                                 
99 Gabara, mistakenly, translates “máquina cinematográfica” as “photographic machine,” (2008 95) 
erasing the tension between the aesthetic effect of the two media that seems central do Andrade. 
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It is worth mentioning that drawing, the medium that Charlie bears on his 
filmic face, had for Andrade its own temporality. In a 1939 essay, published in the 
newspaper O Estado de São Paulo under the title “Do Desenho,” Andrade states that 
“drawing is an intermediary art between the arts of space and of time. […] It is, at 
once, delimitating and without limits, antiplastic qualities par excellence.” (“Do 
Desenho” 71) Whereas, he argues, sculpture and painting are “material phenomena” 
which are limited both by their raw materials and physical framings as “a closed fact, 
which is constructed of their own interior elements, entirely unrelated to what to the 
statue and to the painting would be the non-me,” drawing is “antiplastic” because, 
having the line as its raw matter, it is entirely open to the relation with what is not 
itself, what is not contained in it. (“Do Desenho” 71-72, my emphasis) Andrade sees 
no separation between the drawing and its environment, the “me” and the “non-me,”, 
not because he reduces drawing to mimetic realism, but, and he compares drawing 
with the hieroglyphs, because it is a sort of mimetic analogy in the Benjaminian sense: 
a sensuous copy, made in distance, whose core contains nothing but contact itself.100  
The character of unlimited “open fact” of the drawing, Andrade argues, stems 
not only from its weightlessness—just as light to the photographic image, the line 
hides nothing behind its immaterial aspect, as opposed to clay, stone, or paint. On a 
1940 essay on photography, he writes that “Photography is, above all, a fact of light, 
and it captures, so to say, unlimited fields.” (“O homem que se achou,” 80) Their lack 
of weight can open both to what is beyond their framed and material constrictions, 
evoking the open mobility of the cinematic framing. Both would be what Vilém 
                                                 
100 See Benjamin’s “On the Mimetic Faculty.” 
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Flusser calls an “in-object.” (see chapter 3) And precisely due to their openness, they 
are transitory: “painting always searches for elements of eternity, and therefore it 
tends towards the divine. Drawing, much more agnostic, is a way of defining 
transitorily (...) [it creates] the finites [finitos] of a vision, a movement, a gesture.” 
(“Do Desenho” 75) 
Countering Belgium artist Jean de Bosschere’s devaluation of “natural 
peoples” by their expression in the medium of painting, a medium that would be 
attached to its natural materials, Andrade extends the temporality of the drawing to the 
“primitive body paintings”:  
in the immense majority, these symbolic decorations of the primitive 
being are, such as the drawing, an open fact. It is not the natural limit of 
the face, enclosed by the hair and by the angle of the lower jaw, it is not 
the limit imposed by the chest, that close this body paintings, but rather 
they disseminate through face, body, with no principle of a closed 
composition. (“Do Desenho” 73-74) 
 
The open and transitory nature of the drawing brings together Charlie’s face and the 
black-painted Indian in the photograph. Chaplin plays Charlie as a still drawing; and, 
painted black with jenipapo, the Indian plays the black person. The face of Chaplin 
and the face of the “blackened” tall Indian appear in relation also by the temporality of 
a process of (un)becoming analogies: one as the other, one as another. The image, in 
its temporality, can only exist once the spectator is halted in front of it in a belated, 
malarial gaze. Image and spectator both become intermedial experiences of opening, 
since they can only become inasmuch as they unbecome at the moment of mediation. 
Both sides become “open facts.” 
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In early twentieth century Brazil, the discourse on race, as historian Lilia 
Schwartz argues, brought together photography and scientific discourse as intertwined 
“closed facts” in order to trace the future of the country over questions of 
miscegenation. 101 The notions of process and unbecoming implied in racial 
miscegenation thus bore with it a negative idea of loss that haunted Brazilian elites, 
who would designate themselves temporal managers of the monolithic time of 
progress through biopolitical racial management. Whither the modernist (fetishizing) 
primitivism, or the eugenic whitening policies, both coincided in a paradigm that 
functioned through the imposition of a “historical” (white, modern) time over an 
“ahistorical” (non-white, primitive) one. If a theory of visual media emerges in 
Andrade, it is not one dwelling on the usual natural-artificial dichotomy, but on their 
interrelated capacity to rework time through bodily restriction of the filmic, malarial 
gaze, in which the modern, white, male gazer does not hold the epistemological power 
over the management and fixation of time. 
It is not only that both in Chaplin and in the “blackened Indian” their 
becoming-image is their becoming-artifice, but what brings both together is also their 
capacity to displace movement by its virtualization through inaction, from the image 
to the body of the spectator. They evoke what Akira Lippit theorizes as “avisuality”: 
“not as a form of invisibility, in the sense of an absent or negated visibility: not as the 
antitheses of the visible, but as a specific mode of impossible, unimaginable visuality.” 
(Lippit 32) In this way, one can evoke the cinema not by the serialization of instants in 
                                                 
101 See Lilia Schwartz’s O Espetáculo das Raças. 
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some of Andrade’s photographs, as many have read,102 but by the call they make for 
the duration of the gaze and the virtual movement they withhold in suspension. As the 
filmic image emerges by analogy—Charles Chaplin, Richard Barthelmess—, the 
filmic situation is evoked by the temporality of the engagement between spectator’s 
body and image. The tension between framing and un-framing leading to an excess 
beyond the visible field appears as an unresolved relation between matter, artist, and 
spectator. 103  
“Art of the future? Maybe art of decay…” is how Andrade understood filmic 
aesthesis’s relation to history, through its unearthing of the ongoing present as a 
disjointed relation between the lived time of the spectator, through the image, and the 
lived historical present.104 (“Arte Inglesa” 191) If one remembers that, as Sheila 
Schwartzman shows, filmic spectatorship in São Paulo at the time was practiced by 
the upper bourgeois classes, the capacity of film to make the audiences experience 
“the inactivity of the fulfilled refusal,” as Andrade suggests, becomes a potential mode 
of discomforting self-critique. (“Arte Inglesa” 191) Instead of what Rei Terada calls 
“phenomenophilia” as a perceptual drifting attitude of turning towards the “merely 
phenomenal as an evasive maneuver” to open a “space before the acceptance of any 
given fact,” the drifting malarial gaze in Andrade points to the opposite of a postponed 
endorsement of the given, suggesting a suspension of its empty, modern capitalist 
flow. 
                                                 
102 See, for example, Lopez’s widely followed reading. Also Martins and Gabara. Instead, I would 
suggest, serialization of the movement into still frames shows exactly the opposite of movement. 
103 See “O artista e o Artesão.” 
104 In this sense, his ideas on film prefigure somehow others such as Siegfried Kracauer’s. See Miriam 
Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 2010. 
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Distance and Slowness: Comparison and the Impossible 
Unlike his avant-garde peers in so-called “non-Western” spaces such as 
Oswald de Andrade, Tarsila do Amaral, Murayama Tomoyoshi, Jorge Luis Borges, and 
many others, Andrade did not undertake the traditional tour through European 
metropolitan centers.105 A self-described anti-traveler, in the first draft for the preface 
to his travelogue, he frames his trip as overshadowed by a negative feeling of guilt that 
stemmed from an incapacity for experience itself: “My comprehension of landscapes, 
costumes, and men is processed always by a comparative process that, in this case, 
seems to me frankly wrong . . . The truth is that I'm travelling much around my own 
self, and selfishly applying my experiences instead of enriching myself with new 
ones.” (Turista Aprendiz 2015, 48)106  
In spite of all the discomfort with the comparative process, felt by Andrade as 
an obstacle to experience, comparison does not cease to happen—and it does not 
prevent him from moving. As Andrade travels—and photographs—analogies keep 
appearing: one thing is seen as the other, terms are displaced. Filmic bodies, such as 
Richard Barthelmess, emerge in physical bodies, and imagined places emerge in 
actually lived spaces: “Belém is the main city of Polynesia. They sent Malay 
immigrants here, and from the space in between the mango trees Belém do Pará was 
born.” (Turista Aprediz 1976, 63) Analogy seems just as undesirable as inescapable, a 
                                                 
105 In fact, Andrade never went to the Northern hemisphere metropolitan centers, his knowledge of it 
had always been mediated by images and readings of avant-garde journals and books. See Carnicel 
1993. 
106 This passage appears in the latest re-edition of his travel writings published in 2015.   
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process that produces and inverts the binary opposition between physiognomy and 
feeling: “(…) Brazil, instead of making use of the Africa and India contained in it, 
wasted them, adorning with them only its physiognomy (…) We should think, feel like 
Indians, Chinese, people from Benin, Java.” (61) But through these unavoidable 
events of comparison, Andrade realizes that he is part of that same performative 
“physiognomy”: “I want to sum up my impressions of this trip. . .  I can’t quite 
manage, I’m a bit stunned, astonished, I don’t know. . .  there is a sort of sensation, 
stuck at insuffiency, of a mottling that ruins all the gray neat European that lingers 
within me.” (61) 
Analogy is premised on the fact that things are not the same: they are only 
analogous. They make difference evident. But what wracks Andrade with guilt is not 
much that he experiences comparison as superficial analogies, as it could seem. 
Instead, the problem is that it is not superficial enough. Incapable of leaving this 
“comparative process,” Andrade also cannot exceed his own skin—while, nonetheless, 
at the same time, the skin is “mottled” and he realized the “gray neat European” 
interiority. The problem posed by the comparative process is not the fact that it 
incessantly takes place, but rather that he cannot fully enter its regime: he is held back 
in his European interiority, whereas he cannot help seeing the other as exchangeable 
images. His internal colonizing position comes into relief. 
Andrade’s discomfort betrays the ambivalent position of someone who is 
always on the verge of fetishizing, and consuming, the “primitive” as an asset for the 
global “stage” of the avant-garde discourses, while at the same time bitterly realizing 
that he is also fetishized by the “central” metropolitan gaze. Being a representative of 
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the modernizing hegemonic classes of São Paulo, embedded in the speedup drive of 
the urban center and coming to research the truth of the country, Andrade’s position 
runs the risk of embodying the colonizer in order to push back against the anxiety of 
being the colonized. His desire for the transitory temporal suspension of the malarial 
gaze in a cloud-like body is ultimately the desire to leave behind the paradigm of 
interiority into that of analogical relations: a desire that, he feels, he cannot fulfill. For 
Andrade, the problem is not that comparison reveals difference. The problem is rather 
that he encounters difference as unsurmountable: he feels compelled to an 
“experience” that would close the gap of difference, while this closure is impossible 
because his very experience can only take place for the “freely” moving bourgeois 
body “from the South.”  
The question that Andrade encounters is how to dwell on the impossible. The 
embodied experience of cinematic situation appears as a mode of suspension and 
tarrying that reveals the limits of proximity by the contagions between filmic screen, 
body, camera, and photographic image. The relation between medium, image, and 
body is a place of friction and dispute. If, as Hans Belting suggests in his “image-
anthropology” (Bild-Anthropologie), “the human being is the natural locus of images, 
a living organ for images, as it were,” (37) this dispute is less a “cultural” one, as he 
argues, but rather a material one. Material not because all bodies are different, but 
because they are differently addressed, in their difference, by the modern division of 
labor, capital accumulation, and, in this, of movement. That is when Andrade’s 
embodied cinematic temporality comes to bear on the analogical photographic 
process: to make the gaze endure is to enter the embodied regime of comparison. To 
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experience the temporal depth of the power relations requires unmoving, to make 
movement recede and interrupt the avant-garde’s modernizing speed, through the body 
and into the lived present in its inescapable belatedness. In other words, to be 
reminded, as Sobchack argues is the experience of film, that one is a body—and that a 
body is entangled in micropolitical relations. 
Here I have read these images, along with his essays on aesthetics and film, as 
the site of a temporal tension, in which race—and “primitivism”—is read 
through/against the (non-) temporality that is imposed on the “primitive” by the 
hegemonic discourse, a position Andrade uncomfortably occupies. Instead of seeing 
them as a finished product that unproblematically responds to an avant-garde 
agenda107, I read them as something that troubles it through a media-theoretical 
approach of the body of the spectator, which entails a physical entanglement between 
the seer and the world seen. The primitivist agenda of Brazilian modernism pursued 
the discovery of the nation through the encounter of its original and ontological 
difference—the “primitive”— as an asset to carve its place in, as Eduardo Jardim 
writes, “the concert of the cultivated nations,” (Jardim 115) performing a double 
fetishism: of the “primitive” and of the “modern.” But Andrade’s photographs seem to 
trouble this project in its aesthetic level: not necessarily as a response to his will, but 
sometimes also in spite of it. 108  
                                                 
107 As an example of such an approach, see Canjani. 
108 What is usually called the “primitivist” or “nativist” phase of Brazilian avant-garde starts in 1924 
with Oswald de Andrade’s Manifesto da Poesia Pau-Brasil. The narrative usually places the trip 
undertaken by Mário de Andrade, Oswald de Andrade, Tarsila do Amaral, and French poet Blaise 
Cendrars to Minas Gerais, in the interior of Brazil, as the inaugural point—the “trip of the discovery of 
Brazil”—in which they start to research, in Eduardo Jardim’s words,  the “primitive element,” (115) as 
a means of placing Brazil in the world map of modern art.  
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Working in dialectical ways, both the camera and technical image produces a 
zone of indeterminacy and of negotiations of different restrictions (camera, image, 
subject), as Vilém Flusser has argued (see chapter 3), that will intervene directly into 
modes of embodiment and into possibilities of seeing. Moreover, it plays the role of a 
node to other images, imaginaries, and imaginations, and bodily situations. In this 
sense, instead of doing a programmatic reading of the images according to a preset 
agenda—or according to a clean-cut ontology of the medium, or of the photographer’s 
intention—the emphasis here was on the indeterminacy of the very act of looking, 
experienced on the frictions between a transnational, capitalist media, and a cinematic 
body that receives the experience of movement, without moving. 
If, as Telê Ancona Lopez reminds us, Andrade’s project was to 
“ungeographicize” (desgeograficar) the modern mapping of the nation, the ambivalent 
and conflicting aspect of it lies in the intention of constructing a nation that would at 
once oppose—by the use of indigeneity—and fit into the world mapping. It is 
undermined by the very spatial terms of the comparison it is built upon. If he is “from 
the South” in world geopolitics, in the inverted local spatial hierarchies, being from 
the rich industrialized Brazilian South he inescapably embodies the ideal of 
modernity. The haunting spatial category of the modern, synonymous with that of the 
West, is dislocated by the shifting from spatial gaze to temporal experience: it is not a 
matter of place.109 The need to imagine a different paradigm, temporal rather than 
spatial, made possible by the encounter with different media and their mediation in the 
non-encounters with the national meant, ultimately, the call for the annulment of his 
                                                 
109 On a discussion of idea of “Dislocation of the West,” see Sakai 2001. 
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position as an agent in the operation. An operation that revealed his entanglement in a 
violence that does not conform an event but that is revealed by its repetitive, slow 
procedure—the process of ongoing extraction, expropriation, and colonization—that 
left no space for an easy work of mourning.  
Andrade’s self-obliterating malarial gaze reveals an irresolvable question—the 
horizon of impossibility—that leads to his words in the speech I address in the 
opening of this chapter: “There is always some way to slip into an angle of vision, a 
choice of values, in the blur of a teardrop that swells the unbearable of the world’s 
conditions,” he writes, “and now I reach this consciousness that we have been rather 
out of date [inatual].” (“Movimento Modernista” 253) If to be stuck in an angle of 
vision leads to non-contemporaneity, it also means to be incapable of going past the 
“unbearable of the world” of which the gazer is an active part. The mediated cinematic 
situation, it seems, ultimately leads to a self-awareness in which the will to action 
appears as problematic because it is already premised in the structure of mobility (of 
capital and its bodies) he feels the need to disrupt, calling for imagining a different 
type of movement that could allow for an inactive engagement through just looking. In 
this process however, the melancholic attachment is revealed by the irresolvable loss 
of the subject’s own image as a just agent; and of the image of the nation as a 
discoverable object. 
Looking escapes the either/or relation that Ariella Azoulay describes as the 
usual political thought on the gaze, which proposes “the evacuation of the gaze from 
the realm of action and its consignment to the world of contemplation,” (Civil 
Imagination 67) but it does so not in the way Azoulay suggests. She claims that 
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photography changed the status of the gaze in the political sphere because it brings 
spectatorship to a shared space of free assembly, by “sharing a certain space with other 
people and objects without having to be physically present beside them in the same 
place.” (Civil Imagination 68) She writes:  
This new relation to the visible is in effect a new relation to the visual 
dimension of existence: it consists in a relation to objects, situations, customs, 
images or places that had formerly not been deemed worthy of viewing in their 
own right. It comes into being between people in the plural, in public space 
where the participant does not hold the stable privilege of remaining merely a 
viewer. Anyone preset in shared space is at one and the same time the spectator 
of that which she sees and is exposed in her own right to the gaze of others. 
Such a relation to the visual deviates from the disciplinary gaze, just as it 
deviates from templates of communication that are known in advance. Its 
primary characteristics run parallel with action as Arendt defines it: no one has 
exclusive authorship over her own gaze.  (Civil Imagination 68) 
 
In what Azoulay calls a “practical gaze” enabled by photography, the premise of a 
space in which freedom of assembly can be equally enjoyed is paralleled by the 
freedom of movement that the reproducible image acquires. Subscribing to Arendt’s 
paradigm of action as premised on freedom and plurality of appearance in the public 
space, the image’s entrance in the political sphere, for Azoulay, does not address the 
unequal access to action, but rather rethinks the active role of the spectator. In the end, 
Azoulay’s new political ontology of photography works as a release from bad 
consciousness of the spectator, who can feel, in looking, as if they are acting. “A gaze 
that might parallel “action” in the sense that Arendt bestows upon the term” (Azoulay 
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Civil Imagination 68) is then, the opposite of what appears in Andrade’s theory of the 
visual. For Andrade, it is action that needs to be discarded: the looked-at images and 
subjects want nothing of the viewer, and thus disrupt the very paradigm in which the 
act of seeing is initially invested, since the possibility of equality, as suggests Azoulay, 
is made impossible by the entanglement of the spectator.  
Andrade’s experience of the open temporality of the image shifts the power of 
the camera from photographer to the image: the temporal depth of the photographed 
imposes their presence onto the photographer/spectator. The legitimacy of the 
“legitimate Indian” is set under suspicion within the relation between performance of 
the subject, body of the observer, and the situation of looking at the image—much 
against the discourse embodied by the photographer’s own presence behind the 
camera. This temporal openness of the technical image echoes, and reverts, what 
Vilém Flusser calls its “phenomenological doubt,” flipping over the unequal relation 
between camera, spectator and image: the person behind the camera, or in front of the 
image, is stripped of their sovereignty and set into a state of undecidability about what 
they see, upon the realization that the same object can be seen from an infinite number 
ways. (Flusser 2000, 38) This dispute between closure and openness can be read as a 
crucial aspect in Andrade’s ambivalent tone and conflicting consciousness over his 
own power as the avant-garde photographer-traveler.  
Inaction, here, inverts Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” that Giorgio Agamben 
calls the “pure potentiality” of shattering the paradigm of will, which shows that “Our 
ethical tradition has often sought to avoid the problem of potentiality by reducing it to 
the terms of will and necessity. (...) The categories of the man of the law have no 
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power over Bartleby.” (254) The call for a “zone of indistinction between yes and no,” 
(Agamben 255) in Andrade, opened by the excessive absence represented by the 
technical image—“life out of life,” in his own words—leads to a process of undoing 
the categories of law not as exteriority, but in the realization that he, the avant-garde 
modernist from São Paulo, is also part of the apparatus of the law. In the malarial 
gaze’s intransitive waiting, looking without seeing implies not “preferring not to,” but 
it rather imagines the aporia of to “prefer not to prefer.”  
In the theory of the mediated vision that emerges from this montage reading of 
Mário de Andrade’s photographs and writings, the political dimension of looking 
resides precisely on the possibility of just looking, a negative act that imagines the 
aporetic—and mediated—situation of the cinematic spectatorship of still movement 
devoid of acting, but rather as a state of being acted upon. It entails a self-obliteration 
that, albeit only imagined, produces a process of loss that resides at the center of the 
aporia of a “peripheral” avant-garde, which threw Andrade in a recurrent state of 
melancholic emptiness, between action and inaction, in the realization that the avant-
garde is not the messiah, and neither it is to be saved.  
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